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Editors’ Introduction
Volume 7, issue 1 of Genocide Studies and Prevention continues the discussion of the
state of the ﬁeld of genocide studies that was initiated in volume 6, issue 3. Due to our
(the editors’) keen desire to include as many different voices and perspectives as possi-
ble, we reached out to old hands in the ﬁeld, younger but well established scholars, and
several scholars who recently completed their graduate studies but have already made
an impact on the ﬁeld.
The sequence of the articles over the two issues began with comprehensive treat-
ments and then moved into articles with more speciﬁc focuses, grouped thematically
where applicable. Through the entire sequence across these two issues of GSP, we hope
that readers will gain a solid sense of the history of the ﬁeld and insight into some of
the perdurable issues that have been at the heart of the ﬁeld since its inception and that
they have opportunities to reﬂect on the host of issues and concerns raised by authors
coming from different disciplines (e.g., history, political science, sociology, psychology,
philosophy) with vastly different perspectives. When authors addressed similar, if not
the same, issues and concerns, we placed them back to back. In certain of these cases,
some authors corroborated their colleagues’ takes on a situation, while others took an
almost completely antithetical position. Be that as it may, this concluding set of articles,
just as the ﬁrst set, provides ample food for thought in regard to where the ﬁeld has
been, where it is today, and where it might need to go to become more robust.
Alex Hinton presents an important discussion of the concept of “critical genocide
studies.” He argues that the maturity of the ﬁeld calls for a process of critical analysis of
the approaches prevalent in the ﬁeld such that genocide research becomes self-reﬂective.
Through analyses of many issues in the ﬁeld he illustrates the value of the approach
and, in doing so, advances the critical genocide studies endeavor.
Sheri Rosenberg focuses on advancing the recognition of the concept of “genocide
by attrition” as a contemporary method that has been used, for example, most recently
in Darfur. She argues that this concept offers a way around legal impediments to inter-
vention against genocide and against the view that only direct mass killing in a short
amount of time is true genocide or worthy of intervention. She makes a compelling case
that inclusion of genocide by attrition is both legitimate and crucial.
Jacques Semelin also focuses on the issue of intervention. After considering the var-
ious issues of inclusion and exclusion raised by the efforts to deﬁne genocide in the
UN Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (UNCG)
and beyond, Semelin raises the question of whether the all-too-frequent failures to
intervene against genocide might be better addressed not by continued debate over the
precise meaning of genocide and attempts to stretch it to cover new cases but through
the development of a UN convention on crimes against humanity that would take the
UNCG as a model but have broader applicability. In this light, he discusses the new
International Crimes Against Humanity project. Samuel Totten has addressed this issue
in his article in the ﬁrst part of this special issue but has also raised some serious con-
cerns about such an approach.1
Hannibal Travis’s article is similarly concerned with intervention and prevention,
but it maintains the view that the erosion of the centrality of the concept of genocide
will not lead to better intervention and prevention. On the contrary, he argues that an
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important part of the problem in applying the term “genocide” to the range of processes
it rightly should ﬁt is the tendency of certain scholars to misinterpret the UNCG deﬁni-
tion of genocide in an excessively narrow manner. In the course of his compelling argu-
ment, he offers new insights into central debates in genocide studies, such as whether
destruction must be biological and how “total” intent must be. His article also presents
a critical evaluation of the approach advocated by Semelin.
Evgeny Finkel and Scott Straus’s article, Uğur Ümit Üngör’s article, and Ernesto
Verdeja’s article cohere as a fascinating set of insights into methodologies used by scho-
lars to undertake their research in the ﬁeld of genocide studies. Finkel and Straus argue
that the methodologies used for the study of genocide are often incommensurate with
one another and have failed to be subjected to rigorous tests vis-à-vis their efﬁcacy.
They identify numerous problems that inhibit the scientiﬁc study of genocide and focus
on the failure to research the complexities of apparently uniform genocidal events that
are present at the meso and micro levels and the importance of doing so. Üngör also
sees as crucial the move away from exclusively macro-level analyses to meso- and
micro-level analyses, with the need for greater attention paid to the complex interrela-
tions between the levels that are important features of any genocidal process. Deftly
walking the narrow region just this side of relativism, Üngör looks at other methodolog-
ical issues as well, including the imposition of crude moralism (uncomplicated and re-
ductive notions of “good” and “evil,” for instance) and the impact of crude identity
politics on genocide scholarship. Verdeja continues these poweful examinations of
research methods to ask, how can one study genocide by studying only genocide? For
him, an extreme limitation of the ﬁeld in explaining why genocides occur—and thus
how they can be prevented—is that comparative work is almost always among cases of
genocide rather than between cases of genocide and cases in which similar situations of
tension and violence did not result in genocide. He calls for situating genocide studies
within the broader subject area of political violence to foster this necessary contrastive
approach.
Elisa von Joeden-Forgey continues her groundbreaking work in the ﬁeld with an
overarching analysis of the importance of gender in understanding genocide. She de-
monstrates the centrality of gender relations in perpetrators’ genocidal methods, which
ultimately target the life force of the victim group in an effort to destroy it. She illus-
trates the signiﬁcant implications of her concept of “life force atrocities” not only for a
scholarly study of genocide but also for prevention and intervention and the defeat of
denial. As she points out, life force atrocities often begin occurring long before full-
blown mass killing and yet reveal perpetrators’ intent to destroy the targeted group;
attention to them provides early warning as well as a response to deniers.
Israel Charny, one of the founders of the ﬁeld, offers both an account of the ﬁeld’s
early emergence and history and an analysis of numerous issues that he considers cru-
cial for examination today. His article focuses on the core issues of intervention and
prevention. In this regard, he reintroduces some of his and others’ important work on
early warning systems and prevention organizations.
As some of the previous authors, Henry Theriault offers critical analyses of areas of
concern in the ﬁeld, including academic activism and gender violence. Like Totten and
Charny, his ultimate focus is on prevention, but unlike Totten and Charny and consis-
tent in some respects with other authors inﬂuenced by anti- and postcolonial theory,
Theriault argues that genocide is deeply entrenched in the political and social institutions
2 Theriault and Totten
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and practices that have emerged over the past half millennium. He concludes that only
through a deep reparative reworking of these institutions and practices can the global
order become less genocidal.
In closing, we wish to give special thanks to the exceptional Journals crew at the
University of Toronto Press, in particular Sylvia Hunter, Editorial Manager, Sheree Pell,
Editorial Coordinator, and Antonia Pop, Production Coordinator. Without their skillful
and committed support, patience, and keen editorial work, the large and complex set
of articles spanning this and the previous issue would never have reached their ﬁnal
form as an important joint contribution to the study of genocide and broader issues of
violence and domination.
Henry Theriault and Samuel Totten
GSP Co-editors
Note
1. Samuel Totten, “The State and Future of Genocide Studies and Prevention: An Overview and Analysis
of Some Key Issues,” Genocide Studies and Prevention 6,3 (2011): 211–30, http://dx.doi.org/10.3138/
gsp.6.3.211.
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Critical Genocide Studies
Alexander Laban Hinton1
Rutgers University
Over the last two decades, the interdisciplinary ﬁeld of genocide studies has dramatically expanded
and matured. No longer in the shadow of Holocaust studies, it is now the primary subject of journals,
textbooks, encyclopedias, readers, handbooks, special journal issues, bibliographies, workshops, semi-
nars, conference, Web sites, research centers, government agencies, non-governmental organizations,
international organizations, and a unit at the United Nations. If not yet fully theorized, the discipline
is characterized by a number of debates and approaches. As the outlines of the ﬁeld emerge more
clearly, the time is right to engage in critical reﬂections about the state of the ﬁeld, or what might be
called critical genocide studies. The goal is not to be critical in a negative sense but to consider, even
as a canon becomes ensconced, what is said and unsaid, who has voice and who is silenced, and how
such questions may be linked to issues of power and knowledge. It is, in other words, a call for critical
thinking about the ﬁeld of genocide studies itself, exploring our presuppositions, decentering our
biases, and throwing light on blind spots in the hope of further enriching this dynamic ﬁeld.
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Over the last two decades, the interdisciplinary ﬁeld of genocide studies has dramati-
cally expanded and matured. Genocide studies no longer stands in the shadow of Holo-
caust studies. It is now the primary subject of journals, textbooks, encyclopedias,
readers, handbooks, special journal issues, bibliographies, workshops, seminars, confer-
ence, Web sites, research centers, government agencies, non-governmental organiza-
tions, international organizations, and a unit in the United Nations. If not yet fully
theorized, the discipline is characterized by a number of debates and approaches.
As the outlines of the ﬁeld emerge more clearly, the time is right to engage in criti-
cal reﬂections about the state of the ﬁeld, or what might be called critical genocide stu-
dies. The goal is not to be critical in a negative sense but to consider, even as a canon
becomes ensconced, what is said and unsaid, who has voice and who is silenced, and
how such questions may be linked to issues of power and knowledge. It is, in other
words, a call for critical thinking about the ﬁeld of genocide studies itself, exploring our
presuppositions, decentering our biases, and throwing light on blind spots in the hope
of further enriching this dynamic ﬁeld.
My use of the term “critical genocide studies” overlaps in many ways with that of
A. Dirk Moses,2 whose important historiography of genocide studies reveals much about
the state of the ﬁeld even if our emphases differ somewhat—mine is more concerned
with the decentering associated with Derridian deconstruction and a Foucaultian archeol-
ogy of knowledge, and his is more concerned with critical theory in the tradition of the
Frankfurt School and recent work on empire and world systems theory.3 A handful of
other scholars, such as Anton Weiss-Wendt, Donald Bloxham, Daniel Feierstein, Thomas
Cushman, Adam Jones, Mark Levene, Jens Meierhenrich, and Dan Stone, have also pub-
lished works that are partly or largely in the spirit of a critical genocide studies without
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using this name. So it seems that perhaps a threshold has been reached where we can
speak of a critical genocide studies. My thoughts in this necessarily brief article will be
selective, pointing out some of the domains and directions of a critical genocide studies.
Before beginning, I should note that when people sometimes hear a term such as
“deconstruction” or “critical” they dismiss it as “postmodern,” “nihilistic,” or “relativistic.”
All of these terms are complex and have their distinct genealogies. My view is that decon-
struction is a method of decentering and critique, and such critique, in the sense of criti-
cal inquiry, is at the heart of the academic enterprise and should be front and center in
the ﬁeld of genocide studies. Such reﬂection will only make the ﬁeld stronger and richer.
My perspective is no doubt linked to my own engagement with genocide studies as
I approached it from anthropology, a discipline that has had little voice in the ﬁeld
despite offering important insights into genocide. No doubt this is part of the reason
why a critical genocide studies perspective has been a central focus of the Rutgers Cen-
ter for the Study of Genocide, Conﬂict Resolution, and Human Rights, even as we have
been programming genocide prevention, a topic that is often viewed in opposition to or
at least in tension with academic genocide studies, let alone critical genocide studies.
My own view is that the study of genocide prevention has much to gain from critical
genocide studies (and vice versa), but the perceived opposition of academic genocide
studies and applied genocide prevention speaks to the scholar/activist divide that is part
of our origin myth.
The Origin Myth
Anthropologists like to examine origin myths, and I am no exception. Ethnicity, we tell
our students, is a social category linking a group of people who perceive themselves to
share ancestry and identity markers (language, food, dress, religion, and so forth). The
sense of ancestry is frequently linked to an origin story, which helps provide a sense of
solidarity and belonging as well as a sense of difference from other ethnic groups. Eth-
nic categories are ﬂuid and multiple; thus a person might identify him- or herself (or be
identiﬁed) as Chinese, Han, Cantonese, Chinese-American, or American depending on
time and place. I will return to this point later.
Many other sorts of groups are also bound by an origin myth, which provides them
with a sense of solidarity, belonging, and identity. This includes academic disciplines. In
North American anthropology, for example, Franz Boas is venerated as the father of the
discipline and is known, among other things, for reﬁning the anthropological concept
of culture and method of participant observation and for challenging the notion of bio-
logical race. Introductory anthropology students often hear stories about his exploits
and efforts to demonstrate that race is a social construction, an endeavor that has con-
tinued in North American anthropology into the present.
Within genocide studies, Raphael Lemkin is even more revered as the ﬁeld’s found-
ing father.4 Like Boas, he is remembered for his conceptual work (coining and deﬁning
the term “genocide” and writing a history of genocide), life history (including his escape
from Poland as World War II began and centering on his life-long quest to criminalize
the destruction of human groups), and advocacy (working tirelessly for the passage and
ratiﬁcation of the United Nations Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of
the Crime of Genocide (UNCG), of which he referred to himself as “the founder”). In
many respects, he has come to be viewed as the prototypical genocide scholar: academ-
ically informed yet politically committed to this pressing social issue, an orientation
and a tension that continue to the present. Indeed, the tension between scholarship and
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activism is the Janus face of genocide studies, one that continues to inspire and divide
scholars, as recent controversies over resolutions and the proposed merger of two aca-
demic associations illustrate.5 One research direction for a critical genocide studies is to
examine the origins of this Janus face, which has strong roots in modernity, Enlighten-
ment thought, the anti-slavery movement, humanitarianism, and human rights.
The genocide scholar-activist prototype is evident in Pioneers of Genocide Studies,6
an important volume of autobiographical essays written by many of the “ﬁrst genera-
tion” of scholars who helped forge the ﬁeld of genocide studies in the late 1970s and
early 1980s. It also includes an abbreviated version of Raphael Lemkin’s unpublished
autobiography, “Totally Unofﬁcial Man.” Many of the Pioneers essays are striking for
their resonance with the Lemkin narrative of ﬁnding one’s calling and becoming pas-
sionately engaged in genocide studies and prevention. While this is no doubt partly the
result of the framing questions that were posed to the contributors—the ﬁrst two ques-
tions were concerned with what “led” the author to study genocide and how genocide
became “an imperative for you”7—it seems likely that they, like many other genocide
scholars today, see some of Lemkin’s passion in themselves.
Pioneers makes a valuable contribution by chronicling the origins and institutiona-
lization of genocide studies and providing an understanding of some of the varied rea-
sons that scholars entered the ﬁeld. Many had a direct connection to genocide through
the Holocaust or Armenian Genocide; indeed, a few contributors, like Lemkin, escaped
from or even survived Nazi occupation.8 Others came to the ﬁeld more indirectly
through the experience of the 1960s, the civil rights movements, and human rights
activism. By the early 1980s, several landmark texts began to appear, including Leo Ku-
per’s Genocide: Its Political Uses in the Twentieth Century.9 The ﬁrst conferences on
genocide began to be held, and an incipient network of scholars was being formed, one
that would lead to the 1995 creation of the Association of Genocide Scholars, now the
International Association of Genocide Scholars (IAGS). The essays in Pioneers are illus-
trative of genocide studies in others ways, exemplifying the ﬁeld’s interdisciplinarity
and initial concern with a given set of twentieth-century cases, in particular the Arme-
nian Genocide and the Holocaust with other mentions of cases such as Biafra and the
Cambodian Genocide.
Genocide Studies and the Holocaust
Pioneers also raises a question: Why did genocide studies begin to emerge in the late
1970s? Why not earlier? Or even in the immediate aftermath of the passage of the
UNCG as accusations of genocide began to ﬂy soon thereafter? Raphael Lemkin himself
sought to indict the Soviet Union for committing genocide during the break-up of the
Baltics by kidnapping Jewish children and “working Jews to death in drainage projects”
in Romania.10
While Cold War concerns and politics were involved, this question points toward
the other key origin of genocide studies: the Holocaust, an event that shadows the disci-
pline, always there even if sometimes in the background or taken for granted. The Lem-
kin origin story is a perfect example. While Lemkin’s Axis Rule in Occupied Europe11
focuses on the Holocaust and indeed contains many important legal documents, it is
his chapter 4, “Genocide,” that gets all the attention in genocide studies. Perhaps the
Holocaust would have ﬁgured more prominently in this origin story if Lemkin’s attempt
to push genocide to the forefront of the charges at the Nuremberg trials had been suc-
cessful. As it was, he left Nuremberg early and devoted his efforts to getting genocide
6 Hinton
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codiﬁed in international law. The promulgation of the UNCG, not the Holocaust, is fre-
quently viewed as the landmark moment in the genealogy of genocide studies.
This narrative elides the fact that, without the Nazis’ attempted annihilation of
European Jews and other groups, Lemkin’s word might never have made it into the dic-
tionary and the ﬁeld of genocide studies might not exist, Lemkin might have been a for-
gotten man, and we might very well be talking about “extermination” and “crimes
against humanity” instead of genocide. In other words, no Holocaust (as the Nazi atroci-
ties were later constituted), no Lemkin, no UNCG, no genocide studies. For these and
other reasons, the Nazis’ attempted destruction of the Jews and other groups clearly
stands as a watershed event in the twentieth century, one that helped catalyze the human
rights regime and led to the emergence of genocide studies.
The origins of genocide studies are also closely tied to another discipline that
emerged from the ruins of the Holocaust: Holocaust studies. Even this ﬁeld only be-
gan to emerge after the 1960s Eichmann and Auschwitz trials, the publication of
Arendt’s Eichmann in Jerusalem, the 1967 Arab-Israeli War, and increasing efforts at
memorialization.12
As it grew, Holocaust studies came to be concerned with its own set of issues, in-
cluding profound questions about uniqueness and representation. In contrast to geno-
cide studies, which has a social science emphasis that I will discuss below, Holocaust
studies has been more often linked to the humanities. As Pioneers illustrates, a number
of ﬁrst-generation genocide scholars split off from Holocaust studies because of their
commitment to comparison, which remains a central theme in genocide studies and
is referred to as comparative genocide studies.13 Indeed, the discipline’s predominant
social science/positivistic orientation is frequently concerned with discerning common-
alities and general principles about the phenomenon of genocide, a bias that is in keep-
ing with a normative commitment to prevention. (This theme runs through Holocaust
literature to a lesser extent, in part because of the uniqueness issue which orients
research toward a single past event.) The ﬁeld’s ﬁrst introductory text, Jones’s Genocide:
A Comprehensive Introduction,14 embodies this disciplinary epistemology as the bulk of
the chapters focus on case studies and social scientiﬁc ﬁndings, even as it seeks to de-
center some of the ﬁeld’s biases.
Disciplinary Orientations, Blind Spots, and Biases
The different emphases of Holocaust studies provide one vantage through which to
think critically about and discover new approaches to genocide studies. Indeed, some of
the more interesting contemporary work in genocide studies is being done by scholars,
in particular historians, such as Bloxham, Jacques Semelin, Moses, and Stone, who
came to genocide studies from an initial engagement with Holocaust studies. Their
work clearly ﬁts into the rapidly emerging sub-discipline of critical genocide studies. As
genocide studies has matured and the inﬂuence of the uniqueness argument has waned
within Holocaust studies, genocide studies has, in turn, started to enter into the debates
within Holocaust studies. The title of Bloxham’s recent book, The Final Solution: A
Genocide,15 highlights this point.
More broadly, a critical genocide studies would be concerned with exploring other
ﬁelds—to name a few, indigenous studies, philosophy, cultural studies, visual and liter-
ary arts, semiotics, and critical theory—that have important insights to bring to bear on
genocide even as they ask us to rethink the existing assumptions of the ﬁeld. To be sure,
there are some scholars from such disciplines who are active in the ﬁeld. However, their
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voices, as well as the larger insights that may be gleaned from their home disciplines,
tend to be more muted than historical and social scientiﬁc scholarship in the ﬁeld.
Yet another fertile direction for research in critical genocide studies comes from
scholars working outside of the North American and European regions in which geno-
cide studies has emerged. One illustration of this point is Feierstein’s work as well as
that of other Latin American scholars who are questioning the boundaries of genocide
studies from an alternative regional and Spanish-language perspective.16 Such scholar-
ship helps genocide studies interrogate its possible ethnocentric assumptions and dis-
cover new ways to envision the ﬁeld.
The Anthropology of Genocide
My own engagement with genocide studies, which began in the early 1990s when I
began conducting research on the Cambodian Genocide as a graduate student and at-
tending IAGS meetings, has in a sense followed along these lines in terms of approach-
ing the ﬁeld from an outside perspective. When I attended my ﬁrst IAGS meeting in
1995 I was surprised to ﬁnd only one or two other anthropologists in attendance (Rob-
ert Hitchcock and Pamela Ballinger, if I recall correctly). Genocide studies was also
barely on the radar in anthropology, despite the important work that had been done on
indigenous peoples.17 Likewise, some of the relevant concerns and insights of anthro-
pology were completely outside the orbit of genocide studies.
The cultural patterning of violence provides one illustration of this point. Because
of their long-standing immersion in and in-depth understanding of given societies,
anthropologists are ideally positioned to provide an experience-based perspective on
how genocides unfold, how they are understood by both elite and lower-level actors,
and how people deal with the experience and aftermaths of genocide. Thus, on the one
hand, an anthropological perspective complicates easy assumptions about state ideology
and agency/motivation. To understand motivation and process, then, one needs to
grasp the local understandings that mediate social practices. This can be seen in a vari-
ety of domains, ranging from the elite’s deliberations to the conﬁnes of the torture
chamber. The rigid model of state ideology–perpetrator motivation breaks down from
this perspective, refocusing our attention on process and context. I have sought to illus-
trate this point in relationship to the Cambodian Genocide even as a small but grow-
ing scholarship on genocide has emerged within anthropology in part because of the
genocides in Bosnia and Rwanda.18
On the other hand, an anthropological perspective suggests that we need to broaden
our concerns about the aftermaths of genocide. Usually, this issue is largely glossed over
with the assumption—yet again linked to the Janus face of genocide studies—that pre-
vention is the primary normative goal. This is certainly a critical and admirable aim.
However, the ﬁxation on prevention may divert our attention away from another critical
issue: how people deal with the experience and aftermaths of genocide.
Perusing through the key references on genocide uncovers little concern with this
issue. Aftermaths usually mean a concern with denial and legal redress. (Holocaust stu-
dies provides another interesting foil in this regard as the ﬁeld has been deeply concerned
with issues of trauma and memory.) Given their on-the-ground interactions with perpe-
trators and victims, anthropologists have been able to provide a new way of looking at is-
sues of experience, coping, ritual, and memory. There is even a growing literature within
anthropology that seeks to explore the local understandings and social practices that
undergird the human rights regime, including transitional justice mechanisms such as
8 Hinton
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tribunals.19 All of this is not to say that we should ignore the issue of prevention, but
rather that we should instead cast our gaze on a wider range of aftermaths. Moreover,
prevention is also at stake here since past genocide, including issues of local experience,
coping, and memory, is one of the possible primes for future genocide.20
Deﬁnition
An anthropological perspective also raises important questions about the issue of deﬁni-
tion, one of the central concerns of genocide studies. First there is the semantic ques-
tion: What does “genocide” mean in different societies where genocide is taking or has
taken place? For the term genocide emerged at a given moment in time and in a partic-
ular context. What do we miss when we label mass violence “genocide” without seeking
to ask what such violence means in given context? Jones’s introductory text touches on
this point, listing different terms.21 But to truly understand genocide, we need to grap-
ple with local glosses, which may inﬂect our analysis in new directions and toward pre-
viously unrecognized dynamics and meanings. This is all the more critical after the fact,
given the correlation between memory and genocide.
A second and related question also emerges: What are the categories that victims
and perpetrators use to label and understand one another? This question, with which
scholars had been grappling on an academic level since the early 1980s, gained legal
salience in the 1990s with the establishment of the International Criminal Tribunals for
the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY) and for Rwanda (ICTR) and the ensuing difﬁculties of
ﬁtting terms such as “Hutu” and “Tutsi” into the rigid categories of the UNCG. From
an anthropological perspective, the reiﬁcation of race, ethnicity, religion, and nationality
seems both ethnocentric and misleading. To argue that race is immutable, a key trope
of debate when the UNCG was being promulgated (and one that was made when
notions of biological race still predominated), is to implicitly reassert an essentialized
conception of race that has been used by perpetrator regimes and has long since been
shown by people like Boas to be a social myth. Race is a social construction and,
like ethnicity, religion, and nationality, is clearly, and often highly, mutable. Perhaps
one of the more informative illustrations of this point is the not-so-distant assertion
that the Irish were a race of savages. Or one can travel to a country like Brazil, where
racial categories have very different valences. More disturbingly, the UNCG has created
a set of privileged protected groups while leaving others unprotected and analytically
invisible.
By starting with contextualized, as opposed to rigid, pre-existing socio-legal cate-
gories, a critical genocide studies might help us understand how a wide variety of identi-
ties, including non-Western ones, crystallize (i.e., shift from a more ﬂuid state to one
that, at a given moment in time, becomes less ﬂuid, or what I have elsewhere called the
“crystallization of difference”22) in a variety of genocidal situations. From this perspec-
tive, the UNCG deﬁnition23 constitutes a historical and social construction that, while
having important legal implications, should have been more broadly deﬁned to include
the destruction of any sort of group as deﬁned by the protagonists in genocide. Some
scholars have usefully proposed something along these lines in terms of deﬁnition,24
but scholarly deﬁnitions of genocide tend to be clunky and awkward. There are
strengths and weaknesses to a more or less detailed deﬁnition.
My own view is that there is also much to be said for deﬁnitions which accord
with the principle of economy that less is more and that open rather than foreclose
analysis. While recognizing that all deﬁnitions have weaknesses, we might simply deﬁne
Critical Genocide Studies 9
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genocide as the more or less coordinated attempt to destroy a dehumanized and ex-
cluded group of people because of who they are.
Viewing genocide as “more or less coordinated” allows for the inclusion of cases
that range from highly planned, state-sponsored genocides to those that are more hap-
hazard and diffusely carried out. In the latter case, the state’s role might have more to do
with permissibility than with intent (e.g., not forbidding or doing nothing about acts of
genocide that are carried out by armed groups on the ground or allowing victim groups
to live under conditions of life that lead to their destruction, as in the case of many
Native American genocides). The destruction of a group may be in whole or in part.
Such a deﬁnition has signiﬁcant implications, opening the door to cultural geno-
cide, genocide committed by non-state agents, genocide by neglect, and genocide of
political, economic, social, and other groups as constituted in speciﬁc historical and cul-
tural contexts. It also allows us to escape the rash of “-cides,” such as “politicide,” which
have been proposed to overcome the gaps in the UNCG. We need, in other words, to
explore a much wider range of cases, including those in which there was a more hap-
hazard attempt to destroy a group or a group was destroyed over time by more indirect
means, including structural ones,25 or by neglect and indifference. This deﬁnition is
more in the spirit of Israel Charny’s too-often-dismissed application of the term geno-
cide to almost any targeted civilian group. However, it goes one step further by opening
up the possibility that non-civilian groups might be the target of genocide (e.g., the at-
tempted mutual destruction of two highly armed protagonists in the course of war).
In the end, we might view the above deﬁnition as a methodological deﬁnition,
although of course all deﬁnitions have methodological implications. By this I am sug-
gesting that genocide scholars deploy a broad deﬁnition for the purposes of analysis,
one that allows us to consider the widest range of cases. Whatever bottom-line deﬁni-
tion of genocide a scholar selects in the end, a methodological deﬁnition would contrib-
ute to his or her research by providing additional case material, including (for those
who adhere to a more narrow deﬁnition) information on why genocide does not take
place in certain situations, an area of study that Kuper so nicely illustrated but that has
never been taken up in a signiﬁcant way by scholars in the ﬁeld. A critical genocide stu-
dies invites us to take such chances by exploring new areas that have been cordoned off
by prevailing assumptions, biases, and gate-keeping maneuvers.
For example, one of the critiques of such a broad deﬁnition invokes what might
be called the dilution metaphor. If we open the door to a very broad array of cases, the
argument goes, we “dilute” the meaning and power of the term. Dilution is an interest-
ing term, conjuring up the image of a pure substance being adulterated by an implicitly
contaminating extraneous element (it is, ironically, the sort of metaphor that is often
linked to genocide). But who determines what is extraneous? The dilution trope is a
gate-keeper notion that asserts case-study primacy and relevance on the basis of embo-
died metaphor, not critical analysis. There is no a priori reason why genocide should
encompass a smaller set of cases. Indeed, the ﬁeld of genocide studies might experience
enormous growth and vitality by opening the doors to a much broader range of cases.
Recent scholarship in critical genocide studies has moved in this direction, seeking to
explore what would happen if genocide were to encompass a much broader range of
cases, including the many forgotten genocides.26
Even if it stayed in the background, the Holocaust very much put its imprint on
the UNCG and many of the subsequent scholarly deﬁnitions that emphasize intent,
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particularly with regard to the role of the state. And perhaps we have all missed much
by focusing so much on the classic deﬁnition. Recent research in cognitive science, for
example, has shown that categorical understanding is very much tied to metaphor, me-
tonymy, and prototype effects.27 In other words, people think about phenomena like
genocide through metaphor, metonymy, and prototypes. While this potential shift in
the way in which we think about deﬁnition and genocide could be an article in and of
itself, I want here just to note the somewhat obvious point that the Holocaust has long
served as the prototype of genocide and Auschwitz as one of its key metonyms. What
this means is that in the back of our minds many, if not most, of us have the Holocaust
prototype in mind when discoursing about genocide.
The uniqueness debate suggests this bias, but we ﬁnd it in many contexts, ranging
from issues of deﬁnition to canonization. The Holocaust is also often the case-study
exemplar that implicitly stands in danger of categorical dilution through association
with other, less exemplary cases. The uniqueness debate provides another manifestation
of this point. The obvious salience of the Holocaust notwithstanding, there are other
possible prototypes and exemplars, including the massive destruction of largely forgot-
ten peoples, such as the Taíno of Hispaniola during the conquest and colonization of
the New World or the large number of political groups that perished under Stalin or in
Maoist China. What if these cases were the starting points of genocide studies? A critical
genocide studies asks us to consider what such a rethinking of the concept of genocide
might entail.
A related decentering comes from a reconsideration of Lemkin’s work. While still
heavily inﬂuenced by the Holocaust prototype, Lemkin’s conception had a broad histori-
cal purview and analytical focus on the different ways in which group life is destroyed,
which he viewed as potentially encompassing not only physical but also biological, cul-
tural, and political destruction carried out by state and non-state actors. Over the last
decade there has been a growing body of work that conceptualizes genocide from an
often Lemkinian perspective, with its long historical purview, interest in antiquity and
colonialism, and understanding that genocide might unfold over the course of long peri-
ods of time (as opposed to the short duration of most of the case studies on which geno-
cide studies tends to focus) and through a variety of mechanisms (again, beyond the
usual focus on state-sponsored mass murder), including cultural destruction. Accord-
ingly, scholars have begun to consider what were largely forgotten genocides by increas-
ingly focusing on issues such as colonialism, conquest, settler societies, and modernity.28
This is the work of a critical genocide studies, but there remains much more to do as
such cases tend to be relegated to the margins of the genocide studies canon.
Why have we ignored these cases? The reasons are manifold and complex. The
Holocaust prototype is one as it directs our attention to a certain manifestation of the
genocidal process, foregrounding state and ideology. Perceived relevance might be
another factor as scholars have witnessed a number of cases of genocide take place dur-
ing their lifetime (even if we have also ignored other contemporary cases, such as the
plight of indigenous peoples). There is also more information available about many of
these cases, making it easier to research and write about them. As disciplinary structures
of knowledge become ensconced, habit and tradition, as well as the interests that sustain
them, also become factors in directing our attention to certain cases.
Metanarratives of progress and civilization might also structure our thinking, direct-
ing our gaze to genocidal despots (Hitler, Pol Pot, Milošević, al-Bashir) and authoritarian
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regimes. The language of the UNCG codiﬁes this language, stating that genocide is
“condemned by the civilized world”29 (Lemkin himself frequently used this register).
Such language implies that genocide is only carried out by barbarians and savages, an
understanding condensed by symbols such as the shrunken head that was found at the
Buchenwald camp and exhibited at Nuremberg. While genocide is brutal and to be con-
demned, it is also something that is closely intertwined with modernity and even
democracy.30 The discipline’s long-standing neglect of Native Americans, slavery, and
indigenous peoples illustrates this point.31
A critical genocide studies asks us to consider why scholars have looked away from
such issues. One reason may well be a “liberal” tendency32 among genocide scholars to
seek “progress” and, as the UNCG states, “to liberate mankind from such an odious
scourge.”33 We return to the Janus face of the discipline. A critical genocide studies
does not demand that we give up this objective but instead that we think critically about
its genealogy/framings and our potential conceptual biases and thereby ﬁnd new ways
to approach the problem. For example, how does the image of the “savage”/“barbaric”
Other we construct in our analyses also construct, through inversion, an image of us as
modern, developed, and civilized? What do we miss by such identiﬁcations? One
answer is that our gaze might too easily be directed away from the relationship between
genocide and modernity and toward explanations that smack of ethnic primordialism,
stage theory (an implied progression from a state of savagery to civilization), atavism
(the Nazis as a throwback), or biological/psychological reductionism (our “barbaric” or
“sadistic” “nature”—think of Lord of the Flies and Psycho34).
Canonization
Such decenterings ask us to think critically about the canons that have emerged in geno-
cide studies. To date there has been a strong bias toward a genocide studies canon,
which is approximated in Figure 1.
With certain exceptions, the bulk of scholarship in the ﬁeld of genocide studies,
especially from the 1980s through the 1990s, has focused on the Twentieth-Century
Core, with the Holocaust both in the foreground and in the background in the ways dis-
cussed above. Like all canons, there has been ﬂuidity within the canon as the status of
some groups has changed (e.g., there is the beginning of a shift in the status of Ottoman
Assyrian and Greek Genocides from Forgotten Genocides to the Periphery or perhaps
even Second Circle).
The model of the genocide studies canon is, of course, an ideal type, but it gestures
toward some of the disciplinary biases that have emerged in the ﬁeld. For example,
while cutting against the grain in many ways and discussing the Periphery or even For-
gotten Genocides at times, Jones’s introductory text still gives primacy to the Twentieth-
Century Core, likely because this is what people usually teach about.35 A similar state-
ment could be made about readers and edited volumes in the ﬁeld.36 A critical genocide
studies asks us all to consider how such biases have shaped our own research and teach-
ing and, though decentering, to re-envision our ﬁeld of study.
As this discussion suggests, issues of deﬁnition and canonization are not value-
neutral but are also linked to issues of power and knowledge. Why, we must ask, is it
that certain cases of genocide are forgotten? The literature on denial (which has its own
Janus face of ensuring historical accuracy about horrible events while potentially dimin-
ishing debate) has grappled with this question. But we also need to consider why we
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focus on certain cases and topics and what sorts of inclusions and exclusions ensue.
What is left invisible to us and what can we do to cast light on what has formerly been
opaque? Given the inevitable politicization of our topic, how might we be inﬂuenced
by given interests and agendas? Why, we need to ask, are certain cases forgotten, re-
membered, recognized, or even intentionally hidden or written out of history? For our
discipline to ﬂourish, we need to consider a wide range of such questions, to decenter
and rethink our taken-for-granted assumptions and biases, to seek out new ways to
approach the ﬁeld, and to engage in critical genocide studies.
Alexander Hinton is Director of the Center for the Study of Genocide, Conﬂict Resolution, and Human
Rights and Professor of Anthropology at Rutgers University. He has authored the award-winning Why
Did They Kill? Cambodia in the Shadow of Genocide (University of California Press, 2005) and edited or co-
edited six collections. He is currently President of the International Association of Genocide Scholars
(2011–2013) and a Member of the Institute for Advanced Study, Princeton (2011–2012).
Prototype Holocaust
The Triad Holocaust
Armenian Genocide
Rwanda
Twentieth-Century Core Holocaust
Armenians
Cambodia
Rwanda
Bosnia
Darfur (twenty-ﬁrst century)
Indigenous peoples (taken as a whole)
The Second Circle East Pakistan
Kurdish case
Guatemala
Herero/Nimibian
Kosovo
Carthage
Settler genocides
Ukrainian/Soviet
The Periphery Indonesia
Argentina
Speciﬁc cases of indigenous peoples
Genocides of antiquity
Assyrian and Greek cases
East Timor
Burundi
Maoist China
Democratic Republic of the Congo
Forgotten Genocides Multitude of more or less invisible/hidden/forgotten cases
Figure 1: The genocide studies canon
Critical Genocide Studies 13
© 2012 Genocide Studies and Prevention 7, no. 1 doi:10.3138/gsp.7.1.4
Notes
1. I would like to thank Nicole Cooley, Samuel Totten, Henry Theriault, Joyce Apsel, Antonia Pop, and
Dirk Moses for their comments and suggestions on this article.
2. A. Dirk Moses, “Toward a Theory of Critical Genocide Studies,” Online Encyclopedia of Mass Violence,
18 Apr 2008, http://massviolence.org/Toward-a-Theory-of-Critical-Genocide-Studies (accessed 5 Jul
2011.
3. See A. Dirk Moses, “Conceptual Blockages and Deﬁnitional Dilemmas in the ‘Racial Century’: Geno-
cides of Indigenous Peoples and the Holocaust,” Patterns of Prejudice 36,4 (2002): 7–36; A. Dirk Moses,
“Raphael Lemkin, Culture, and the Concept of Genocide,” in The Oxford Handbook of Genocide Studies,
ed. Donald Bloxham and A. Dirk Moses (New York: Oxford UP, 2010), 19–41; A. Dirk Moses and Do-
nald Bloxham, “Genocide and Modernity,” in The Historiography of Genocide, ed. Dan Stone (Hound-
mills: Palgrave MacMillan, 2008), 156–93.
4. The focus on Lemkin has increased dramatically over the last decade, in part because of the publication
of Samantha Power’s best-selling A Problem from Hell: America and the Age of Genocide (New York:
Basic Books, 2002) (Joyce Apsel [Liberal Studies, New York University], in discussion with the author,
25 Feb 2012) and a strand of critical genocide studies that uses Lemkin’s historical work to reconsider
the ﬁeld’s traditional emphases. See, e.g., Jüergen Zimmerer and Dominik Schaller, eds., The Origins of
Genocide: Raphael Lemkin as a Historian of Mass Violence (London: Routledge, 2009).
5. See, e.g., Gal Beckerman, “Top Genocide Scholars Battle over How to Characterize Israel’s Actions,” For-
ward: The Jewish Daily, 16 Feb 2011, http://www.forward.com/articles/135484/ (accessed 21 Feb 2011).
6. Samuel Totten and Steven Leonard Jacobs, eds., Pioneers of Genocide Studies (New Brunswick, NJ:
Transaction, 2002).
7. Samuel Totten and Steven Leonard Jacobs, “Introduction,” in Totten and Jacobs, Pioneers, xiv. See also
A. Dirk Moses, “The Field of Genocide Studies,” in Genocide: Critical Concepts in Historical Studies, ed.
A. Dirk Moses (Abingdon: Routledge, 2010), 1–23.
8. See Henry R. Huttenbach, “Vita Felix, Via Dolorosa: An Academic Journey Towards Genocide,” in Tot-
ten and Jacobs, Pioneers, 47–58; Robert Melson, “My Journey in the Study of Genocide,” in Totten and
Jacobs, Pioneers, 139–51; Ervin Staub, “The Roots and Prevention of Genocide and Other Collective
Violence: A Life’s Work Shaped by a Child’s Experience,” in Totten and Jacobs, Pioneers, 479–504.
9. Leo Kuper, Genocide: Its Political Use in the Twentieth Century (New Haven: Yale UP, 1982). See also
Israel W. Charny, How Can We Commit the Unthinkable? Genocide, The Human Cancer (Boulder, CO:
Westview, 1982); Irving L. Horowitz, Taking Lives: Genocide and State Power, rev. ed. (New Brunswick, NJ:
Transaction, 2002); Jack Nusan Porter, Genocide and Human Rights: A Global Anthology (Washington,
DC: UP of America, 1982).
10. “U.N. Genocide Action Sought on Red Bloc,” The Washington Post, M3, 18 Jan 1953.
11. Raphael Lemkin, Axis Rule in Occupied Europe: Laws of Occupation, Analysis of Government, Proposals
for Redress (Washington: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, Division of International Law,
1944).
12. Daniel Levy and Natan Sznaider, The Holocaust and Memory in the Global Age (Philadelphia: Temple
UP, 2006). See also A. Dirk Moses, “The Holocaust and Genocide,” in The Historiography of the Holo-
caust, ed. Dan Stone (Houndmills: Palgrave MacMillan, 2004), 533–55.
13. See Scott Straus, “Second-Generation Comparative Research on Genocide,” World Politics 59 (2007):
476–501.
14. Adam Jones, Genocide: A Comprehensive Introduction, 2nd ed. (New York: Routledge, 2011).
15. Donald Bloxham, The Final Solution: A Genocide (New York: Oxford UP, 2009). See also the recent
exchange on Bloxham’s book: Jürgen Matthäus, Martin Shaw, Omer Bartov, Doris Bergen, and Donald
Bloxham, review forum of The Final Solution, Journal of Genocide Research 13,1–2 (2011): 107–52.
16. See, for example, Marzcia Esparza, Henry R. Huttenbach, and Daniel Feierstein, eds., State Violence and
Genocide in Latin America: The Cold War Years (New York: Routledge, 2009); Daniel Feierstein, El Gen-
ocidio como Practica Social: Entre el Nazisomo y la Experienca Argentina (Tlalpan, Mexico: Fondo de
Cultura Economica, 2008); and issues of Revista de Estudios sobre Genocidio.
17. See Alexander Laban Hinton, ed., Annihilating Difference: The Anthropology of Genocide (Berkeley: U of
California P, 2002).
18. Alexander Laban Hinton,Why Did They Kill? Cambodia in the Shadow of Genocide (Berkeley: U of Cali-
fornia P, 2005); Hinton, Annihilating Difference.
19. See Alexander Laban Hinton and Kevin Lewis O'Neill, eds., Genocide: Truth, Memory, and Representa-
tion (Durham: Duke UP, 2009); Alexander Laban Hinton, ed., Transitional Justice: Global Mechanisms
and Local Realities after Genocide and Mass Violence (New Brunswick, NJ: Rutgers UP, 2010); Victoria
Sanford, Buried Secrets: Truth and Human Rights in Guatemala (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2003).
14 Hinton
© 2012 Genocide Studies and Prevention 7, no. 1 doi:10.3138/gsp.7.1.4
20. See Samuel Totten and Raﬁki Ubaldo, eds., We Cannot Forget: Interviews with Survivors of the 1994
Genocide in Rwanda (Piscataway: Rutgers UP, 2011), and other interviews with survivors and memoirs.
21. Jones, Genocide: A Comprehensive Introduction, 23–4.
22. See Hinton,Why Did They Kill?
23. For the UNCG’s deﬁnition of “genocide,” see Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the
Crime of Genocide, 9 December 1948, 78 U.N.T.S. 277, Article II, http://www.preventgenocide.org/law/
convention/text.htm (accessed 3 Feb 2012) [UNCG].
24. See Frank Chalk and Kurt Jonassohn, The History and Sociology of Genocide (New Haven: Yale UP,
1990); Helen Fein, “Genocide: A Sociological Perspective,” Current Sociology 38,1 (1990): 1–126.
25. See, for example, Jones, Genocide: A Comprehensive Introduction, on structural genocide.
26. See, for example, Donald Bloxham and A. Dirk Moses, eds., The Oxford Handbook of Genocide Studies
(New York: Oxford UP, 2010); Ben Kiernan, Blood and Soil: A World History of Genocide and Extermi-
nation from Sparta to Darfur (New Haven: Yale UP, 2007); René Lemarchand, ed., Forgotten Genocides:
Oblivion, Denial, and Memory (Philadelphia: U of Pennsylvania P, 2011).
27. George Lakoff, Women, Fire, and Dangerous Things: What Categories Reveal about the Mind (Chicago:
Chicago UP, 2007).
28. See, for example, Zygmunt Bauman, Modernity and the Holocaust, rev. ed. (Ithaca: Cornell UP, 2000);
Hinton, Annihilating Difference; Kiernan, Blood and Soil; Michael Mann, The Dark Side of Democracy:
Explaining Ethnic Cleansing (New York: Cambridge UP, 2005); Moses, “Toward a Theory of Critical
Genocide Studies”; A. Dirk Moses, ed., Genocide and Settler Society: Frontier Violence and Stolen Indige-
nous Children in Australian History (New York: Berghahn, 2004); A. Dirk Moses and Dan Stone, eds.,
Colonialism and Genocide (New York: Routledge, 2007); A. Dirk Moses, ed., Empire, Colony, Genocide:
Conquest, Occupation, and Subaltern Resistance in World History (New York: Berghahn, 2008); Mark
Levene, Genocide in the Age of the Nation State, vol. 1, The Meaning of Genocide (New York: I.B. Tauris,
2005); Mark Levene, Genocide in the Age of the Nation State, vol. 2, The Rise of the West and the Coming
of Genocide (New York: I.B. Tauris, 2005). See also the early volumes by Bauman, Modernity and the
Holocaust; Chalk and Jonassohn, The History and Sociology of Genocide; and Ward Churchill, A Little
Matter of Genocide: Holocaust and Denial in the Americas, 1492 to the Present (San Francisco: City
Lights, 1997).
29. UNCG.
30. Bauman,Modernity and the Holocaust; Mann, The Dark Side of Democracy.
31. John H. Bodley, Victims of Progress, 3rd ed. (Mountain View: Mayﬁeld, 1990); Churchill, A Little Matter
of Genocide; William L. Patterson and Paul Robeson, eds., We Charge Genocide: The Historic Petition to
the United Nations for Relief from a Crime of the United States Government Against the Negro People
(New York: International Publishers, 1970).
32. Moses, “Toward a Theory of Critical Genocide Studies.”
33. UNCG.
34. William Golding, Lord of the Flies (New York: Berkeley, 2003); Psycho, directed by Alfred Hitchcock
(Universal City, CA: Universal Home Video, 2000).
35. In a 15 February 2011 lecture at the Center for the Study of Genocide, Conﬂict Resolution, and Human
Rights on “Studying Genocide, Preventing Genocide,” Adam Jones noted the dilemmas inherent in se-
lecting cases and the dangers of canonization. His own efforts at grappling with these problems are illu-
strated in differences between the ﬁrst and second editions of his books, with the ﬁrst edition chapter on
“The Armenian Genocide” being recast as the “The Ottoman Destruction of Christian Minorities” in
the second. Similarly, he expanded the chapter on ﬁrst edition chapter on “Stalin’s Terror” to “Stalin
and Mao” in the second edition. He noted that he self-consciously attempted to weave in a number of
cases, ranging from attacks on witches to post-US invasion Iraq to cut against the grain of canonization.
36. But see Chalk and Jonassohn, The History and Sociology of Genocide, for an early exception.
Critical Genocide Studies 15
© 2012 Genocide Studies and Prevention 7, no. 1 doi:10.3138/gsp.7.1.4
Genocide Is a Process, Not an Event
Sheri P. Rosenberg1
Benjamin N. Cardozo School of Law, New York
Genocide studies is simultaneously an emerging and accepted category of scholarly inquiry. The ﬁeld
is robust and at a critical turning point as more disciplines engage the subject. This article identiﬁes
two areas within the ﬁeld that suggest the need for further scholarly attention. First, it urges a
renewed attention to the processional nature of genocide and the implications that ﬂow from a par-
ticularized understanding of it, speciﬁcally in relation to prevention. The article explores this rela-
tionship by providing a process-oriented examination of the under-theorized concept of "genocide by
attrition," seeking engagement and critique of the concept. Second, new disciplines have entered the
ﬁeld of genocide studies, bringing with them new methodologies and insights. While this is a welcome
advance, genocide studies must move from multidisciplinary to interdisciplinary research to avoid
fragmentation and achieve the diverse objectives of the ﬁeld.
Key words: genocide by attrition, prevention, multidisciplinary research, law of genocide
Since the early 1990s there has been a renewed interest in the subject of genocide and
its prevention. The scholarly attention has been vibrant and dynamic. In fact, there is
now a category of scholarly inquiry speciﬁcally dedicated to and referred to by many as
“genocide studies.” It is a diffuse and multidisciplinary ﬁeld in which vigorous debates
over deﬁnitions continue in full force. In fact, as of 2001 political scientist Scott Straus
noted approximately 21 different deﬁnitions of the term “genocide.”2 To some, geno-
cide is a classic example of an essentially contested term. And at least one scholar argues
that its contentious status precludes its acceptance as an actual discipline,3 while for
others deﬁnitional disputes provide energy to historical and cultural debates.4 Regardless
of one’s stance in this debate, one cannot deny that the study of genocide and its pre-
vention is healthy and maturing. More disciplines are weighing in, bringing their own
sets of methodologies to the table. For example, micro studies by contemporary political
scientists such as Scott Straus and Lee Ann Fujii provide nuanced and complex analyses
to complement theories of blind masses, ancient ethnic hatreds, and elite divide-and-
conquer strategies. Historians are looking at macro factors across space and time to
focus on exogeneous and endogenous factors. Critical genocide studies is starting to
take root with the work of historian A. Dirk Moses, sociologist Thomas Cushman, and
others. These scholars attempt to interrogate some of the fundamental assumptions
and biases that exist throughout most scholarship related to genocide studies. When
scholars within their own discipline begin to critique their own acquisition of knowl-
edge, it becomes apparent that a ﬁeld of inquiry has been established. Nonetheless, old
debates persist and new challenges have emerged.
Among the categories of inquiry, there has been a thread of scholarship explicitly
dedicated to exploring the genocidal process and the implications that ﬂow from de-
ducing a particularized understanding of it.5 The “genocidal process” is a relatively
indeterminate term, and it is the notion of the complex genocidal process that will
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be the focus of this article, which urges renewed attention to exploring the social phe-
nomenon of genocide as a process rather than as the outcome of a process. The rigid
conception of genocide as a deﬁnition (as opposed to a social phenomenon) of “some-
thing” against which unfolding events are to be measured is in part due to the very suc-
cess and standing of the concept in international law. The emphasis on legalism
subjects each genocide to a rigid test in order to maintain the integrity of the term and
determine criminal culpability. This, however, has caused some authors and policy
makers to lose sight of the fact that genocide is a ﬂuid and complex social phenomenon,
not a static term. This process perspective is crucial to the detection and standardization
of early warning indicators for the prevention of genocide, a goal which many genocide
scholars seek to pursue.6 As Bloxham and Moses argue, “the focus on speciﬁc types of
outcomes that qualify as genocide is analogous to studying the peaks of mountains
from above a cloud-line that only particularly tall mountains penetrate, when a glimpse
beneath the cloud-line would illustrate that other mountains fall just short.”7 Hence, if
one focuses on how the process of genocide unfolds and the acts that are often perpe-
trated on the victim—both indirectly and directly—during the genocidal process, then
one might begin to link these preliminary or early acts to the efforts of genocide preven-
tion. Moreover, a process-oriented approach provides lawyers and jurists with a lens
through which to interpret the 1948 UN Convention on the Prevention and Punish-
ment of the Crime of Genocide (UNCG). This approach aids in the interpretation of
the UNCG’s dual goals of prevention and punishment.
Genocide discourse may be unpacked in a variety of ways. One’s approach is natu-
rally inﬂuenced by his or her personal, ideological, and academic discipline. For the
purpose of this review, we will adhere to the deﬁnition of the phenomenon set forth in
the 1948 UNCG.8 While Professor William Schabas seeks, in my view, an overly narrow
and restrictive interpretation of the UNCG itself, we agree when he suggests that “[f]or
decades the Genocide Convention has been asked to shoulder a burden for which it was
never intended, essentially because of the relatively underdeveloped state of interna-
tional law dealing with accountability for human rights violations.”9 Today, there is a
relatively well-developed body of international law that deals with mass atrocities and
is codiﬁed in the Rome Statute establishing the International Criminal Court. As a
result, mass atrocities that are crying out for individual accountability no longer need
to be corralled under the crime of genocide; rather, the individuals who commit
these atrocities that fall short of genocide can be brought to justice for crimes against
humanity.
Nonetheless, pushing the outer boundaries of the UNCG and arguing for an inter-
pretation of the crime that approximates contemporary instances of its pursuit, rather
than static and narrow interpretations that dismiss Raphael Lemkin’s original concep-
tion and the modern-day occurrences that do not—and will not—ﬁt the paradigm or
politics of the 1940s (the years during which the UNCG was ﬁnalized), has merit. After
all, as Nigel Eltringham eloquently suggests, the danger with classiﬁcations (and con-
crete deﬁnitions) is that we will “set out to prove that our abstract concepts . . . really do
correspond to reality, rather than being contingent approximations.”10 With this in
mind, it becomes evident that genocide is a complex social phenomenon that cannot
solely be disaggregated into its parts and tucked neatly into a deﬁnition. Rather, it must
be understood as an unfolding process to be viewed against or within historical, politi-
cal, and social factors. What follows is a brief analysis of the evolution of concept of
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the genocidal process, followed by a summary of a theory of “genocide by attrition” and
how the development of this concept, heretofore under-theorized, can be useful for
early warning, and hence prevention, of genocide. Finally, this article concludes with a
number of suggestions for future directions in genocide studies.
Genocide as Process in Genocide Studies
While many early studies have focused on comparative analysis of speciﬁc cases, an in-
creasing number of scholars have taken the broader view of genocide as a complex and
dynamic process. These scholars explore the causal contexts of genocide by using struc-
ture and agency theories to understand the process. They analyze structures of govern-
ment, political systems, and relevant socioeconomic, cultural, and historical factors.11
Some genocide scholars have synthesized and reduced this complex process into the
many “stages” of genocide. According to Gregory H. Stanton, genocide “develops in
eight stages that are predictable but not inexorable.”12 The stages are classiﬁcation, sym-
bolization, dehumanization, organization, polarization, identiﬁcation, extermination,
and denial. Helen Fein, examining the Holocaust, identiﬁes ﬁve necessary and usually
sequential stages of genocide: “deﬁnition (identifying discrimination victims), stripping
(of rights, roles, ofﬁces, claims), segregation (enforced compulsory wearing of the yellow
star), isolation, concentration.”13 These stages preceded the Final Solution. More re-
cently, Jacques Semelin, in his book Purify and Destroy, has investigated the sources of
mass killing using the Holocaust, Rwanda, and Bosnia as the primary sources for his ex-
plorations. He seeks to create a political sociology of mass murder and, among other
things, explores the dynamic process of implementation against the historical and polit-
ical backgrounds of each situation.14 Although these stages are broad enough to cover
most instances of genocide, it is unlikely there is a single process of genocide. As Leo
Kuper notes, “[t]he forms of genocide are too varied, with quite different sequences of
action, and great differences in scale, raising different ‘logistic’ problems.”15 Technologi-
cal sophistication, geographical concentration of victims, bureaucratic efﬁciency, and
the possibility of reciprocal violence are some of the variables that differentiate one
genocide from another and resist the easy accommodation of a linear model of the
genocidal process.
Contributing to the body of literature, which seeks to understand a speciﬁc geno-
cide’s complex and evolving nature with prevention in mind, this article sets forth
a brief conceptualization of the genocidal process that can be marked by the term
“genocide by attrition” to bring to the foreground what is often in the background:
genocide is a process, a collective cataclysm, that relies more heavily—than currently
appreciated—on indirect methods of destruction for its success.16 It is the excessive
focus on violent deaths and a preoccupation with the numbers of victims that have
obscured alternative means of annihilation and have thereby missed the signals of
unfolding tragedies. In fact, many victims of historical genocides died from slower,
“indirect,” and less immediately deadly methods than outright murder. For example,
approximately 13.7% of all Jewish Holocaust victims died as a result of disease and
starvation attributable to their conﬁnement in dire, despondent, and life-threatening
ghettos at a time prior to their deportation to forced-labor and extermination camps.17
This theory is not intended to offer yet another typology of stages. Rather, it presents a
list of attributes that are likely to occur at different stages of genocide and follow their
own distinct paths of development.
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Genocide by Attrition: A Process-based View
As the ﬁeld continues to grow, new and important ways of looking at and describing
genocide are found. The emphasis on strict, narrow legalism in genocide interpretation
coupled with the conceptual link between genocide and the paradigmatic case, the
Holocaust, have imposed a restrictive reading on the term set out in the UNCG. Justiﬁ-
ably, this perceived rigidity led those witnessing the developing crises and unfolding
violence in today’s complex international arena to search for a more ﬂexible term
that would nevertheless maintain the emotional and conceptual force of the genocide
concept.
The term genocide by attrition is relatively new to common parlance. While the
term has been used before, it is most notably associated with the crisis unfolding in Dar-
fur, Sudan.18 Eric Reeves, who has closely monitored the situation in Darfur, has been
the most ardent supporter of the view that what has occurred since late 2004 or early
2005, after the more direct killings took place, is genocide by attrition. As Reeves ob-
served in 2005, “[s]ometime in the summer of 2004 (we will never know precisely
when), genocidal destruction became more a matter of engineered disease and malnu-
trition than violent killing, [as] there came a point . . . in which ongoing genocide was
no longer primarily a result of slaughter, but a cruel attrition.”19 Both Nicholas D. Kris-
tof ’s work as well as that of Michael Petrou and Luiza Savage describes what we are wit-
nessing in Darfur as “genocide in slow motion.”20 More recently, Gerard Prunier has
drawn attention to the constellation of violence by describing death in Darfur as “killing
by attrition.”21 Moreover, countless news media outlets wantonly describe the situation
in Darfur as “genocide by attrition” or “genocide in slow motion.”22
Although the term is bandied about with some frequency, there has been little
attempt to provide it with a theoretical, legal, or conceptual foundation. Most uses of
the phrase are loose and descriptive. However, by engaging in a comparative analysis of
prior genocides and of the contemporary usage of the term, it becomes evident that
genocide by attrition essentially describes a slow process of annihilation that reﬂects the
unfolding phenomenon of the mass killing of a protected group rather than the imme-
diate unleashing of violent death. The methods of genocide by attrition describe
state (or non-state) policies and practices which deprive individuals of a speciﬁc set of
human rights; such policies and practices do not cause the immediate death of an indi-
vidual but rather lead to the slow and steady death of the individual and the annihila-
tion of the group.23
The concept of genocide by attrition set forth in this article is consistent with the
UNCG. While grounding the legal deﬁnition of genocide in physical annihilation, the
UNCG deﬁnes acts that constitute genocide not only as acts of immediate physical
destruction but also as acts which create conditions that will lead to physical destruc-
tion, including the inﬂiction of physical and mental harm, acts to arrest procreation,
the transfer of children, and incitement to genocide.24 Thus, genocide by attrition is
not a new deﬁnition of genocide or one that intends to stretch the meaning of the crime
of genocide as set forth in the UNCG to accommodate emotional, political, or tactical
resorts to the term. Moreover, genocide by attrition does not replace the concept of
genocide; instead it draws attention to the genocidal process (rather than the outcome
of a process) and illuminates the prominent role that indirect methods of annihilation
play in the genocidal process.
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Practices and policies of genocide by attrition primarily, but not exclusively, include
forced displacement, the denial of health and health care, the denial of food, and sexual
violence. Empirical evidence from cases of genocide points to this set of attributes and
suggests several tentative conclusions about the genocidal process.25 First, indirect
methods of mass killing play a more important role in the genocidal process than previ-
ous models have suggested. Second, indirect methods of annihilation might occur at dif-
ferent points in the linear process and/or might reﬂect a jumping or collapsing of
stages. The concept of genocide by attrition ultimately helps correct the view of geno-
cide as a primarily directly murderous event that can simply be tracked back to individ-
ual culpability in order to assign moral and legal responsibility.
Genocide by Attrition and Prevention
The failure to apprehend the process of genocide by attrition reﬂects a general failure to
understand the link between the conditions of life that bring about the physical annihi-
lation of the group and the policy decisions that bring about such conditions. This over-
sight is particularly troubling where early warning of genocide is concerned. Generally,
early warning systems seek to collect, analyze, and communicate information about
escalating situations that are developing or could develop into genocide.26 The UNCG
requires state parties to prevent and punish the crime it seeks to prohibit. Thus, unlike
most other human rights laws and even international criminal laws, there is a direct
obligation upon states to prevent genocide. Until February 2007, when the International
Court of Justice issued its decision in the case of Bosnia and Herzegovina v. Serbia,27
there was a debate among scholars on whether the prevention clause in the UNCG cre-
ated a legal rather than a moral obligation upon states. This decision settled the matter.
The International Court of Justice held that prevention is a legal obligation and one that
is separate from the obligation to punish genocide. Moreover, it found Serbia liable for
failing to prevent the genocide in Srebrenica. More than 136 states have undertaken an
obligation to prevent genocide, and the prohibition of genocide is jus cogens—that is, a
norm so fundamental that no state can derogate from it.
The obligation to prevent genocide necessarily implies the need for effective early
warning. Of course, there is no human phenomenon that is 100% preventable. All we
can do is develop and enhance our techniques of early detection and pay close attention
to each situation that appears to be percolating. The paradigm is the same in health
care as it is in international relations: each of these ﬁelds is concerned with regulating
intervention in relation to death risks. Like in the ﬁeld of health care, the beneﬁts of
accurately preventing genocide greatly outweigh the risks associated with robust enthu-
siasm in early detection. Speciﬁcally, focusing on discriminatory forced displacement,
discriminatory denial of health and health care, discriminatory denial of food, and tar-
geted sexual violence provides a clear set of attributes of the genocidal process, thus
distinguishing them from the noise of regular human rights reporting. While these attri-
butes generally continue throughout the genocidal process, they often occur during the
earlier stages. For example, it might not have been as easy to send Jews into death
camps during the Holocaust if they had not been previously displaced from their
homes, often into ghettos where hundreds of thousands of Jews died from disease and
starvation. Likewise, sexual violence is more likely to occur to women or children who
are displaced from their homes. Thus, clearly recognizing these attributes of the geno-
cidal process might aid in identifying early warnings in advance or at a relatively early
stage of the conﬂict. Early warning might be doomed to failure if it cannot make
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predictions at a relatively early stage. Once a crisis has fully unfolded and the dynamic
murderous process is well underway, policy options for the international society are sig-
niﬁcantly restricted. In particular, once military intervention is the only realistic option
on the table, relevant stakeholders are left with a virtual Pandora’s Box, where complex
legal, moral, and political issues abound.
While most early warning systems identify a build-up of human rights violations
as an early warning indicator, broad emphasis on human rights abuses might poten-
tially overwhelm the models with too many variables, creating the opposite problem of
the rigid interpretation of genocide. The information overload makes it difﬁcult to iden-
tify emerging patterns of genocidal violence from other deteriorating situations. The
concept of genocide by attrition proposes a framework that short-circuits both of those
problems by narrowing the universe of variables.
Conclusion and New Directions in Genocide Studies
In the evolution of genocide studies, all of the participating disciplines have made sig-
niﬁcant contributions and provided much-needed insights. Nonetheless, in the existing
literature, ranging from philosophy to law, there is a lack of an overarching methodol-
ogy or theoretical convergence of how to approach the subject. As a result, there is a
pronounced murkiness in the ﬁeld and an inability to move on from old debates (e.g.,
over deﬁnitions) that stymie the ﬁeld’s development and inhibit its potential. Moreover,
it does not appear that anyone has addressed the implications of the social sciences
developing in one way, while legal developments have gone in a different direction. In
addition, while many genocide scholars proclaim interest in prevention, very few pieces
related to genocide tie explicitly to this concern.
Genocide by attrition represents a new direction in genocide studies that demon-
strates the ﬁeld’s elasticity and its ability to draw from historical episodes to understand,
in practical terms, present instances of genocide. Further, genocide by attrition is part
of the expanding literature that views both genocide and humanitarian crises as com-
plex processes. While this article points to only one way in which the interpretation of
genocide by attrition can aid in genocide’s prevention, hopefully further research will
engage with the concept (positively or critically) and the many ways this interpretation
of the genocidal process may (or may not) aid in early warning.
Finally, many scholars in the ﬁeld talk about its interdisciplinary nature. However,
the ﬁeld is multidisciplinary, not interdisciplinary. An interdisciplinary approach is nec-
essary to genuinely grasp the essential meaning of genocide. Because genocide envelops
the political, the social, and the legal, giving expression to its multifaceted dimensions
demands an interdisciplinary rather than multidisciplinary approach. While scholars
from politics, law, and social anthropology all engage in genocide studies, they rarely
engage with one another. Moreover, when they do, it is not uncommon for conversa-
tions to sink into deﬁnitional debates and academic pageantry. The ﬁeld would greatly
beneﬁt from more cross-pollination. For example, often there is a divide between legal
scholars and political (and other social) scientists. On the one hand, the former are usu-
ally interested in establishing clear legal deﬁnitions because the fundamental principles
of law—and criminal law in particular—require that crimes be deﬁned with precision as
a matter of fairness so that the individual is forewarned about the illegality of his or her
actions. The political scientists, on the other hand, view deﬁnitions and conceptual
debates as useful tools for establishing some parameter for the universe of admissible
cases and for elucidating links between structures and agency. These in turn are viewed
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as crucial to the development of generalizable models that can explain the causal links
between a set of variables and the observed phenomenon. By working together, a bal-
ance might be struck between ﬁdelity to deﬁnitional precision and a greater approxima-
tion of the ﬂuid and chaotic reality of the genocidal process. Similar conversations
should take place across varying disciplines. It is only then that the ﬁeld of genocide
studies will truly continue to move into a new and productive direction.
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Around the “G” Word: From Raphael Lemkin’s Deﬁnition to
Current Memorial and Academic Controversies
Jacques Semelin
Center for International Research and Studies–CNRS–Sciences Po, Paris
The term “genocide” has generated passion and misunderstanding since its coining in 1944 by Ra-
phael Lemkin. Applying this term to very heterogeneous historical and current situations brings up
many objections and debates. The ﬁrst problem arising from the word genocide concerns its uses, in-
cluding its memorial, humanitarian, legal, and political purposes. Scholars are divided about its
meaning. However, this article stresses that the global digital academic enterprise, Online Encyclo-
pedia of Mass Violence, represents today a unique effort to gather the most important historical
cases of mass human destruction, with respect to their own singularity, while offering a way to com-
pare them according to the same framework of analysis. It builds a strong body of knowledge and
follows a rigorous methodology, including a peer-review process. This article also brings some clariﬁ-
cations to three questions: the relationship of genocide studies with international law, the strong
tendency in this ﬁeld to qualify any massacre as genocide, and the legal relevance of the notion of
crime against humanity.
Key words: genocide, massacre, mass violence, crime against humanity
In this short article, I restate what has been my general approach regarding the deﬁnition
of genocide over the past decade. I also try to explain why I have become more ﬂexible
about its deﬁnition, particularly in light of my experience with the global publication
Online Encyclopedia of Mass Violence (OEMV) which was founded in 2004.1 This project
was initiated in 2004 by Sciences Po Paris (Center for International Research Studies). It
has taken us nearly four years to get the OEMV ready to be put online. Considering the
highly sensitive nature of this project and the relative novelty of this ﬁeld of research,
this maturation period has proved valuable. The gradual construction of this Web site is
the result of genuine teamwork on the part of computer specialists and researchers, who
endeavored to coordinate technical, scientiﬁc, and ethical criteria.
There’s no doubt that the term “genocide” has generated passion and misunder-
standing since its creation. Indeed, since the United Nations adopted the Convention
on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (UNCG) on 9 December
1948,2 genocide has come to mean absolute evil: mass atrocities against defenseless civi-
lians. Coined in 1944 by the Polish jurist Raphael Lemkin, the term has gained increas-
ing international acceptance. Thus, one has talked about genocide in almost every
major deadly conﬂict of the second half of the twentieth century from Cambodia to
Darfur, including Burundi, Rwanda, Guatemala, Colombia, Iraq, Bosnia, Chechnya,
Argentina, and Ethiopia.
The term has also been used retrospectively to qualify the massacre of the inhabi-
tants of Melos by the Greeks (ﬁfth century BCE), the Vendée people in 1793 by the
French revolutionary army, the native people in North America, and the Armenians in
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1915 as well as the cases of famine in Ukraine, the various deportations of populations
by Stalin, and of course, the extermination of European Jews and Roma. It has even
been applied to the US nuclear bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki. This list is by no
means exhaustive.
Applying this “genocide” notion to these very heterogeneous historical situations
has generated many objections and passionate debates. These numerous handlings of
the concept suggest the need to resort to a word of universal signiﬁcance to point out a
major phenomenon in the twentieth century—that of the mass destruction of civilian
populations. Other terms have, in fact, been suggested, such as “politicide” proposed by
Barbara Harff and Ted Gurr and “democide” proposed by Rudolph Rummel.3 But these
alternative notions have no legal recognition and thus the word genocide continues to
dominate the ﬁeld.
The ﬁrst problem arising from the word genocide has to do with its various uses. It
has a role in various kinds of political, identity-driven, or humanitarian rhetoric. This is
a full-ﬂedged matter of research and its several uses reveal some issues of great signiﬁ-
cance. I have tried to identify the main ones.
Issues of memory. When a population has been killed on a mass scale, the survival
community sometimes struggles to have this past suffering recognized as genocide. The
most emblematic ﬁght in this ﬁeld is that of the Armenian community in the face of
aggressive denial by the Turkish government and its supporters around the world. But
there are numerous other cases as well. Very often, activist or nationalist leaders put
moral pressure on historians to recognize their individual cases as genocide. If such
scholars are convinced that the case constitutes genocide, they can conduct their
research without any obstacles. If they are not convinced, they might have problems get-
ting access to archives or testimonies. Scholars might also be blamed by survivors who
absolutely want their suffering to be recognized as genocide. In sum, keeping distance
from memory issues and political pressures is a very difﬁcult task in the ﬁeld of genocide
research. This does not mean that scholarly works inspired by memorial issues are nec-
essarily biased and controversial. On the contrary, some such works can constitute some
of the best research, especially when they are focused on what are referred to as “forgot-
ten genocides,” which have been studied less.4 At the OEMV we require each contributor
writing up a case study to distinguish between “memory issues” and “interpretation of
facts.”
Urging humanitarian action. This occurs when non-governmental organizations
(NGOs) report that a population is in danger of genocide. In such cases, using the word
“genocide” aims to prompt public concern that will lead to an international intervention.
This can also lead to an overuse of the word to convince state decision makers of the
desperate nature of a crisis and/or to act decisively. That, of course, can be counterpro-
ductive. Indeed, if genocide is already underway in a particular country, state decision
makers can reply that there is nothing that can be done because it is too late. Thus,
instead of spurring action, the use of the word genocide leads to no action at all, to pas-
sivity. For this reason US legal expert David Scheffer has recommended the use of the
term “mass atrocities” instead of “genocide” in cases when NGOs want to convince the
international community to take action. Paradoxically, this expression is less frightening
than the “G” word, which is why some academic programs are now titled Genocide and
Mass Atrocities Studies. It should be kept in mind that this approach to the concept of
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mass atrocity is a practical step to maneuver through the political realities that are obsta-
cles to human rights intervention against mass violence, not a genuine conceptual shift.
Legal purposes. When prosecuting instigators and perpetrators, such as Pinochet
or Milošević, for the crime of genocide, prosecutors and judges use the wording of the
UNCG, by which the International Criminal Court (ICC) abides. But it is not certain
that use of the charge of genocide for prosecution is appropriate in all cases. Darfur is a
good example of this: for some analysts and organizations it was a real case of genocide
but for others (such as the French NGO Médecins Sans Frontières) it was not. However,
this position did not prevent those concerned about the mass violence in Darfur from
being deeply engaged in trying to help the people of Darfur. ICC President Luis Moreno-
Ocampo’s decision to prosecute Omar al-Bashir, the president of Sudan, for genocide
has surprised those who believe that Khartoum was more responsible for ethnic cleans-
ing, which can be qualiﬁed more as a crime of war or crime against humanity (as the
legal expert Antonio Cassese argued in his report for the UN), than genocide. In that
regard, one can argue that the ICC might contribute to the banalization of the word
genocide.
Last but not least, the term can also be used as a moral and psychological weapon
against one’s enemy. For example, the Serbs of Kosovo claimed to be the victims of a
new genocide by the Albanians since the middle of the 1980s, while delegates of the
Conference of Durban in 2001 accused Israel of perpetrating a “real” genocide against
the Palestinian people. As a result, the word is sometimes used as a symbolic shield to
construct the identity of the victim, just as a sword is drawn against an enemy.
Can we hope for some clariﬁcations from the research community? Not really. The
range of deﬁnitions is very wide, from Israel Charny who thinks that any massacre is
genocide (including the nuclear accident at Chernobyl) to Steven Katz who asserts that
only one genocide has been perpetrated in history: the one against the Jews. Fortunately,
some Holocaust scholars, such as Omer Bartov and Yehuda Bauer, have developed a dif-
ferent point of view and have demonstrated that they are open to comparative analysis
with other cases of genocide.
Obviously, there is no consensus among scholars about what does and what does
not constitute genocide. This ﬁeld of research might appear as both confused and highly
subject to political and memorial controversies even if researchers are doing their best
to produce a high level of scholarly work. Considering that discussion around the
G word is endless and above all leads nowhere, some eminent colleagues such as Chris-
tian Gerlach now reject the G word, advocating instead alternative expressions, such as
“extremely violent society.”5
On a different but certainly related note, let me underline the fact that our aca-
demic and digital initiative, our OEMV, represents a unique effort to gather together
the most important historical cases of mass human destruction while honoring their
singularity, thus offering a way to compare them according to the same framework of
analysis. It aims to build a strong body of knowledge beyond these controversies thanks
to the fact that we are following a rigorous methodology set out in our guidelines. So far
so good; none of the contributions available online have provoked any major objection.
Beyond this, is it possible to bring some clariﬁcation to this new ﬁeld of research?
In this regard, I wish to raise three key questions/issues.
1. What is at stake in our relationship with relevant international law (i.e., the
UNCG)? We can identify at least two schools of thought among genocide scholars.
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First, there is what I call the UN school of genocide scholars. Most scholars come
from this school and believe that the UNCG offers the most useable deﬁnition precisely
because the scholarly community is unable to agree on a common deﬁnition of geno-
cide. They also believe that it is legitimate to make use of the legal deﬁnition as a
research category in social sciences. To some extent, they are right since this was Lem-
kin’s position in his book.6 He did not intend to dissociate the historical analysis of
such bloody events from its legal incrimination. But Lemkin was an international legal
expert. Does his position have to be shared by historians and political scientists?
This UN school of genocide scholars has been challenged by a new generation of
scholars who want to distance the ﬁeld from the UN legal deﬁnition. Essentially, they
ask, To what extent is it legitimate to take an international legal norm, based on a politi-
cal agreement by the international community in 1948, as an operational basis for our
research in history, sociology, anthropology? To do so means that we base our genocide
research on an international norm which is by deﬁnition political since the text of the
UNCG is clearly the outcome of an international agreement reached by the world com-
munity of states within the post-war context.
Such a concern is why scholars of the new generation want to rely ﬁrst and fore-
most on their discipline (i.e., history, sociology, political science, anthropology) in their
genocide research. They certainly take into account the legal deﬁnition but they do not
want to be bound by it.
There is another basis for using alternatives to the UN deﬁnition: the need for an
interdisciplinary approach. Genocide as a phenomenon in itself is so complex that it
must be examined not only from the standpoint of the historian but also from that of
the psychologist, the anthropologist, and so forth. Interdisciplinary analysis is absolutely
necessary if we really want to study such monstrous events in-depth. Inspired by Chris-
topher Browning’s work, this is the basic argument of my book Purify and Destroy.7
2. There is a second important difference among scholars regarding the scope of the
events that they deﬁne as genocide. For numerous scholars, especially in North
America and the UK, genocide and massacre mean more or less the same thing. A
recent example of this is found in Martin Shaw’s work.8 According to Shaw, any
kind of killing of an unarmed group might be regarded as genocide, an idea that
lead him to support a controversial position when he recently stated that Israel
committed genocide in 1948 against the Palestinian people. Bartov strongly dis-
agreed with him in calling this expulsion of Palestinian people a genocide.9 Ulti-
mately, they both agreed that some form of what is now called ethnic cleansing did
occur in 1948. But whereas Bartov was not willing to think of this as genocide,
Shaw conﬁdently argued that any policy meant to destroy a group, even if it is not
outright murder, should be seen as genocide.
I, too, disagree with Shaw’s assertion that any massacre constitutes a form of geno-
cide. This overuse of the G word leads to its abuse.
Being aware of this, some scholars use the expression “genocidal massacre.” But this
notion is rather confusing in itself. Here, as scholars, we should distance ourselves from
the G word to study “massacre” as such as an independent object of research. (A new book
co-edited by Lyndall Ryan and Philip Dwyer is an important and fruitful contribution in
that direction.10) Thus, it is legitimate to study the multicausal process, which can lead a
country from massacre to genocide without pre-supposing any kind of determinism, the
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road to mass killing and genocide being circuitous. I have defended the idea that not
every massacre can be considered genocide and genocide is composed of one or more
massacres. In other words, we need to study the genocidal process—that is, the process
moving from massacre to genocide, as suggested by Leo Kuper back in the early 1980s.
Still, it should be understood that my criticism about the overuse of the word genocide
does not mean that I reject the term itself. At the end of Purify and Destroy, I ﬁnally
present my own deﬁnition of genocide from a social scientiﬁc point of view: “[Genocide
is] a particular process of civilian destruction that is directed at the total eradication of a
group, the criteria by which it is identiﬁed being determined by the perpetrator.”11
3. The notion of the crime of genocide as deﬁned in the UNCG is not comprehensive
enough to be applied to the different historical processes of mass destruction to
which scholars try to stretch it to cover. Instead of modifying its contents, why not
have another complementary UNCG to focus on the notion of crime against
humanity? It will be very helpful in clarifying many debates on legal/social scientiﬁc
deﬁnitions and enriching the legal weapons to prosecute instigators and perpetra-
tors of such crimes. In that regard, the Crimes Against Humanity Initiative,
an international initiative currently led by Leilha Sadat (Washington University of
St. Louis) and supported by William Schabas and many other international lawyers,
is exactly what is needed today. The results of my own work have led me in that
direction as well, even if I am not a legal expert.
Let us start again with the 1948 UN deﬁnition of genocide. We all know that geno-
cide is deﬁned through the intent to destroy a group as a whole or in part.12 But the UN
text does not specify the political goals of such intent. As a historian and political scien-
tist, it seems important to me to draw a distinction between two processes of mass
destruction:
Destroying to subjugate. The goal here is to annihilate a group partly in order to
force the rest of the group into total submission. The destruction process is, by deﬁni-
tion, partial but it is intended to have an overall impact on the rest of the group. In legal
terms, I understand that this can be described as a crime against humanity.
Destroying to eradicate. Genocide aims not so much to subjugate individuals tied
to a given political power but rather to eliminate a community from a more or less
extensive territory controlled or coveted by a state. This process involves “cleansing” or
“purifying” the area of the presence of another who is deemed undesirable and/or dan-
gerous. For this reason, the concept of eradication seems particularly relevant since its
etymology conveys the idea of severing roots or extracting from the earth—in short “up-
rooting”—as would be said of a harmful plant or contagious disease. In legal terms, the
UN deﬁnition of genocide is closely linked to this particular process of mass destruction.
These two processes often overlap in the same historical situation. In Rwanda, for
example, Hutu extremists tried to eradicate the Tutsi minority while suppressing mod-
erate Hutu. In the former Soviet Union under Stalin, these two processes of destruction
were also at work. While the general aim of the communist power was to subjugate all
Soviet people, Stalin’s policy was to eradicate particular groups or nations perceived as
enemies of his regime. If he had ever been brought to trial, Stalin might have been pro-
secuted for having perpetrated both genocide and crimes against humanity.
If we look at the ﬁeld of genocide research as a whole, what a mess! I hope that
these comments can help bring about some clariﬁcations, but I doubt it. Individual
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scholars have their own genocide deﬁnitions in mind to apply to their personal historical
cases to which they have dedicated their lives. For these reasons, and primarily because
they are dedicated to speaking in the name of the dead, scholars are generally not at all
ﬂexible or ready to make any concessions. We all know scholars who specialize in a par-
ticular sub-ﬁeld and no longer speak to other specialists within the same sub-ﬁeld
because they strongly disagree in their respective approaches. This is one of the reasons
why our OEMV has opted for the more neutral and general term “mass violence.”
However, we do not reject the notion of genocide. Our “Scientiﬁc Approach”
explains,
Nonetheless, the incrimination of genocide remains relevant in view of the UNCG. Un-
doubtedly, and in spite of its ambiguity, this document represents a fundamental contri-
bution by international lawyers. It bears witness to the emergence of a universal
conscience opposing the outrageousness of mass crimes. Indeed, the UNCG appears all
the more important since social scientists have been unable to agree on a common deﬁ-
nition of genocide. Shedding light on their different approaches is among the main ob-
jectives of the OEMV.13
With respect to my own deﬁnition of genocide, I do not pretend to convince any-
body else that it is the deﬁnition to which all should adhere. This leads me to be more
tolerant of what does and what does not constitute genocide. What is really at stake is
understanding why and how a society can slide into mass violence and mass destruc-
tion. This is exactly what Purify and Destroy is about. But that is another story.
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On the Original Understanding of the Crime of Genocide
Hannibal Travis
Florida International University
This article is an extended exercise in genocide originalism. Efforts to equate genocidal intent with
total racial destruction have grown more common within the UN system over the past decade, in-
cluding in the cases of Yugoslavia and Sudan. The article surveys evidence that the drafters of the UN
Genocide Convention (UNCG) did not deﬁne genocidal intent as the intent to destroy an entire race
or religion. This evidence shows that the UNCG does not require a deliberate plan or policy of a state
to exterminate the members of an entire racial or religious group, or a total genocide. Rather, the
UNCG expressly covers partial genocides, genocides in which heads of state do not participate, and
genocides motivated by reasons other than racial or religious hatred. This original understanding is
manifest in the text of the UNCG, the drafting process, and the course of performance of the UNCG.
Key words: Armenian Genocide, originalism, Sudan, Yugoslavia
Although many genocide scholars adopt sociological or other social scientiﬁc deﬁnitions
of genocide, other leading genocide scholars have propounded a purportedly legal deﬁ-
nition that is unduly narrow. Presumably based on the drafting history of the United
Nations Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide
(UNCG), this narrow deﬁnition actually rests upon incomplete and selective references
to legal sources with misleading implications. This is apparent during discussions of
the question of whether partial genocides, such as by “ethnic cleansing,” constitute the
crime of genocide.
In this article, I argue that the greatest setback to genocide scholarship, and one
largely self-inﬂicted by some genocide scholars, is the elevation of the requirement of
genocidal intent to a standard that is nearly impossible to satisfy because it requires the
total destruction of a race. This view has gained ground within the UN system in recent
years, as represented by certain ﬁndings of the International Court of Justice (ICJ), the
International Commission of Inquiry on Darfur (ICID), and the trial chamber of the
UN-backed International Criminal Court (ICC). At the root of this misunderstanding
is some scholars’ equation of the intent to destroy a group—as required by Article II of
the UNCG—with a state’s deliberate plan or policy to exterminate the members of an
entire racial group, or a total genocide. Contrary to this distortion of the UNCG, its
drafters and ratiﬁers rejected efforts to limit genocide to total destruction, a plan or pol-
icy of destruction, or a motive of racial hatred. This explains why the UNCG deﬁnes
genocidal intent so as to include the “intent to destroy . . . in part” and why the UN and
its members consistently condemn ethnic cleansing as genocide.1
Achievements of Genocide Studies
Scholars, human rights groups, and journalists have made steady progress over the past
seven decades in identifying genocide and other crimes against civilian populations and
in persuading prosecutors and UN ofﬁcials to initiate proceedings. Raphael Lemkin
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pioneered this process, which was taken up most effectively by John Barron and René
Lemarchand in the 1970s,2 by Leo Kuper and Israel Charny in the 1980s,3 and by Rich-
ard Hovannisian, Vahakn Dadrian, and Robert Melson with regard to the Armenian
genocide in the 1980s and 1990s,4 with the latter tradition being expanded upon by
Thea Halo, Donald Bloxham, and Adam Jones in the 2000s as they documented a gen-
eral Ottoman Christian genocide.5 Since the 1990s, Frank Chalk, Kurt Jonassohn, Helen
Fein, R.J. Rummel, Iris Chang, Samantha Power, Ben Kiernan, and Samuel Totten have
described other genocides, especially in Africa and Asia.6
Even without a standing international criminal court, scholars and other writers
have consistently shined the light of truth upon attempts to shroud genocide within the
fog of war. Although the convictions of high-ranking Nazis for the Holocaust at the
International Military Tribunal, Nuremberg, were for “extermination of the Jews” rather
than “genocide,” Raphael Lemkin fought as adviser to the tribunal to have destructive
acts against Jews, Poles, “Gypsies,” and others indicted as genocide, and the concept
was used in the indictment.7 The British prosecutor at the Nuremberg trial argued that
not only Jews but also Belgians, Dutch, French, Norwegians, and Yugoslavs had been
victims of genocide.8 This echoed Lemkin, who wrote that Poles, Slovenes, and Russians
were victims of genocide by mass killings under German “colonization.”9 Lemkin ar-
gued in 1953 that the Soviet Union and its allies were guilty of genocide by killings and
deportations to Siberia.10
After Lemkin’s death in 1959, legal scholars and politicians continued to uncover
evidence of genocide in the Soviet Union, China, Nigeria, Pakistan, Vietnam, Cambo-
dia, Iraq, Sudan, and elsewhere.11 Scholars helped persuade the UN to establish interna-
tional criminal tribunals backed by the Security Council for Rwanda and Yugoslavia
and to support the drafting of the Rome Statute of the ICC in 1998, and other scholars
helped persuade the ICC to exercise its jurisdiction over genocide.12
Was the UNCG Only Intended to Apply to Total Genocides?
In recent years, scholars and genocide prosecutors have had to contend with an exces-
sively pro-perpetrator interpretation of the UNCG. This interpretation would attempt
to remove all doubt that a genocide conviction is appropriate by requiring an extraordi-
narily high showing of the intent to destroy an entire group and its physical and biolog-
ical remnants accompanied by racist motives completely unrelated to any political
purpose. Taken seriously, this interpretation is virtually impossible to satisfy with evi-
dence. Thus, it may undo much of the progress made since 1945 in deﬁning genocide
and banning it.
Typically, a treaty like the UNCG is interpreted to give effect to its text, its drafting
history, and the case law applying it.13 Unfortunately, in the past decade and a half, a
form of scholarship has emerged that very selectively takes account of these sources,
especially the working papers or travaux préparatoires, and ends up constructing a
strained and anti-victim meaning of key phrases in the treaty.
One way not to interpret a treaty is to make its provisions so difﬁcult to satisfy that
no concrete case qualiﬁes, making the treaty useless and frustrating its drafters’ pur-
poses. Some scholars conﬁne the deﬁnition of genocide to a set of very rare and unique
events that may never be repeated as long as politicians have enough sense to not write
down that they are exterminating races for no good reason. In that sense, the interpreta-
tion is very favorable to the perpetrators of genocide who appear as defendants before
international criminal tribunals.14 It is, therefore, also anti-victim in effect. For example,
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one scholar argues that a “lone genocidal maniac” should receive psychiatric care rather
than criminal punishment, whereas a victim might well disagree.15
Some scholars and practitioners in the ﬁeld of genocide law argue that only total
biological and physical genocide, and not partial physical genocide or systematic eco-
nomic or cultural genocide, are covered by the UNCG.16 For example, Professor Wil-
liam Schabas (University of Ireland at Galway) suggests that the Holocaust and the
Rwandan Genocide represented true, legal genocides,17 while the Armenian Genocide,
Bangladesh, Biafra, Cambodia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Kosovo, and Darfur did not.18
He argues that genocide requires a motive to destroy the entire group for reasons of
“racist hatred,” and that the presence of mixed racial and political/military motives
precludes genocidal intent—that is, the speciﬁc intent to destroy the group.19 Other
scholars also equate motive with intent.20
Professor Steven Katz (Boston University, formerly Co-Chair of the Academic Com-
mittee of the US Holocaust Memorial Museum), adopts a similarly narrow interpretation
of the crime of genocide. As a result, Katz opines that there was no genocidal intent in
Rwanda.21 He argues that the Hutu-Tutsi conﬂict in Rwanda was “not genocidal” but
rather a war for “tribal domination.”22 Katz also argues that even if the Ottoman Empire
killed 775,000 Armenians, this would not be genocide because 17–27% of Armenians sur-
vived and this did not amount to the “complete physical extirpation of every person of
Armenian heritage.”23 These equations of genocide with total extermination for no rea-
son, rather than ethnic conﬂict resulting in mass violence, is analogous to the argument
that the Srebrenica massacres did not indicate genocidal intent because they were not
total; that is, the women and children of the region lived and the Bosnian Serbs might
have had good tactical reasons to massacre Muslim men and boys.24
Both Katz and Professor Emeritus Guenter Lewy of the University of Massachusetts
at Amherst have argued that only Jews were victims of genocide and all Jews were vic-
tims of a total genocide in the Holocaust or Hebrew Shoah.25 Lewy explains that the dif-
ference is that the Nazis intended to “annihilate physically every man, woman and
child” who was Jewish.26 Katz similarly identiﬁes the distinction between Jewish geno-
cide and other tragedies on the basis that there was an “intention to kill all Jews without
escape.”27 Lewy argues that killing 40% of the world’s Armenians was not genocide,
without noting the rate of Jews surviving the Nazis.28 He contends that, unlike the
Holocaust, the Armenian case lacks evidence of a “state-sponsored plan of annihila-
tion.”29 Likewise, Katz ﬁnds no genocide in Armenia because “several hundred thou-
sand Armenians survived” their deportations.30 He does not calculate how many Jewish
survivors there may have been after 1945.31
These total genocide theories differ in some respects. Unlike Katz and Lewy, for
example, Schabas does not ignore the fact that the case of the Armenians was among
those considered by the drafters of the UNCG as a typical or exemplary case of geno-
cide.32 Moreover, Schabas does not deny that Rwanda was a genocide; in fact, he was
among the ﬁrst to allege that Tutsi may be victims of genocide in Rwanda.33 Finally,
Schabas acknowledges the existence of case law and other legal materials that have
found genocide to have been committed where there were survivors.34 He simply at-
tempts, as set forth below, to prove that case law wrong.
The total genocide interpretation of the UNCG is ﬂawed whether the text of the
UNCG, the UN drafting history, or the case law is considered. The UNCG deﬁnes as
genocide certain acts with “the intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a national,
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ethnical, racial or religious group.”35 Not one of the acts is restricted to exterminating
the group and killing all of its members. In fact, both Lemkin and the UNCG repeatedly
emphasize that the victims may survive36; thus, they deﬁned genocide to include
destructive acts other than killing, such as harming physical and mental health, degrad-
ing economic conditions, and interfering with the birth and rearing of children.37
The introduction of the words “in part” into Article II of UNCG was achieved by
the Norwegian delegation to the drafting committee.38 The Norwegian delegation ar-
gued that “it was not necessary to kill all the members of a group in order to commit
genocide.”39 The Yugoslav delegation agreed, pointing out that “the main characteristic
of genocide lay in the intent to attack a group,” in other words not simply the intent to
exterminate a group.40 The Uruguayan delegation proclaimed that partial genocide
was already covered by the “intent to destroy a group,” because “genocide was commit-
ted when a member of a group was attacked.”41 The US delegation concurred, explain-
ing that genocide is not so much about the extermination of groups as the “denial of
the[ir] right to live” and insisting that the UNCG must “afford protection to human
groups against the acts of individuals.”42 The British delegation noted that “if it was de-
sired to ensure that cases of partial destruction should also be punished, the amendment
proposed by the Norwegian delegation would” do that.43 The French delegation voted
for the Norwegian proposal because it clariﬁed that genocidal intent would include
an intent to kill or inﬂict mental harm on “an individual as a member of a human
group.”44
Was the UNCG Intended to Apply Only to Racial Genocides?
Some scholars contend that speciﬁc intent means the intent to destroy the group com-
pletely, as part of a plan or policy of total destruction, and not to destroy some of it
physically and eliminate the remainder of the group by refugee ﬂight.45 They suggest
that the use of the phrase dolus specialis in the drafting committee’s report requires a
motive of racial hatred on the part of génocidaires.46 Special intent or dolus specialis is
contrasted with dolus eventualis or the conscious disregard of a known risk (reckless-
ness as to the result).47 The idea is that a series of massacres alone may not be “calcu-
lated to destroy the group, in the sense of genuine [Nazi-style] extermination camps.”48
Scholars use terms such as “racial hatred” and “physical extermination” to describe the
intent to destroy thus construed.49 One even says that to charge a suspect with geno-
cide, prosecutors need to ﬁnd a “centralized blueprint for racial annihilation.”50
The report of the committee on the drafting of the UNCG reveals that genocidal
intent was distinguished from the Nazis’ premeditated racist extermination campaign
against the Jews, so that genocidal intent may exist in more varied circumstances.
Among other evidence, a Soviet amendment speciﬁcally emphasizing racism and Hitler-
ism was rejected, and another Soviet amendment underlining the importance of “racial
hatred” also failed.51 Moreover, language deﬁning genocide as requiring an intent to act
“on grounds of national or racial origin” was replaced with a deﬁnition including the
“intent to destroy [a group] in whole or in part,” and language suggesting that perpetra-
tors must be motivated to act “particularly on grounds of ” race, nation, or religion was
refused.52
The point is, delegates declined to link genocide explicitly to racism or Hitlerism
because other forms of intent may sufﬁce for the crime of genocide.53 The Soviet Union
unsuccessfully pressed the view that genocide requires extermination of entire groups
“because of their race and nationality.”54 Most importantly, the other delegates turned
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back a proposed Soviet amendment which would have required acts “particularly on
grounds of national or racial origin or religious belief ” because most delegates believed
that “the destruction of a human group on any grounds should be forbidden.”55 There-
fore, a requirement of discriminatory motives was not adopted.
The effect of adopting a highly restrictive construction of the UNCG is the same as
if every Soviet amendment had been accepted. But this frustrates the intent of the other
delegates, who intended the UNCG to apply to other motives and contexts.
Does the UNCG Require Physical or Biological Destruction?
The total genocide interpretation of the UNCG equates intent to destroy with physical
destruction.56 Some scholars have argued that genocide was not committed in Darfur
because the state did not achieve “the intentional physical destruction of an ethnic
group.”57 Some have also argued that the Cambodian Genocide did not occur because
Cambodians are not a protected national group, and religious minorities were singled
out for assimilation rather than murder.58 According to this interpretation, the UN
General Assembly, Cambodian war crimes tribunal, and US Congress were simply
being “idiosyncratic” or “political” in declaring a Cambodian genocide.59 A similar
argument is made about Kosovo, often while refusing to note that in 1999 several lea-
ders of the key states involved in the drafting of the UNCG condemned genocide in
Kosovo.60
Furthermore, some scholars condemned the International Criminal Tribunal for
the former Yugoslavia (ICTY) for ruling that genocide was committed at Srebrenica as
a result of the massacre of up to 8,000 Bosnian Muslim men and boys. Schabas, for
example, argues because genocide must be physical, it “distort[s]” the UNCG to ﬁnd, as
the tribunal has, that genocide could be committed by massacring the men and boys of
a community in order to make its physical survival in the area difﬁcult or impossible.61
Another scholar remarks that because the Srebrenica massacre was improvised by the
military, it lacked the element of political strategy to exterminate a race required to
apply the stigma of genocide.62
There is extensive evidence in the text of the treaty and in the travaux prépara-
toires, however, that the drafters intended to prohibit non-physical genocides as well.
The text of the UNCG refers to “mental harm” and to the forced removal of children
from their parents’ inﬂuence not as crimes against humanity but as acts of genocide.
The word “physical” is used to qualify only one of the listed acts—the imposition of liv-
ing conditions calculated to bring about the group’s destruction.63 The intent to destroy,
therefore, need not be physical when the act does not kill.64
The drafting history of the UNCG reveals that the Soviet Union proposed another
amendment limiting the intent to destroy a group to acts “aimed at the physical
destruction” of the group, which was rejected.65 The Soviet Union argued that because
“article II was concerned with biological genocide,” the “idea of ‘physical destruction’
should therefore be speciﬁed in the text of the deﬁnition” so as to distinguish it from
cultural genocide.66 The other delegates spoke out against this proposal. One delegate
remarked that “history gave examples of genocide where there had been no intent of
physical destruction of the groups concerned,” which would not constitute genocide
under the Soviet amendment, such as when “the older members of a group had been
killed and the younger ones converted by diverse means to an ideology different from
their own.”67 The United States agreed, explaining that the intent to destroy need not
be shown by the actual destruction of the group as a result of the perpetrators’ acts.68
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The Soviet amendment was overwhelmingly rejected by a vote of 36 to 11, with four
abstentions.69
The Soviet Union also proposed that genocide requires a “physical destruction of [a]
racial, national (or religious) group committed on racial, national (or religious) grounds”
and not merely an intent to destroy a group in whole or in part.70 This amendment failed
as well.71 Therefore, as one delegate opposing the Soviet proposals explained, genocide
may occur under Article II even though “individual members of [the group] continued
to live normally without having suffered physical harm.”72 The mental genocide prong
of Article II conﬁrms this interpretation.73 It applies to all “inhumane . . . treatment” and
“persecution” that targets a group and tends toward its mental destruction.74
When the Soviet Union attempted to make religious genocide a subset of national
genocide, a coalition of states including Egypt, Greece, and Yugoslavia successfully orga-
nized the opposition to this amendment. They pointed to ethnic and religious cleansing
between Hindus and Muslims in India and Pakistan, Jews and Muslims in Palestine, and
Serbs and Croats in Yugoslavia and argued that such “genocides” should be prohibited.75
In none of these historical episodes was the group completely eradicated, so the “geno-
cide” was partial, potentially covered by the “destroy . . . in part” language adopted by
the drafters.
Some scholars argue that ethnic cleansing and cultural genocide were excluded
from the UNCG when Article III of the original draft was stripped during the delibera-
tions and when a Syrian amendment addressing forced displacement was rejected.76 A
closer examination reveals, however, that these proposals were not rejected because the
drafters wanted to immunize from prosecution as genocide the selective murder of the
leaders or adult men of a group followed by the deportation or forcible assimilation of
women or children. Quite the contrary is true. The problem with Article III was not
that it prohibited cultural genocide but that it deﬁned it so broadly as to include restric-
tions on the use of language (think of English-only education laws), the destruction or
“dispersion” of documents or objects of cultural or historical value (think of urban
development projects), and the “systematic destruction of books” (think of libraries
weeding out collections).77 It was therefore too difﬁcult to establish the limits of cultural
genocide when it was deﬁned to include the “use of the language of the group . . . in
schools” or “preventing the use of . . . museums, schools, historical monuments, or
places of worship.”78 Schabas remarks that the US and Canada led the opposition to
“cultural genocide”; they actually opposed including “ethnical” (or cultural and linguis-
tic) groups in the UNCG at all, but they lost this ﬁght when ethnic groups were in-
cluded alongside racial groups.79
Similarly, the Syrian proposal was extremely overbroad in including any “measures
intended to oblige members of a group to abandon their homes” by intimidating them,
which might apply to the construction of public works such as highways through for-
merly residential neighborhoods after use of the power of eminent domain to force
residents to leave.80 All of the leaders of the countries joining the treaty could be prose-
cuted for becoming complicit in genocide by building highways. The government of
India objected that “not even the threat of genocide” was required by the Syrian amend-
ment.81 The Soviet Union argued that true compulsion to depart from one’s home
under a threat of genocide was already covered by the draft convention.82
The intent of the drafters not to immunize ethnic cleansing as practiced in the
Ottoman Empire, or more recently in the former Yugoslavia, was absolutely clear. The
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drafters announced their design to prevent and punish ethnic cleansing when they ac-
cepted a Swedish amendment to add “ethnical”83 to the Soviet categories of national,
racial, or religious genocide. They made this amendment expressly in order to clarify
that the impact upon the “whole of the traditions of a group, with its cultural and his-
torical heritage, had to be taken into account.”84 Sweden emphasized that in some cases
a group’s language rather than its race would be the target of attacks.85 Sweden also ar-
gued that the law of genocide should protect “a group which was held together by a
common origin or common identity.”86 It was understood that the Swedish amendment
would apply to instances such as the post-World War II ethnic cleansing of the Ger-
mans in Poland and the Poles in Germany.87 Sweden argued that such groups “might
be deﬁned by the whole of [their] traditions and [their] cultural heritage.”88 The US and
the Soviet Union also agreed that the UNCG should apply to the members of political
groups who make up the intellectual or cultural leaders of populations that an occupy-
ing army like that of the Nazis was attempting to “subjugate.”89 A Greek amendment
designed to prevent genocide by the forced abduction of children to be raised in new fa-
milies, as occurred in the Ottoman Empire, also passed.90
The drafters made other departures from the model of physical genocide as in the
case of the Jews gassed at Auschwitz. They dismissed a proposal to limit mental harm
to “mutilations and biological experiments.”91 The US argued that physical injury not
resulting in permanent harm or mutilations should be protected against.92 The drafters
similarly expanded a predicate act of genocide from the impairment of the “physical
integrity” of group members to the inﬂiction of serious bodily or mental harm upon
them.93 China explained that outlawing genocide was of cardinal importance to China
because the Japanese had committed genocide in China by various methods, such as by
dealing opium.94 Japan has yet to ratify the UNCG.95
The text and drafting history clarify that genocide may occur by “deliberately in-
ﬂicting on the group conditions of life calculated to bring about its physical destruction
in whole or in part”96 with the intent to destroy the group in whole or in part, even
when total destruction does not result. This prong of Article II actually summarizes a
longer list of acts identiﬁed by the UN Secretary-General as causing slow death or
impairment to a group’s health, such as denial of food, medical care, hygiene, clothing,
or housing and compulsion to perform excessive physical work.97 The Secretary-
General suggested that what is now called ethnic cleansing might inﬂict conditions of
life calculated to destroy the group in part when it results in the denial of group mem-
bers’ livelihoods, conﬁscation of their homes and means of sheltering their children,
mass dismissals from employment, and the refusal of food or other supplies needed for
families to survive.98 Schabas also concedes that the drafters of the UNCG considered
the Armenian Genocide, in which mass deportations resulted in deaths from hunger
and exposure and were accompanied by direct massacres, as the paradigm of indirect
genocide using the forces of nature.99 But he argues that the UNCG is not applicable to
the Armenian Genocide because Armenians suffered only cultural harm in the period
since genocide entered customary international law sometime after 1914.100
In light of this drafting history, the German Supreme Court has found that geno-
cide was committed in Bosnia and Herzegovina because “cleansing” occurred by “kill-
ings, . . . a determined effort to capture others for killing, the forced transportation or
exile of the remaining population, and the destruction of homes and places of wor-
ship.”101 The fact that some victims in Bosnia and Herzegovina were deported or exiled
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did not preclude a conviction for genocide. Similarly, the US Supreme Court let stand a
federal appeals court’s ruling which concluded that genocide occurred in Bosnia even
prior to Srebrenica.102 Courts in Austria, Brazil, Cambodia, Equatorial Guinea, Ethio-
pia, Latvia, Lithuania, Iraq, Spain, and Ukraine have also conﬁrmed that the UNCG was
not intended to be applied narrowly so as to be triggered only when a plan or policy to
destroy an entire group is decided upon at the heights of state power. They have found
defendants culpable for genocide based on localized massacres and forcible displace-
ment of the remaining population.103 National courts have ruled that massacres affect-
ing as few as 12 members of a group could reﬂect genocidal intent.104 Based on this
reading, leaders of states party to the UNCG have laid genocide charges at the diplo-
matic or political level after massacres in which most of the group survived, as in Biafra
in 1968, Bangladesh in 1971, Cyprus in 1974, Afghanistan in the 1980s, Iraq in 1984
and 1987–1991, Bosnia in the early 1990s, and Kosovo in the late 1990s.105 Such charges
amount to state practice of genocide.
Other sources of the customary international law of genocide are to similar effect.
These sources include General Assembly resolutions, the practice of domestic parlia-
ments, the proclamations of national politicians and diplomats, the reports of UN ex-
perts, and the treatises of jurists and international law scholars.106 The international
community has simply refused to restrict the crime of genocide to total unprovoked
genocides based on state policy. A number of General Assembly resolutions recognize
ethnic cleansing as a form of genocide.107 Many, perhaps most, of the delegates to
the drafting process of the UNCG described ethnic cleansing (including the ethnic
cleansing conducted by the Soviet Union) as genocide.108 The Pakistani delegate called
cultural genocide indivisible from physical genocide under Article II.109 The representa-
tives of several other states agreed that when accompanied by violence, cultural geno-
cide should be prohibited by the UNCG.110 Numerous treatise writers make similar
arguments.111 Turkey and other countries that have ratiﬁed the UNCG have protected
cultural and political groups from genocide and have often condemned ethnic cleansing
as genocide.112
Schabas has argued that the ICC, the ICJ, and the ICID are in agreement with him
that ethnic cleansing is irreconcilable with an intent to destroy a group in whole or in
part.113 It is unfortunately true that the ICJ, following Schabas’s lead, concluded in 2007
that the drafting history of the UNCG excludes destruction of the group through dis-
placement alone and includes only “biological” and “physical” destruction.114 However,
the ICJ indicated that ethnic cleansing may constitute genocide when it rises to the level
of “deliberately inﬂicting on the group conditions of life calculated to bring about its
physical destruction in whole or in part” without persuasively analyzing whether this
was the case in Bosnia and Herzegovina.115 The Pre-Trial Chamber I of the ICC initially
agreed with the ICJ, but the decision was reversed on appeal to the ICC’s appellate
body.116 The Pre-Trial Chamber I rejected a charge of genocide after concluding that
the government of Sudan may have “subjected, throughout the Darfur region, thou-
sands of civilians, belonging primarily to the Fur, Masalit and Zaghawa groups, to acts
of murder and extermination.”117 The ICID report adopted a similarly pro-defendant
construction of the UNCG when it determined that even though the UNCG was origi-
nally intended to protect groups against the destruction of a substantial number of their
members, the destruction of a substantial number of Fur and Masalit people did not
qualify as genocide.118
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The international criminal tribunals have often agreed with the Appeals Chamber
of the ICC that deportation could constitute genocide and disagreed with its Pre-Trial
Chamber I and the ICID report on that point. The ICTY has twice ruled that survivors
of selective killings might suffer mental genocide because they fear that they might be
killed or injured.119 The ICTY’s decision on the indictment against Radovan Karadzić
and Ratko Mladić stated “that cruel treatment, torture, rape and deportation could con-
stitute serious bodily or mental harm done to members of a group under a count of
genocide.”120 The ICTY has found “that the forcible transfer of individuals could lead
to the material destruction of the group, since the group ceases to exist as a group, or at
least as the group it was.”121 It has also conﬁrmed three times “that the means of delib-
erately inﬂicting on the group conditions of life calculated to bring about its physical
destruction, in whole or in part, include subjecting a group of people to a subsistence
diet, systematic expulsion from their homes and deprivation of essential medical sup-
plies below a minimum vital standard.”122 Although some defendants accused of geno-
cide by ethnic cleansing in Bosnia and Herzegovina were acquitted, these perpetrators
spared from harm most of the civilians under their area of effective control and did not
even deport most of them.123
The judgment in the trial of the mastermind of the Rwandan Genocide, Théoneste
Bagosora, also indicates that the impossible standard of proof advocated by the ICJ was
not applied. Although rejecting the prosecution’s theory of a military-led conspiracy to
commit genocide in Rwanda against all Tutsi, even those who were not suspected of
sympathizing with the rebellion, the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda
(ICTR) in 2008 convicted several military defendants of genocide for carrying out selec-
tive massacres of Tutsi in Kigali as well as in other places, including a church, a mosque,
and a university.124 Other ICTR convictions largely inferred genocidal intent without re-
quiring smoking-gun evidence of a state policy of genocide; the judges look for evidence
of large-scale atrocities, systematic ethnic targeting, the use of derogatory ethnic lan-
guage or slurs, and the large scale of the attempted destruction of those who survived.125
Does the UNCG Only Prohibit a Plan or Policy of Genocide?
In 2005, the ICID concluded that the government of Sudan had not pursued a policy of
genocide despite many massacres, mass rapes, deportations, burnings of villages,
destruction of foodstuffs, and so forth.126 The report, according to some scholars, de-
monstrated that a “state plan or policy” is an “essential element” of the crime of geno-
cide even if it was “unspoken” by the UNCG’s drafters.127 In 2007, for example, Schabas
defended the “theoretical construction” of genocide adopted by the ICJ, under which
ethnic cleansing does not constitute genocide because it does not reﬂect a plan or policy
of total destruction.128
The text of the UNCG clearly does not require a plan or policy of genocide by the
state or its rulers.129 Instead, Article IV of the UNCG makes it clear that private indivi-
duals who are not public ofﬁcials may commit genocide.130
During the drafting process, the US and other nations blocked a proposed require-
ment for government ofﬁcials to “co-operate” in genocide because these nations intended
the UNCG to “afford protection to human groups against the acts of individuals.”131
Likewise, a proposed requirement of “deliberate” acts prompted opposition because
“premeditation had a special meaning, distinct from that of intention.”132 The “intent to
destroy” requirement represented a liberalization of the Secretary-General’s draft, which
required a “purpose of destroying.”133 The Secretary-General apparently designed the
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purposeful genocide requirement to ensure that the “act must be deliberate,” as opposed
to “isolated acts of violence not aimed at the destruction of a group of human beings.”134
Therefore, the phrase “deliberate acts” became “acts” in the deﬁnition of genocidal intent,
and the proposed requirement that ofﬁcials “co-operate” in the killing was dropped.135
The delegates’ rejection of a requirement of racist motive or premeditation is
important because in common law the notion of intent or speciﬁc intent may be
inferred from conduct. Courts infer speciﬁc intent to kill in domestic US law from the
destructive nature of an act, such as shooting another person.136 The international
criminal tribunals, with many judges trained in the civil law tradition, have similarly
inferred intent from the act and the surrounding circumstances.137 Otherwise, only a
confession could convict.138
In response to a French amendment that would require the participation or “con-
nivance” of constitutional rulers in genocide, the drafters expressed widespread opposi-
tion to such a deﬁnition. Like scholars endorsing a “plan or policy” element for the
crime of genocide, France wanted to “deﬁne genocide in terms of its essential and pri-
mary character as a governmental crime.”139 The US delegate, on the other hand, de-
clared that the killing of even one individual with the intent to destroy a group could be
genocide.140 The US desired to preserve state responsibility for genocide in instances
“where an act of genocide had been committed by private individuals without any par-
ticipation by the rulers, if those rulers had not taken appropriate measures to punish
the guilty persons.”141 The UK delegate explained that “acts of genocide committed, en-
couraged or tolerated by rulers were not the only cases of genocide.”142 The delegates of
Iran and Pakistan likewise objected because under the amendment the massacres of reli-
gious groups recently committed in India would not be covered and insisted that such
“fascist or terrorist organizations” should be punished regardless of the degree of partic-
ipation of the state.143 The Egyptian delegate made similar comments about recent
massacres in Palestine.144 Brazil’s delegate explained that “cultural genocide” could
“obviously be committed by private individuals without any responsibility on the part
of the State.”145 Yugoslavia’s delegate mentioned an incident in which war criminals
illegally entered Yugoslavia with plans to commit crimes of genocide.146 The French
amendment received only 2 votes in favor, 40 against, and 1 abstention.147
One issue that judges have with resort to the legislative history of statutes or treaties
is that the process can be somewhat selective, with text, history, and case law providing
ample opportunity to reach nearly any conclusion.148 In this vein, advocates of the most
restrictive construction of the UNCG have no trouble disregarding the drafting history
of the UNCG when the history indicates a broad meaning. Thus, for example, while
acknowledging that the drafting history of the UNCG reﬂects a clear rejection of a
requirement of a genocidal plan or policy, Schabas has argued that it is impossible to
imagine genocide without it. He persisted in this view even after several judges of inter-
national criminal tribunals disagreed with him.149 Finally, when some other judges
(notably within the ICTY) and the Darfur commission agreed with him, he looked to
their rulings as authoritative, despite criticizing rulings by judges over the years as con-
tradicting the drafting history.150 When both judges and the drafting history repudiated
his narrow reading of the UNCG, he appealed to public policy.151 The gist of this policy
argument is that a generous interpretation of the UNCG “demeans the suffering of the
victims”; how the survivors of massacres in Rwanda are demeaned by genocide preven-
tion is not explained, and indeed the notion is denied by survivors themselves.152
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Was State Responsibility for Genocide Intended to Be Prospective Only?
Some scholars have argued that the UNCG is inapplicable to the Armenian Genocide,
either because of insufﬁcient deaths or because the only acts that occurred between the
1920s and 1940s, when the customary international law crime of genocide might have
come into existence, involved the destruction of cultural, historical, and religious heri-
tage, to which the UNCG does not apply.153 Schabas, for example, has argued that scho-
lars on the Armenian Genocide “overstate the law” in order to “play well in certain
Armenian communities,” implicitly accusing them of twisting the law to earn funds or
gain popularity in the Armenian Diaspora.154 He insisted repeatedly that Turkey has no
responsibility for the Armenian Genocide, even though Germany and German ofﬁcials
had to take responsibility for a genocide completed before the UNCG was drafted.155
The typical analysis of the retrospective application of the UNCG has several de-
fects. First, it assumes that statutes of limitation on genocide may only be relaxed in the
case of an ongoing genocide.156 Second, it assumes that Germany’s payment of repara-
tions to the State of Israel and individual Jews was strictly voluntary.157 Third, it as-
sumes that international law will not make any progress in the next century toward
redressing instances of mass violence that occurred in the distant past.158
Case law arising out of the US casts doubt on these assumptions. First, at least one
court has held that statutes of limitation should not apply to crimes against humanity
concluded decades ago, such as during the Vietnam War.159 The court noted that the
“principle of non-applicability of statutory limitations” to crimes against humanity, in-
cluding genocide, is recognized in international treaties including the Rome Statute of
the ICC and the Convention on the Non-Applicability of Statutory Limitations to War
Crimes and Crimes Against Humanity.160 The latter convention reﬂects customary
international law enforceable in the US, according to some scholars.161 Second, US
courts have conﬁrmed that plaintiffs’ attorneys’ threats of litigation compelled Germany
to come to the table with various other entities and announce a scheme to compensate
survivors of the Nazi era for the actions of Germany’s war industry.162 Prior to that, the
victims of Nazis received compensation,163 including by such means as the seizure of
assets by the Allies and their distribution to Jews and other survivors of Nazi crimes.164
Even before the UNCG was drafted, the occupying powers in Germany established
General Claims Laws to distribute gold, diamonds, and ﬁne art to Jews and other vic-
tims.165 Third, in 2006, the State of California extended the statute of limitations for
Armenian Genocide survivors until 2010 to 2016.166 The law marches on.
Do Genocide Scholars Have a Responsibility to Past and Future
Victims of Genocide?
Roger Smith, Erik Markusen, and Robert Jay Lifton have argued that genocide scholars
have a professional responsibility not to give too much analytical aid to the defenders of
genocidal acts.167 With Charny, they maintained that genocide denial may be an assault
on the cultural identity and national existence of the victim group.168 The destruction
of the remembrance of the act increases the likelihood of a recurrence.169 Denial leads
to a “situation of impunity,” which “fosters the chronic repetition of human rights vio-
lations and the total defenselessness of the victims and their next of kin.”170 As others
have argued with respect to torture, lawyers might embolden perpetrators.171
The “deﬁnitionalist” position that partial, cultural, ethnic, or religious genocide is
not a violation of the UNCG, and that the UNCG should not be modiﬁed upon its
enactment in domestic penal codes to include such non-racial groups, threatens to
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exonerate those accused of past genocide and to embolden the perpetrators of future
genocides. The position is a popular one in Turkey, Russia, China, Sudan, Yugoslavia,
and other places where past or present leaders have been charged with genocide by
human rights advocates.172 As a Turkish diplomat summarized the deﬁnitionalist per-
spective in the Turkish Daily News, murders or rapes targeting a group such as the Ar-
menians are genocidal only if “committed on a collective scale with a racist motive
leading to the formation of the intent to destroy the group ‘as such’” or if committed
“with the intent to destroy, which is motivated by racial hatred.”173 The author argued
that the Armenians were solely a “political group” despite their ethnic and religious dif-
ferences, and “no anti-Armenian racism existed.”174 On a related note, Schabas cited a
rumor that a Russian ofﬁcial agreed with him that genocide could not have been com-
mitted in Darfur for then it might have been committed in Chechnya as well.175 Fur-
thermore, China resisted the Security Council’s application of the word “genocide” to
the atrocities perpetrated in Rwanda in 1994; at least one expert cites “the Tibet factor”
because China might have had “Taiwan or Tibet in mind.”176 The Sudanese govern-
ment smugly embraced the ICID report’s adoption of the theory of genocide as total
destruction in January 2005.177 Tellingly, British attorneys hired by two organizations
supporting the Sudanese government and working in coordination with Sudanese ofﬁ-
cials urged the ICC to read Schabas’s works and ﬁnd that “grave crimes have been com-
mitted in Darfur by all parties to the conﬂict” but not genocide.178 Finally, it is worth
noting that several defendants accused of genocide in Yugoslavia offered Schabas’s
expert report that did not ﬁnd genocide to have been committed, a report which the
tribunal found to be an improper attempt to usurp the law-ﬁnding function of the tri-
bunal’s own judges.179 Radovan Karadžić expressed hope in his pre-trial brief that Scha-
bas’s work would exonerate him on the grounds of lack of intent.180
Part of the problem is that arguments against applying the concept of genocide to
partial genocides usually rest on the denial of the magnitude of the events themselves.
Thus, writers in the total genocide tradition of scholarship have ignored the true scale
of death during episodes of mass violence. Regarding the Armenian Genocide, Schabas
basically denied it on grounds of inadequate destruction in the period since genocide
entered customary international law, which was sometime between 1914 and 1939.181
He argued that only property was subject to ongoing destruction even though in reality
countless thousands of Armenians must have died prematurely and/or suffered serious
mental harm as a result of poverty or ill-health since the 1920s, and he dismissed claims
that the continuous destruction of Armenian monuments reﬂects an ongoing intention
to destroy Armenia.182 In his view, the only recognition appropriate for the Armenian
Genocide, like the Cambodian one, would be a political, not a legal, one.183
Schabas also characterized the Cambodian Genocide as not meeting a rigorous
deﬁnition of genocide because “destruction of religious institutions and forced assimi-
lation of populations are acts of cultural, not physical, genocide.”184 Yet he failed to offer
a death toll of Cambodians under the Khmer Rouge or to apply Article II(c) of the
UNCG, which refers to “deliberately inﬂicting on the group conditions of life calculated
to bring about its physical destruction in whole or in part.”185 Nor did he discuss Arti-
cles II(d) or II(e) in this context, which refer to “imposing measures intended to prevent
births within the group” and “forcibly transferring children of the group to another
group.”186 The Khmer Rouge forcibly sterilized women and stole children from their
parents in order to destroy families and work children to death.187 Ben Kiernan and
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others have shown that the Buddhist, Vietnamese, and Muslim populations of Cambo-
dia were not simply assimilated; they were massacred and tortured.188 The post-Khmer
Rouge government announced that 1,800 Buddhist monks and 41,000 Muslims were
killed or died from Khmer Rouge policies in Phnom Penh from 1975 to 1979.189 None
of Schabas’s works provided any evidence that the death toll among Tutsi in Kigali was
higher than that, even though he refers to Tutsi as victims of a clear genocide.190
There are similar ﬂaws with scholarly analyses of genocide charges relating to Bos-
nia and Herzegovina, Kosovo, and Darfur. Writing on Bosnia/Herzegovina and Kosovo,
some scholars fail to acknowledge that scientiﬁc studies suggest that estimates of excess
deaths vary between 200,000 and 305,000 for Bosnia/Herzegovina and between 12,000
and 18,300 for Kosovo.191 Scholars have argued, moreover, that only “men of military
age” were killed at Srebrenica,192 whereas evidence showed that younger boys were also
killed.193 With respect to Darfur, scholars have often failed to acknowledge a death toll
of 70,000 in 2004, rising to 400,000 in 2006,194 or have described the events as mas-
sacres of the “military-aged men” and displacement of the civilian population,195 when
in fact many children, women, and elderly people have been massacred as well, even ac-
cording to the deeply ﬂawed ICID report.196 These omissions of death tolls widely cited
by others are central to some total-genocide scholars’ argument that deportation is a
humane, protective policy.197
Restoring the Legal Force of the UNCG
Advocates of a pro-defendant construction of the UNCG argue that it will not result in
an “impunity gap” for perpetrators of genocide by selective massacres or the imposition
of poor living conditions.198 The theory is that crimes against humanity will cover these
acts.
However, there is no counterpart to Article I of the UNCG which establishes an
obligation to prevent and punish all crimes against humanity.199 Crimes against
humanity have been committed in nearly every conﬂict since World War II, and inter-
national criminal tribunals have not been forthcoming in punishing the perpetrators,
especially in the Baltic states, the Koreas, Tibet, Southeast Asia, Indonesia, Afghanistan,
Chechnya, Lebanon, Israel, Palestine, India, Pakistan, Bangladesh, Sri Lanka, British
Kenya, Burundi, the Congo, Nigeria, Rhodesia, Angola, Mozambique, South Africa,
Peru, Colombia, and Mexico. Even when a hybrid tribunal has convened, as with the
Special Panels and Serious Crimes Unit for East Timor, the result has often made a
mockery of justice.200
Some scholars have suggested that no one cares and have implied that nothing
should be done when a single individual kills or maims many others with the intent to
destroy an entire group.201 It would “trivialize” the UNCG to punish an ethnic or reli-
gious massacre by such a person, is the suggestion.202 When the US was convinced that
the events in Rwanda were simply local “acts of genocide” without a total physical geno-
cide, the State Department took the view that the US would not be obligated to punish
the perpetrators or prevent the acts.203
The narrow deﬁnition of genocide popularized by scholars and adopted by the ICJ
deprives the UNCG of most of its legal force because few or none of the mass atrocities
since 1948 qualify as genocide.204 With the ICTR’s judgment in the Bagosora case, even
Rwanda could be doubted to be a total racial genocide.205 In the case of Darfur, Profes-
sor Gérard Prunier observed that the public’s “mass-consumption need for brands and
labels” means that “a genocide is more serious[,] a great tragedy and more deserving of
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our attention than [the deaths] of 250,000 people in non-genocidal massacres.”206
Rwanda, Yugoslavia, Iraq, and Sudan probably had to be “branded” as anti-minority
genocides before anything could be done; indeed, massive crimes against humanity
against the dominant ethnic groups in these countries went unpunished by the UN sys-
tem.207 The insistence on the original understanding of the UNCG contributed to action
on Darfur.
In adopting the total genocide model of the UNCG, the ICJ, ICC Pre-Trial Cham-
ber I, and ICID report created an “almost impossible standard of proof ” for establishing
genocidal speciﬁc intent.208 As Eric Reeves has argued, it seems that they were attempt-
ing to ensure “the irrelevance of the Genocide Convention.”209 Only the rejection of
this model and a return to ﬁrst principles can ensure the UNCG’s effectiveness.
Likewise, adding a “plan or policy” of genocide as an element of the crime results
in nearly impassable barriers to the enforcement of the UNCG. The actual killers during
genocides would usually be acquitted on the basis that they were not aware of the total
extermination scheme decided by the political or military leadership.210 The leaders
would often then be acquitted for not committing the genocidal acts themselves.211 It is
a perfect recipe for impunity.
The drafters of the UNCG predicted that impunity would result if the deﬁnition of
genocide were to be made very narrow. During the debate on the French amendment
requiring the participation of rulers in genocide, the Venezuelan delegate argued that
“fear of punishment would be diminished in the case of non-rulers, while rulers them-
selves would frequently be able to escape punishment, either by avoiding trial by all pos-
sible methods or by shaking off responsibility by making false accusations.”212 The
Soviet Union remarked that a deﬁnition based on a state policy would “free the large
majority of those who had committed acts of genocide from all responsibility and . . .
give rulers an opportunity to avoid punishment by alleging that the crimes of which
they had been accused had been committed in circumstances beyond their control.”213
This is, of course, occurring now with respect to Cambodia, Darfur, Iraq, Rwanda, and
Yugoslavia.
Conclusion
Genocide research is at an ethical and legal turning point. The question it faces is, Will
excessively pro-defendant interpretations of the UNCG make it inapplicable to the
mass murders of the twenty-ﬁrst century? And, in so doing, will scholars belittle the
full scale of post-World War II genocides in order to classify them as war crimes or
“tragedies”?
The drafters of the UNCG have left us a precious legacy. After centuries of crimes
by heads of state, the efforts of Lemkin and others created a framework to prevent and
punish such atrocities. The UNCG they handed down to us is a ﬂexible and forward-
looking instrument, stripped of the limiting references to Nazism and fascism that the
Soviet Union would have liked to use to bind judges and prosecutors to the past.
The UNCG is a promise to all the peoples of the world that by common resolve
humanity will halt not only racial annihilation by poison gas or mass grave but also
other methods of targeting human groups for total or partial destruction. Genocide
scholars have the solemn responsibility of transmitting the hope and determination
conveyed by this promise to future generations. They must not forget that the UNCG
was drafted to predict and pre-empt new forms of genocide.
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Macro, Meso, and Micro Research on Genocide: Gains,
Shortcomings, and Future Areas of Inquiry
Evgeny Finkel and Scott Straus1
University of Wisconsin, Madison
The article critically reviews the existing literature on genocide and mass violence and divides it ac-
cording to different levels of analysis: macro, meso, and micro levels. We discuss the main theories
and ﬁndings at each level of analysis and suggest avenues for further research. We argue that the
literature on genocide should pay more attention to meso and micro levels of analysis. We also iden-
tify a number of other research problems, including conceptualization, selection bias, case compar-
ability, the role of restraint, the question of change over time, and the need to engage in dialogue
with the broader social science scholarship on political violence and intrastate conﬂict.
Key words: genocide, political violence, levels of analysis, social sciences
As a growing ﬁeld of inquiry, the comparative study of genocide is more robust than
ever; yet major problems and obstacles remain. Begun in the late 1970s and 1980s with
seminal works by Leo Kuper, Helen Fein, Israel Charny, and Irving Louis Horowitz,2
the area of study remained relatively marginal to mainstream social sciences and history
until the mid to late 1990s. Thereafter, the onset of cases in Central Africa and Eastern
Europe, which drew widespread attention in policy and academic domains, stimulated
major new interest from scholars. The net impact is substantial progress on a number
of fronts, in particular broader comparative analysis, more sophisticated methods of
comparison, and a raft of new and exciting theories, particularly at the macro level.
Yet a number of important problems continue to plague the ﬁeld of study: concep-
tual disagreement (which in turn limits consensus on the universe of relevant cases), a
tendency toward selection bias (with reliance on “positive” cases—i.e., cases where
genocide occurred—rather than a focus on variation in outcomes, thus avoiding com-
parisons between situations where genocide occurred and those in which it did not),
unit heterogeneity (the cases under comparison are quite diverse), an unhealthy aca-
demic cloistering (in particular, a lack of dialogue with kin literature on political vio-
lence), and a theoretical focus on invariant or slowly changing variables measured at
the society and state levels of analysis.3 Most of these factors, we argue, substantially
limit the ﬁeld’s ability to move forward and successfully address new research questions
and agendas. In addition, we argue that meso-level analysis remains underdeveloped in
the ﬁeld of genocide studies and that micro-level analysis would gain from more atten-
tion to variation and to greater cross-case comparison.
Consistent with the mandate of this special issue of Genocide Studies and Preven-
tion, our main purpose is to critically review the existing literature and suggest avenues
for future research. In our case, the exclusive focus is on literature on the causes of geno-
cide (and mass killing) and its dynamics, with a particular emphasis on comparative
analysis.4 There is no easy way to neatly divide and classify this literature, which is
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interdisciplinary, diverse, and increasingly deep. Rather than clustering the literature
into “generations,” as one of us has done elsewhere,5 we borrow from the literature on
civil war and choose to divide the literature according to different levels of analysis:
namely macro, meso, and micro levels. A crucial caveat is in order: any short, critical,
and broad-gauged analysis of the existing literature can do justice neither to the com-
plexity and nuance of many authors’ arguments nor to the breadth of research. The
review is necessarily incomplete. Even so, we aim to provide a useful guide to the exist-
ing literature and to suggest areas of improvement for future work.
Macro-Level Research
In the interest of simplicity, we divide the macro-level literature into six major streams
of argumentation about (1) intergroup relations, (2) regime type, (3) hardship and
upheaval, (4) ideology, (5) leaders’ strategy, and (6) modernity and development. Some
theories cross these boundaries; some theories are multicausal. Yet, in the main, these
different theoretical emphases provide a starting point for categorizing the existing
macro-level literature on the origins of genocide.
The central claim made by scholars who stress intergroup relations is that the deep
origins of genocide are fractious relations between groups in a society. For Kuper, “di-
vided” societies in which populations disliked and distrusted each other are necessary
conditions for the occurrence of genocide.6 For Fein, the idea that dominant groups in
particular contexts deﬁne subordinate groups “outside the universe of obligation” is
central to her explanation.7 More recently, Daniel Goldhagen has asserted that wide-
spread eliminationist hatred is the root of genocide.8 Similarly, John Hagan and
Wenona Rymond-Richmond stress racism in their recent book on Darfur.9 There are a
number of causal mechanisms in this strand of literature. The main ones concern
hatred, antipathy, and distrust on the part of a segment of the population toward
another segment of the population. Dehumanization is another commonly stipulated
mechanism. For large segments of a population to acquiesce to or support genocide,
they must either be indifferent to or want the destruction of other segments.
The central claim made by scholars who stress regime type is that authoritarianism
facilitates radicalization and the use of violence. The causal claims are present in two
seminal works by Rudolph Rummel and Horowitz.10 They receive more contemporary
empirical support in Barbara Harff ’s quantitative research as well as that of Kristine
Eck and Lisa Hultman (though Jay Ulfelder and Benjamin Valentino’s quantitative ﬁnd-
ings as well as those of Matthew Krain do not support a relationship between regime
type and large-scale destruction).11 Although sometimes submerged in scholarship, the
regime type literature posits two main mechanisms. On the one hand, the absence of
democratic constraints in authoritarian states depresses opposition and thereby facili-
tates the escalation of extremism. On the other hand, the regular use of repression in an
authoritarian system regularizes and normalizes the use of violence by states.
The central claim made by those scholars who stress hardship and upheaval is that
certain factors create conditions within populations that in turn trigger violence and sca-
pegoating toward other populations. As Ervin Staub and Peter Uvin have found, the
central hypothesized mechanism in the literature is frustration-aggression, whereby dep-
rivation or structural violence create anger and disappointment which are then chan-
neled into aggression toward other populations.12 A related claim is that instability and
upheaval (war, revolution, coups, or regime changes) create uncertainty and dislocation,
which too can be directed toward out-groups. Harff argues that national upheaval is a
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key facilitating condition that interacts with pre-existing social cleavages which are po-
larized in crisis.13
Ideological arguments are diverse, but at the base the claim is that leader-level
goals and ideational frameworks shape the policy choice of genocide. Scholars highlight
different ideological content. Eric Weitz emphasizes commitments to utopia based on
race and nation; Michael Mann emphasizes commitments to ethnic nationalism and
perversions of democratic ideals; Ben Kiernan argues that ideological commitments
to racism, agrarianism, expansionism, and the cult of antiquity are consistent themes
across time in genocide cases; Jacques Semelin emphasizes commitments to purity in
times of crisis.14 In some contrast to scholars who locate the origins of genocide in
social or intergroup relations, scholars who emphasize ideology conceptualize the pro-
cess leading to genocide as top-down. Some scholars also argue that ideology shapes
processes of escalation and how leaders respond to contingency and constraints in
times of crisis.15
Strategic arguments are similarly diverse, and similarly top-down, but the central
claim is that leaders choose genocide for instrumental purposes to solve problems and
achieve major goals. Ben Valentino’s work is the most explicit, but other political scien-
tists, such as Chip Gagnon, argue that politicians choose nationalism and persecution
for instrumental purposes.16 Manus Midlarsky argues that the choice of genocide is ex-
ercised to protect state interests, emerging from realpolitik—political and strategic con-
siderations rather than ideological ones—but he argues that the decision is imprudent
and disproportionate.17 A related claim is that genocide and war have a strong causal
connection. This claim is made, among others, by Martin Shaw; Valentino, Paul Huth,
and Dylan Balch-Lyndsay and Ulfelder and Valentino argue that mass killing most
likely emerges in the context of guerrilla civil war.18
Finally, a number of scholars link the destruction of civilian populations to under-
lying processes of modernization, development, and interstate competition. The claims
are found in Zygmunt Bauman’s seminal work on the Holocaust and more recently in
Weitz, Mann, and Mark Levene’s comparative research.19
While not comprehensive, these six streams of argumentation reﬂect the diversity,
heterogeneity, and sophistication of comparative research on genocide and related
forms of mass killing. In the past decade in particular, macro-level research and theori-
zation has expanded signiﬁcantly. In comparison to research at the meso and micro
levels, macro-level research is explicitly comparative; it is often cross-national and cross-
temporal. While a number of problems continue to limit the coherence of the ﬁeld (as
discussed below and perhaps as would be expected given the interdisciplinary nature of
the ﬁeld and the complexity of the phenomenon), we underline here that much of the
dynamism in the literature on the origins of genocide in recent years has occurred at the
macro level. This makes sense. Because genocide is usually a top-down process, in
which national states are initiators and authorizers of mass violence, theorizing causa-
tion at the macro level is a natural ﬁt for genocide studies. At the same time, the dyna-
mism at the macro level should not overshadow important research agendas at the
meso and micro levels. As the article argues, theorizing all three levels should be part of
a comprehensive agenda for studies of genocide and similar forms of mass violence.
Meso-Level Research
What is the meso level? At the broadest level, the meso level is the space between
national- or international-level factors and individual-level ones. More speciﬁcally,
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meso-level studies typically focus on subnational regions and communities (provinces,
towns, and villages) or on speciﬁc institutions (such as political parties, civil society or-
ganizations, economic sectors, social or political networks, or military units). Compared
to macro- and micro-level research, meso-level analysis is the least developed among
the three prongs of genocide research, and the ﬁeld of genocide studies would beneﬁt
from greater attention to this level of analysis.
The meso level is crucial for several reasons. First, local-level actors are often criti-
cal in how genocide occurs. Local actors transmit and sometimes initiate policies to
commit violence, identify and sort victims, and frequently are key perpetrators of actual
killing. Coordination between macro-level and meso-level actors is an essential part of
the process of genocide. As Bloxham argues, mass murders “are organized, in the sense
that the actions of perpetrators are concerted and systematic. An organizational struc-
ture usually emerges—however rudimentary or temporary.”20 Meso-level actors are
essential to that process. Second, meso-level actors shape the process of violence, in par-
ticular in more decentralized states. In highly centralized and coercive states, meso-level
actors might enjoy comparatively little autonomy in substantially changing or altering
the trajectory of mass violence. But in other circumstances meso-level actors have
greater independence. Their actions in turn can shape, amplify, and inhibit agency and
victimization.21 Third, by looking carefully at the meso level, scholars can develop a ri-
cher understanding of the dynamics of violence and generate evidence by which to eval-
uate competing hypotheses. Fourth, studying meso-level institutions will yield insight
into variation into how and why violence unfolds at different levels or in different ways,
as the civil war literature has recently demonstrated.22 Pioneered by Stathis Kalyvas and
Elisabeth Wood, a focus on local dynamics has been a central innovation in the litera-
ture on violence in civil war.23 In particular, Kalyvas argues that the national and the
local level should be disarticulated and that the dynamics at the local level are often not
derivative of the broader or “master” cleavages at the national level.
To be sure, the meso level has not been completely overlooked by scholars, in par-
ticular scholars of the Holocaust. Our understanding of the Holocaust has been vastly
improved by classic community studies (such as Jan Gross’s Neighbors), studies of Ein-
satzgruppen and various Nazi institutions, and recent works, such as Christopher
Browning’s Remembering Survival and Barbara Engelking and Jacek Leociak’s monu-
mental study of the Warsaw ghetto.24 Often authored by historians, the principal goals
of these studies were to describe what happened in these communities.
But some recent work on Eastern Europe in the 1940s has been undertaken with
more explicit explanatory and theoretical objectives. One innovative study focuses on
the summer of 1941 when numerous Jews were murdered not by the Nazis but by their
non-Jewish neighbors. These pogroms and collective killings were not formally part of
the Nazi-initiated genocide. But by studying variation in where the violence occurred,
Jeffrey Kopstein and Jason Wittenberg develop a rich argument about how the outburst,
or the lack thereof, of anti-Jewish violence is related to pre-existing patterns of politics
and modes of intercommunal relations between the Jewish minority and their non-
Jewish neighbors. According to their ﬁndings,
[in places] where Jews supported ethnic parties that advocated minority cultural auton-
omy, the local populations perceived the Jews as an obstacle to the creation of a nation-
state in which minorities acknowledged the right of the titular majority to impose
its culture across a country’s entire territory. These communities became toxic. Where
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determined state elites could politically integrate minorities, pogroms were far less likely
to occur.25
Their ﬁndings echo a similar study by Diana Dumitru and Carter Johnson, which
focuses on variation in the levels of violence against Jews during World War II.26
Subnational variation has been broached in studies of other cases, in particular the
1994 genocide in Rwanda but also violence in Bosnia.27 In Rwanda, there is observed
variation with respect to when violence started in different communities and in the
composition of the local actors driving the genocide. Several scholars have designed stu-
dies at the subnational level to focus on the variation in patterns of violence, whether at
the commune (district) or secteur (sector) levels.28 Those studies have yielded insights
into how the process of violence unfolded in Rwanda and have also allowed for a more
empirically rich assessment of competing hypotheses that would explain the dynamics
of genocide in Rwanda.
A major recent meso-level study on the Rwandan Genocide is Timothy Longman’s
analysis of churches. By carefully examining one institution, Longman’s study provides
a rich understanding of the social dynamics and the processes by which violence un-
folded and was legitimized. Longman argues that not only were mainstream Christian
churches complicit in the Rwandan Genocide of 1994 but their actions facilitated and
sometimes encouraged the mass violence. He argues that the churches’ embrace of eth-
nic politics and subservience created fertile ground for the execution of genocide. Long-
man also conducts a comparative study of the dynamics of genocide in two parishes. In
one parish, local actors worked with the state before and during the genocide, singling
out Tutsi, labeling them as the accomplices of insurgents, and, ﬁnally, murdering them.
In the other, the dominant local actors and many common villagers resisted the state’s
murderous policies. Rwanda is a highly centralized state, and at the end of the day the
Tutsi of this parish were also slaughtered. But through his comparison, he effectively
illustrates the dynamics of violence and shows that there were important attempts to
resist the genocide.29
Another recent study by Yang Su focuses on rural China during the Cultural Revo-
lution. In that case, as many as three million people labeled “class enemies” were bru-
tally murdered by their neighbors in collective killings and “struggle rallies.” This
happened even though the central government had not issued any mass killing orders
or policies. Drawing on the social movements literature, and viewing collective killing
as an extreme form of collective action, Su proposes a community model to explain
why and how a community mobilizes to kill its members. Su also points to and seeks to
explain subnational variation in victimization rates. Su’s community model considers
ﬁve related processes to be crucial for collective killing to take place. The ﬁrst concerns
collective ethnic categorization, which is shaped by the community’s history, tradition,
and culture. The second process generates potential victims in the community, and the
third process generates potential killers in the community. The fourth process is the de-
mobilization of legal constraints in the community, while the ﬁfth process is the demo-
bilization of moral constraints and the framing of the situation in terms that make
killing possible. However, while some processes—such as scapegoating of so-called class
enemies, mass mobilization of the population, and ﬁerce competition between party fac-
tions and cadres—affected the state as a whole, in the bloodiest provinces of Guangdong
and Guangxi these national-level dynamics were superimposed on and interacted with
distinctively local factors, such as a unique history of Chinese migration to these areas,
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patterns of local clan conﬂicts and village level politics, and the strategic location of the
provinces. The outcome was mass killing and only the combination of national and
local factors can explain why in Guangdong and Guangxi the killing rates were substan-
tially higher than in the rest of the country.30
Finally, the interplay between national- and local-level factors is a theme in Geof-
frey Robinson’s recent study of East Timor. Robinson, a historian and member of the
UN’s political team in East Timor in 1999, does not simply see the conﬂict in dichoto-
mous terms between the Indonesian government, on one hand, and the East Timorese,
on the other. He argues that the violence has roots in conﬂicts between different groups
of East Timorese as well as in the patterns of governance and warfare of the Portuguese
colonial administration. The Indonesian political and military elite based in Jakarta, ar-
gues Robinson, turned to a strategy of mass murder when challenged but could not
carry out massacres and terror without local militia. The latter, in turn, were often
driven by local factors, histories, and traditions which in many cases predated and were
unrelated to the master cleavage of independence from or integration with Indonesia.31
Although the meso-level study of genocide or other forms of mass violence remains
underdeveloped vis-à-vis other areas of research, our brief consideration here shows
how valuable these studies are. Meso-level research from various corners of the world
brings into focus key institutions, patterns of interaction before mass violence starts, and
detailed attention to how the dynamics of violence unfold. In some cases, as in Poland
and China, meso-level factors substantially explain variation in outcomes. But in all the
cases, an explicit focus on meso-level factors generates a fuller, richer picture of the pro-
cess of violence and allows for grounded theorization into the causal dynamics at hand.
Micro-Level Research
Why do individuals participate in mass violence against civilians? Why do individuals
harm others with whom they have no prior individual conﬂict or who are not engaged
in conﬂict? The question is a perennial and critical concern for scholars of genocide and
mass violence. In recent years, the topic has received a systematic review from psycholo-
gist James Waller.32 There also has been a series of studies on Rwanda as well as an
ethnographic study on Cambodia under the Khmer Rouge.33 From a comparative per-
spective, two main weaknesses of micro-level research are (1) the relative absence—with
some exceptions—of systematic comparison across cases and (2) an empirical focus on
the Holocaust and Rwanda. There is a paucity of systematic data at the individual level
on most other cases. A major question that remains unanswered is whether and how
agents of violence in cases of mass killing and genocide differ systematically from agents
of violence in atrocities of lower magnitude. More speciﬁcally, are there patterns of per-
petrator composition or individual-level motivation that are speciﬁc to cases of mass
killing and genocide? Once again, to answer that question, a greater engagement with
the broader literature on political violence is necessary.
There are six main methods that scholars of genocide and mass killing have used to
make observations at the individual level: (1) compiling biographies or social composi-
tion studies through court documents, newspaper coverage, and/or historical accounts
of events34; (2) in-depth interviews with selective, non-systematically sampled perpetra-
tors35; (3) close observation of particular actors36; (4) experimental designs37; (5) survey
research38; and (6) community-based studies that derive observations about individual-
level motivations. It is hard to prescribe any one method. Scholars choose their research
methods depending on the questions that they are asking and the data available.
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Theories of why individuals participate in mass violence abound and can perhaps
be productively synthesized into eight main categories of argumentation. There are
claims about (1) psychological predisposition, such as sadism, to commit violence39; (2)
deprivation and frustration and in particular the idea that hardship causes stress that is
channeled into violence40; (3) identity, in particular the idea that individuals harbor out-
group antipathy or in-group solidarity which would lead them to harm others41; (4)
ideological conviction and commitment42; (5) legitimacy—perpetrators commit violence
because of their obedience to or vertical relationships with superiors43; (6) collective and
horizontal peer pressure44; (7) fear and insecurity45; and (8) selective and material incen-
tives—the idea that individuals commit violence to gain power or property.46
Are there any cumulative ﬁndings in this theoretically diverse literature? To our
minds, there are at least two consistent ﬁndings. The ﬁrst is that the perpetrators of
atrocities are “normal”—that is, they often reﬂect a demographic cross-section of their
societies. There is nothing a priori that would have predisposed the average perpetrator
to commit violence. The agents of violence do not appear, on average, to have any pre-
existing, demonstrated psychological abnormality or predisposition to deviance; they do
not seem on average to be especially poor; and they have common levels of education.
Demographically, they tend to be representative of their societies. The theme is recur-
rent across some of the most inﬂuential micro-level studies, from Waller to Arendt,
Browning, and Goldhagen.47 This is not to say that some professions are not especially
represented in certain aspects of genocide, such as a scientiﬁc community in conceiving
and implementing the Final Solution.48
A second ﬁnding concerns heterogeneity at the micro level. A number of scholars
who study individual-level behavior conclude that there are multiple dynamics of moti-
vation. Some individuals might have multiple reasons to participate in violence. Others
might participate at one point in time for one reason but continue at another point in
time for another reason—that is, motivation changes over time. Finally, genocides and
other instances of mass killing are complex social and political phenomena in which
often thousands of perpetrators take part; no single theory is likely to explain each per-
petrator’s motivation. Thus, heterogeneity, complexity, and mutability all characterize
the ﬁndings about perpetrators of mass killing and other forms of extreme violence.49
Future Research
In this section we summarize the main achievements and shortcomings of scholarship
at each level of analysis and then suggest new questions and agendas for further
research. For a ﬁeld dominated by macro-level studies, the most fundamental gains have
been in understanding which factors lead to genocide; under which conditions leaders
turn to mass killings; and how ideologies, emotions, and beliefs contribute to the emer-
gence of genocidal policies. However, despite numerous and quite substantial gains,
macro-level scholarship on genocide suffers from several important shortcomings.
First, conceptual disagreements limit the ability to generate cumulative ﬁndings. In
particular, scholars both maintain different deﬁnitions of genocide and use different
terms to talk about it. Rummel analyzes “democides,” Harff discusses “politicides” (and
genocides), and Mann focuses on “murderous ethnic cleansing.” Valentino examines
mass killings of 50,000 victims over the course of ﬁve years, while Shaw argues that the
actual number of people murdered matters less than the intention “to shatter and break
up” the community’s social existence; one should not confuse ends with means and out-
comes, he contends.50 Some scholars, such as Christian Gerlach, question the theoretical
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usefulness of the concept of genocide.51 Achieving scholarly consensus on the concept
of genocide or whether genocide should be the unique focus of study (as opposed to
another term or a broader category) is probably unlikely. Certainly, debate and dis-
agreement are productive for scholarship. However, as long as there remain core and
vigorous disagreements about the main concept that unites a ﬁeld of study, the ability
to make theoretical generalizations about causes will be constrained. At best, scholars
working in the ﬁeld must remain attentive to the conceptual differences that shape it.
Second, macro-level qualitative comparative scholarship on genocide, with some
minor and notable exceptions,52 is characterized by insufﬁcient attention to variation.
The main question in the ﬁeld is, What do X cases of genocide have in common? In
contrast, there is comparatively little macro-level research that seeks to build on existing
ﬁndings and theory to explain why some cases result in genocide while others do not.
Many theories suffer from what we call a “frequency mismatch” in the sense that the ex-
planations point to conditions that are much more common than the phenomenon of
genocide is. In short, there is a critical need for more attention to negative cases—“dogs
that did not bark”—that did not result in genocide, which in fact are the norm. Geno-
cide is a comparatively rare outcome.
A third and related shortcoming is that scholarship pays insufﬁcient attention to
temporal factors. A number of studies point to a dynamic of escalation, or “cumulative
radicalization,” as central to the process that leads to genocide.53 Some studies point to
the importance of stages of genocide or to the idea that genocides are “ﬁnal” solutions.54
These studies strongly imply that the steps taken in the planning and execution of geno-
cide are not automatic; rather, they constitute a process. Thus, there are several critical
but underexplored comparative questions: What explains escalation? Why do key deci-
sion makers choose to escalate rather than de-escalate? Are there commonalities across
cases that seem different in negative cases? These questions imply a strong need for the
temporal disaggregation of cases. But, with some notable exceptions,55 these types of
temporal, disaggregated questions are rarely asked in a comparative context. The
absence is all the more surprising given that the majority of comparative research is
qualitative, small N research whose hallmark should be process tracing.
Three ﬁnal related concerns at the macro level are (1) insufﬁcient attention to is-
sues of restraint, (2) problems of unit heterogeneity, and (3) an unhealthy division from
studies of political violence.
With regard to the ﬁrst issue, much of the existing macro-level literature focuses on
those conditions that would prompt leaders and societies to commit genocide.56 But if
the operative question becomes why does genocide occur in some locations and at some
times but not in other locations or at other times, an equally important question asks
what prompts leaders to avoid or moderate the use of mass violence.57
The issue of unit heterogeneity is the idea that the cases being compared are empir-
ically quite different. The Armenian Genocide, Rwanda, and the Holocaust are three of
the common cases of comparison in the comparative literature on genocide. Yet in
terms of the historical period, region, territory, economy, demographic structure, and
even the nature of the violence, these cases differ dramatically. To continue to build
theory, tighter comparisons that hold more variables constant will be important.
Finally, the study of genocide should not be cloistered from studies of political
violence or violence in civil war. At base, studies of genocide share a great amount of
substantive overlap with studies of other forms of violence—riots, assassinations,
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massacres, the targeting of civilians in war,58 counterinsurgency, general strategy—yet
there is little intellectual interaction between these obviously related areas of inquiry.
Again, a key issue concerns isolating and explaining the speciﬁcity of genocide by em-
bedding the analysis in the study of kin phenomena.
We have argued that meso-level research is the least developed branch of genocide
scholarship, but meso-level single-country and comparative research is a promising
emerging research area. Concentrating on the meso level, where national-level policies
and decisions translate into individual actions on the ground, will provide the ﬁeld with
a better understanding of causal chains and mechanisms. In other words, the meso level
is an essential link between the macro and micro levels, without which our ability to
analyze genocides will be signiﬁcantly restrained.
Furthermore, meso-level research has the ability to overcome some problems asso-
ciated with macro-level scholarship. First, meso-level research often explicitly incorpo-
rates variation into the research design. In particular, for community-based research,
the question is, What explains variation in outcomes across different regions and com-
munities? Second, the analysis of subnational units creates greater possibilities for large
N statistical analysis, which in genocide studies is often constrained either by unit heter-
ogeneity or by a small number of cases. Third, subnational meso-level comparative ana-
lysis holds national-level factors constant, and in so doing meso-level analysis lends
itself to identifying factors that independently cause variation.
Yet, there are important limitations to meso-level analysis. First, it cannot explain
why, when, and under which conditions genocide takes place. Meso-level research
should not treat genocides as only or mainly local and should not underestimate the
role of macro-level factors, namely state policies and actions. At the end of the day,
genocide most often is top-down.59 Second, it is still unclear how to differentiate local
violence during genocide from instances of local violence that are not genocidal in
nature, such as ethnic riots, pogroms, or localized massacres. At the same time, by con-
centrating on local factors and conditions and by comparing different units, institu-
tions, regions, and communities, future meso-level research can play a key role in
bridging macro- and micro-level scholarship and improving our understanding of how,
why, and under which conditions a government’s vague and often murky orders of
extermination are translated into actual killings on the ground.
Micro-level research will likely remain an area of continued attention. Many ana-
lysts want to understand and explain how ordinary people commit terrible acts of atroc-
ity. What then are some avenues for future research to strengthen this area of analysis?
Studies of genocide perpetrators often do not provide systematic explanations of varia-
tion among potential perpetrators. Why do some individuals participate in mass vio-
lence while others do not? Micro-level research often does not consider the whole
spectrum of potential behavioral strategies and does not explain what accounts for the
adoption of each strategy. Furthermore, as noted above, two cases now empirically
dominate the literature—the Holocaust and Rwanda (the former much more than the
latter)—and there is relatively little systematic comparison across countries and time
periods. Finally, we note the relative absence of new insights from the social psychology
literature and the relative absence of contemporary experimental design in the study of
genocide.60
To summarize, we envision further research that applies both qualitative and quan-
titative methods, is embedded in the broader political violence literature, pays sufﬁcient
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attention to and seeks to explain variation in outcomes, concentrates on identifying
causal mechanisms and tracing causal chains, and combines different levels of analysis
with particular attention to developing meso-level analysis. These changes will continue
to help advance research on the origins and dynamics of genocide and mass killing
while putting the ﬁeld in closer methodological and theoretical conversation with
related areas of research in the social sciences and history.
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Studying Mass Violence: Pitfalls, Problems, and Promises
Uğur Ümit Üngör
Utrecht University and Institute for War and Genocide Studies, Amsterdam
This article examines some of the main pitfalls, problems, and promises of genocide research. It ar-
gues that genocide is a viable academic concept if protected from moral, legal, political, and emo-
tional constraints. It should be approached in a dispassionate, amoral, non-juridical, and apolitical
way. The article further discusses a model for understanding genocide that identiﬁes three levels of
analysis: the interstate pressures of the global state system and the inﬂuence of crises and war; the
intrastate context of radical ideology, state power, and the dynamic of the genocidal process; and
the micro-level conditions that enable the involvement of individual actors in violence.
Key words: genocide, approaches, theoretical model, conceptualization
“The century of Einstein and Planck was also the century of Hitler.”
—Vassili Grossman, Life and Fate
Introduction
Genocide can be deﬁned as a complex process of systematic persecution and annihila-
tion directed at a particular group of people by a government. In the twentieth century,
between 40 and 60 million people fell victim to deliberate genocidal policies.1 The
twenty-ﬁrst century began not much better, with genocidal episodes in Darfur and the
Democratic Republic of Congo. We can speak of genocide when individuals are targeted
for persecution and murder on the basis of their presumed or imputed membership in a
group, rather than for any reason relating to their individual characteristics or their par-
ticipation in certain acts. Although it makes little sense to work with victim minima, we
can state that a genocidal process always involves a society at large and that genocide
often destroys a signiﬁcant—often critical—part of the affected community or commu-
nities. Arguably, genocidal processes are particularly malicious and destructive because
they target all members of a group, mostly innocent and defenseless people who are per-
secuted and killed regardless of their behavior. The term “genocide” always denotes a
brutal and colossal collective criminality. For this reason, the phenomenon of genocide
is distinct from other forms of mass violence, such as war, civil war, or massacre.2
The term “genocide” was coined by the Polish-Jewish lawyer Raphael Lemkin
(1900–1959). While attending law school at the University of L’viv (Lwów/Lemberg),
Lemkin became interested in why international law had been unable to curb collective
violence by states. He had studied massacres, and became convinced that governments
should not be allowed to harm unarmed civilians. During World War II, Lemkin intro-
duced the new concept of genocide, a neologism formed from the Greek genos (“people”
or “race”) and the Latin caedere (“to kill”). Lemkin deﬁned genocide in 1944 as “a coor-
dinated plan of different actions aiming at the destruction of essential foundations of
the life of national groups, with the aim of annihilating the groups themselves.”3 After
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his death in 1959, the term fell into disuse. In the 1970s, however, historians and social
scientists rediscovered the concept and published the ﬁrst academic studies on geno-
cide. Since then, the number of publications on genocide has continued to grow, and
today genocide studies is a respectable academic specialty with its own journals and
research institutes in North America, Europe, Australia, and South America.4
The central question in genocide studies, How can we explain the fact that
genocidal violence has occurred in culturally, technologically, and politically different
societies?, has three sub-questions. First, what are the causes of a genocidal process?
Or, how does the process of systematically destroying a category of people begin? Sec-
ond, how does a genocidal process develop? There are strong indications that when
such a process has been set in motion, it develops its own dynamic; how exactly does
that dynamic evolve from the individual to the most collective level? Finally, what are
the consequences of genocide? How do perpetrators, victims, and third parties continue
to live after genocide? How do they process the traumatic events—or not? Much useful
research has examined the evolution of separate genocides, such as the destruction
of the Ottoman Armenians in 1915, the Holocaust, and the genocides in Cambodia
(1975–1979), Rwanda (1994), and Bosnia (during the civil wars in the former Yugosla-
via). We also know a great deal about speciﬁc aspects of genocidal processes: research
has investigated how a fairly “normal” civil society turns into a persecutory society, the
motives of ordinary killers, the power and effect of charismatic leaders, and the gender
aspects of violence, among other issues. In this article, I discuss two themes related to
genocide studies: the positionality of the scholar and a model for genocide analysis.
Pitfalls and Problems
The study of genocide has never generated consensus among students of the phenome-
non. Some colleagues have even rejected the use of the word, citing politicization and
lack of complexity as sources of misunderstanding.5 These are laudable concerns, but I
believe we should preserve the concept, provided that we remain vigilant with respect to
four perspectives: emotional, moral, legal, and political approaches.
First, let us consider the emotional constraints of genocide studies. All social
research operates amidst the tension between involvement and detachment. As a gen-
eral problem in the academy it has been dealt with at some length, and the study of vio-
lence is particularly relevant from the perspective of involvement and detachment.6
Many people ﬁnd the topic intrinsically repulsive and react with strong condemnatory
emotions. Although a certain amount of passion and involvement can determine a
scholar’s choice to study this topic, a great deal of detachment is necessary to sift
through multitudes of documents and memoirs describing very intimate details of kill-
ing. Iris Chang’s suicide, reportedly suffering from depression due to research on Japa-
nese war crimes in China, might be an extreme example of excessive involvement.7 But
even a seasoned researcher such as Robert J. Lifton confessed in the introduction to his
book The Nazi Doctors that during the research process he had “nightmares about
Auschwitz, sometimes involving my wife and children.”8 All in all, intensive research
on violence can be straining when one is emotionally involved, and detachment remains
important.
To illustrate how emotions interfere in genocide research, let us turn to empathy.
Empathy is the capacity to recognize and, to some extent, share other human beings’
feelings. It comprises the cognitive and affective process of “the inner experience of
sharing in and comprehending the momentary psychological state of another person.”9
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In other words, emotions can be contagious. Anyone studying genocide cannot help but
feel intense anger and hatred toward genocide and its perpetrators. This is a conse-
quence of empathy: the real, existing emotions of the victim group contaminate the
scholar. A personal example can elucidate this point. In the summer of 2007, I was fea-
tured in the documentary Land of our Grandparents, during which time I traveled to
Eastern Turkey to trace the life of genocide survivor Vahram Goekjian, whose moving
memoir I had read.10 In the documentary, we encounter a group of Turks partying in a
place that was the site of a massacre in 1915 and I make a rancorous comment. Many
viewers found this an unnecessary expression of acrimony, even wrath. Even I found
my response unduly overweening when I watched the documentary much later, but
after some reﬂection I now understand why I made the comment; as a result of empa-
thy, the emotions of the victim group (Armenians) had deeply affected me. Indeed,
Armenian audiences that watched the documentary understood me quite well, but for
most viewers I came across as exceedingly emotional. For this reason, genocide studies
is an isolating experience; the more one is absorbed into the material, the more one is
drawn into these emotions through empathy. This process can lead to a certain loneli-
ness, the feeling of not being understood by most people, and even professional defor-
mations such as the development of an esoteric sense of black humor, which again
isolates the genocide scholar further from mainstream society.11
A good way to think about involvement and detachment is the axis of tension
between sacralization and trivialization. These two opposing forces can best be seen as
poles on a continuum, and genocide scholars should maintain vigilance against both. At
the one extreme, there is sacralization: victim activists sometimes mystify the phenome-
non as an inexplicable horror that we cannot possibly fathom. Their history is sacred,
they enjoy moral immunity, and the memory of their genocide has indeed been made
into a religion by some. Their visits to sites such as death camps resemble pilgrimages
as though they are out to catch some historical aura. This kind of approach is perfectly
understandable from their perspective, but it carries some risks too. It places taboos on
complex and ambivalent questions and does not help us better understand genocide. At
the other end of the continuum there is trivialization. Spurious associations lead to the
inﬂation of the concept and banalize it. For example, genocide has been applied to
phenomena as disparate as the spread of AIDS, the 2003 American invasion of Iraq,
postcolonial immigration to Britain, and Hurricane Katrina. At its most pernicious, tri-
vialization includes deliberate genocide denial.
A second pitfall is moralization. Most people, but even some scholars, think about
genocide in terms of good versus evil. Indeed, many books on genocide include the
word “evil” in their main titles, usually coupled with a harrowing picture of skulls on
the book cover. But a manicheistic divide between purely evil perpetrators and purely
good victims is not at all helpful in explaining processes of mass violence. The myth of
pure evil is a form of pre-scientiﬁc thought with a strong religious overtone.12 Popular
representations of genocide often stagnate at this level of imagery. For example, a Chan-
nel 5 documentary titled The Most Evil Men and Women in History contains footage on
Nero, Vlad Tepeş the Impaler, King John, Ivan the Terrible, Attila the Hun, Rasputin,
Hitler, Pol Pot, and Idi Amin.13 The accompanying book reads, “There are some evil
people in this world, when you think about the killing, torturing, bombing and maiming
and this book covers it all.”14 The example of Vlad Tepeş’s violence against enemies
and prisoners of war contains only images of cruelty: “He was a fan of various forms of
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torture including disembowelling and rectal and facial impalement. Vlad the Impaler
tortured thousands while he ate and drank among the corpses.”15 But in the same
breath, Stalin’s “evil” is then interpreted as a matter of magnitude.16 Secular political
leaders are portrayed as devils incarnate.
The imagery of evil is so powerful that it percolates into scholarship. Professional
historians also sometimes ﬁnd it difﬁcult to avoid the pitfall of moralization. Simon
Sebag Monteﬁore’s Monsters: History’s Most Evil Men and Women treats the following
persons: Caligula, Richard III, Adolf Eichmann, Joseph Stalin, Pol Pot, Charles Manson,
Herman Cortes, Hitler, Al Capone, Lavrenti Beria, Lucrezia Borgia, Nicolae Ceauşescu,
Vlad the Impaler, Saddam Hussein, Simon de Montfort, Pablo Escobar, Ivan the Terri-
ble, Genghis Khan, Idi Amin, Attila the Hun, Josef Mengele, Heinrich Himmler, Mao
Zedong, Osama bin Laden, Kim Il Sung, Slobodan Milošević, Empress Cixi, and Tomas
de Torquemeda.17 By lumping disparate political leaders together into a single pantheon
of evil, both books are deeply ahistorical and asociological in their juxtapositions. The
media’s depiction of ongoing political violence, which profoundly shapes popular per-
ceptions of violence, is no more sophisticated. Whereas violent individuals such as
suicide terrorists, rampage shooters, or dictators are often seen as evil incarnate, when
groups such as paramilitary units, political parties, or even entire societies descend into
violence, this descent is often attributed to madness or some other collective psychiatric
disorder.18 Moralistic approaches to genocide only serve to strengthen this kind of
thought and do not add anything substantial to our understanding of it.
There can be no doubt that genocide is a crime and its perpetrators are criminals.
Nevertheless, a third approach that we should try to avoid is the legalistic one. In legal
practice, which at the international level is closely concerned with genocide, the objec-
tive is not necessarily to ﬁnd out the causes and mechanisms of genocide but to prose-
cute and convict people. We should avoid the overuse of terms such as “crime,”
“criminal(s),” “punishment,” “blame,” and especially “guilt.” In a lucid essay, the Dutch
sociologist Van Benthem van den Bergh discussed the question of guilt as a means of
intellectual orientation. He argued that the judicial system assumes that the individual
and the society are two different realities, and he further noted that the courts that
judge the criminals are not part of the human structures of that same society. An indi-
vidual (or group of individuals) is accused of an act, and he or she must be judged as
guilty or not guilty. Law does not concern itself with the nature of relationships between
people or complex long-term processes, and it is purely interested in qualifying a single
act and isolating it in a person. (Social science, on the other hand, looks at interpersonal
or intergroup relations and treats individuals as intersection points of complex rela-
tional vectors.) Establishing a perpetrator’s guilt is taken to mean that the cause of vio-
lence is a certain amount of evil in that perpetrator (a reiﬁcation or personiﬁcation of
evil) and that the search for other causes can be terminated.19 This binary thought pro-
cess sustains monocausality and leads to often-heard debates such as “was it genocide
or not?” All in all, guilt and blame are not helpful points of departure for understanding
genocidal processes.
Furthermore, legal responses to genocide are much more a product of politics and
compromise than scholarly ones generally are. At the 1945 Nuremberg trials, signiﬁcant
concessions were awarded to the Soviet Union, whose prosecutors and judges such as
Andrey Vyshinskiy, Roman Rudenko, Lev Sheinin, and Iona Nikitchenko had been up
to their knees in blood during the 1930s. At Nuremberg, Stalin’s juridical accomplices
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succeeded in obscuring the true nature of the Soviet massacre of Polish military and
civilian elites, in which some were even personally complicit.20 After the Cold War, as
hopes of an international human rights regime rose, some aspects of international law
did not change. It was not an absolute, moral yardstick but an outcome of compromises
struck between perpetrator elites and third parties. For example, when Radovan Kar-
adzić was arraigned at the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia
(ICTY), he claimed that US envoy Richard Holbrooke promised him immunity from
prosecution if he withdrew from politics.21 Holbrooke passed away in 2010 and carried
the truth to the grave, and we will probably never know the details. But Carla del Ponte
hints at the existence of such deals as well in her unvarnished memoir of her tenure as
prosecutor at the ICTY.22 Legal responses to genocide lack relative autonomy from
power and do not offer a useful mode of orientation.
Finally, the fourth, and perhaps most important, danger that looms over genocide
research is politics. Lobbyists, identity politics, activism and advocacy groups, and espe-
cially states use the concept not in a scholarly way but as a politischer Kampfbegriff
(political combat concept) as hollow rhetoric. They have a vested interest in misrepre-
senting the truth and they often operate with legal and moral agendas. Political violence
is politically very sensitive. The quintessential example of how lasting the damage is that
genocide generates is the Turkish-Armenian conﬂict. Almost a full century after the
event, group relations between these two neighboring ethnic groups are bitterly tense,
both at the informal level and the formal, interstate level. Scholarship on the genocide is
deeply politicized and only in recent years has steered away from partisanship and
reached a modicum of normality.23 Politicization originates from all directions. Victim
group activists demand genocide recognition not only because of the caedere aspect of
the concept (i.e., the violence itself) but also because of the genos dimension of genocide
(i.e., the collective nature of the violence). The victims often believe that they have been
destroyed as a nation. Hence, recognition conﬁrms group identity and acknowledges
and reinstates the group’s membership in a global family of nations.24 Critics, opposition
groups, and the Left also engage in politicization; decades of fellow traveling with the
Soviet Union testiﬁes to this. But even after the collapse of communism, the Left’s
response to mass violence has not always been prudent. An excellent example is Marko
Attila Hoare’s devastating analysis of how left-wing European revisionists, by champion-
ing the Milošević regime as Europe’s last “socialist” government, abandoned its Yugoslav
victims and failed to respond appropriately to the violence.25 The politics of genocide
are also embedded in a dense international force ﬁeld in which genocide is abused as a
diplomatic trump card. A clear example of international hypocrisy in denouncing geno-
cide was the treatment of Kurds in the late 1980s and early 1990s in Turkey and Iraq.
Whereas the Anfal campaign in Iraq, which cost approximately 150,000 Kurds their
lives, was vigorously denounced, a deafening silence reigned regarding the Turkish
army’s blanket destruction of 3,000 Kurdish villages across the border. The diplomacy of
genocide stems mostly from geopolitical interests between allies and enemies.26
The main catalyst in the politicization of genocide is the state. For some states,
genocide denial is part and parcel of their collective identity process or national security
concepts. Robert Hayden pointed out that “genocide has been a tool for building a
number of nation states that are now honorable members of the world community.”27
The identity politics and genocide denial of states that enjoy global legitimacy manifest
themselves when governments, discontented with scholars searching for “skeletons in
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the closet,” deny access to archival collections and libraries or prohibit them from con-
ducting ﬁeld work. The opposite situation is also possible: governments might try to
foster or manipulate research by funding politically useful research by pushing for the
establishment of academic chairs at home or abroad or by offering scholarships. Exam-
ples include both the Turkish and Armenian governments’ manipulation of research on
the Armenian Genocide, Israel’s sacralization and monopolization of Jewish victimhood
in the Holocaust, Iran’s willingness to sponsor Holocaust denial, the former Ukrainian
government’s ofﬁcial declaration of the 1932–1933 famine as genocide, and the Rwan-
dan government’s exclusion of Hutu from the category of Rwandan genocide victims.28
This dense political and moral ﬁeld has affected scholarship in quite fundamental ways.
For this reason, Max Weber’s classical distinction between politics as a vocation and
science as a vocation should be written in stone for genocide scholars.
Victor Hugo famously said “If a man is killed in Paris, it is a murder; the throats of
ﬁfty thousand people are cut in the East, and it is a question.”29 Although politicization
has not (and will never be) surmounted, genocide studies has managed to overcome
this kind of orientalism and methodological racism in the study of mass violence. It is
to the credit of genocide scholars that orientalist approaches to violence have been sub-
dued. Too often, génocidaires outside of Europe have been romanticized as products of
ostensibly brutal cultures. Moreover, modern political crimes have been attributed to in-
herently evil crooks with large moustaches, living in exotic areas such as the Balkans
and the Caucasus and possessed by oriental despotism and barbaric tribalism. For
example, in accounts of the Armenian Genocide, the perpetrators, from the organizing
elites to the rank-and-ﬁle executioners, have too often ﬁgured as evil faceless killers, un-
differentiated and unexplained. The perpetrators appear in the Anatolian killing ﬁelds
ex nihilo and murder people for no apparent reason other than innate (Turkish or
Islamic) cruelty and malignance. These kinds of caricatures not only romanticize the
perpetrators but play down the experiences of the victims. “The death of one man is a
tragedy, the death of a million is a statistic.” This harrowing quote, commonly (and
probably wrongfully) attributed to Stalin, was the norm in orientalist views of genocide,
in which the victims were not individuals but statistics. After all, they were only replace-
able and expendable masses of illiterate peasants, anonymous villagers, or invisible sub-
alterns anyway. Implicitly racist biases such as these continue to be undermined in
research on mass violence, in which individual victims and perpetrators are taken ser-
iously. Genocide studies needs to continue to reject essentialist platitudes and treat each
and every individual and group as actors in a power struggle.
All in all, genocide research must strive to be dispassionate, amoral, non-juridical,
and apolitical. Genocide can be studied, if not objectively and impartially, with due
scholarly care.
Promises
A recent, profound, subtle, and nuanced study of genocidal violence is Jacques Seme-
lin’s Purify and Destroy: The Political Uses of Massacre and Genocide.30 The book is
eminently interdisciplinary, covers a broad chronological and geographical perspective,
and successfully integrates different theories. The tone is detached and the book has
well-planned and effective moments of rest as well as acceleration. Semelin focuses on
three cases by asking the following question: What did Germany in the 1930s, Yugosla-
via in the late 1980s, and Rwanda in the early 1990s have in common that each came to
such horriﬁc violence?
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Semelin unfolds his model from the strong core concept of “imaginary,” a noun
that comprises the totality of ideas, emotions, and images that a social group or society
has about itself. It is the deﬁnition of the “us,” the in-group. The social imaginary is a
socio-affective process subject to manipulation by political elites. This construct is con-
tinuously shaped by politicians and other prominent public ﬁgures. Semelin discusses
how, in times of crisis, politicians increasingly come to forge this imaginary around
three themes: identity, purity, and security. The ﬁrst theme refers to identity politics, a
form of politics that revolves around the self-interest of a self-proclaimed identity
group, often on ethnic, religious, or racial grounds. The objective of identity politics is
to deﬁne and elevate the in-group and to fuel polarization between the in-group and de-
spised others. Second, purity is a crucial theme that reforges the imaginary as society
begins to imagine itself as a dirty nest. Catharsis can be achieved only by “cleansing,”
which, by the way, is genocidal elites’ favorite verb. Finally, Semelin discusses the multi-
dimensional concept of security, which can be understood in territorial, cultural, eco-
nomic, and emotional terms. When these social dimensions come under pressure,
radical elites can construct an imaginary of fear and anxiety. They then determine that
only the destruction of an (often internal) enemy can neutralize threats. The primary
components in the three themes of identity, purity, security are life versus death and
existence versus destruction. In times of political crisis, they can appeal to large seg-
ments of the population and serve to justify violence against certain groups.
Purify and Destroy is useful for genocide scholars for its analytical structure, which
can metaphorically be imagined like a three-pronged Matryoshka doll. This design par-
adigm can be analyzed at the macro, meso, and micro levels, bearing in mind the rele-
vant connections between the three levels. The macro level refers to interstate structures
and the context of geopolitical power relations. The meso level consists of all intrastate
developments relevant to the genesis of the political crisis and, later, the genocide. The
micro level, then, is about how individuals become involved in the genocidal process
either as perpetrators, victims, or third parties. Viewed in its coherence, rather than a
pyramid structure, a Matryoshka doll might be a better visualization of a model. These
three contextual layers are not simply piled on top of each other, but the largest contexts
are conditions for the smallest ones. Without the macro context of interstate crisis,
there cannot be an internal radicalization of the political elites; and without that radica-
lization, the violent measures against the victims would not have been taken and count-
less individual perpetrators would not have murdered innumerable individual victims
in micro situations of killing. If we take this structure as a starting point, there is a lot
we know about genocide. In what follows, I shall brieﬂy discuss these three contexts,
using recent and forthcoming studies of genocide.
The macro level concerns the international context and structure of geopolitical
power relations that could lead to war. It is most often binary international conﬂicts
that escalate into war and (potentially) genocidal situations: Turkey–Greece, Germany–
USSR, Cambodia–Vietnam, Serbia–Croatia, Rwanda–Burundi. During war the main
condition for genocide is often met. Violence is already widely exercised, ﬁrst only
between standing armies in legally legitimate military hostilities but later also in crimi-
nal para-state operations. One binary axis of tension that has been studied in-depth is
that between Nazi Germany and the Soviet Union. Ernst Nolte’s 1986 argument that
the Nazi genocide was a reaction to Stalinist mass murders (including the Gulag), trig-
gered the Historikerstreit but did not substantially confront the problem of interstate
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polarization.31 Conversely, recent research has recognized that their relations, whether
rapprochement or antagonism, inﬂuenced the course and nature of their violence. Tim-
othy Snyder’s mammoth Bloodlands makes the argument that the two regimes wittingly
(and unwittingly) “enabled” each other’s crimes in the Molotov-Ribbentrop pact.32 On
the other hand, antagonism unleashed violence of a different nature, which Michael
Geyer and Mark Edele paraphrase as follows: “Seen as a totality, the war in the ‘East’
started with a rapid-ﬁre escalation of unrestraint on the German side . . . and was coun-
tered by a distinct radicalization and barbarization in the context of defense measures
by the Soviets, which in turn triggered a radicalization and barbarization process on the
side of the aggressor.”33 These sophisticated studies on the interstate context of mass
violence can be replicated in other cases.
Apart from the relations between discrete states, the international state system as a
changing, unpredictable constellation needs more attention as well. Before the growth
of international and transnational organizations, states often championed humanitarian
intervention, while under the surface playing a dirty game of manipulative diplomacy.
The Cold War only exacerbated this existing, structural problem as the United States
and the Soviet Union fought proxy wars and expressed moral indignation at mass vio-
lence opportunistically. Forthcoming research on genocide focuses on Western coun-
tries’ responses to mass violence in postcolonial states as one dimension of Cold War
politics.34 Since the 1990s, studies of the role of the United Nations have exposed the
organization’s inertia in the face of genocide, for example in Rwanda. They have also
demonstrated that this apathy (and states’ knowledge of it) can even contribute to the
commission of genocide.35 The politics of the macro level profoundly inﬂuence the
lower two levels. For example, on 14 July 2008 the International Criminal Court (ICC)
in the Hague indicted Sudanese President Omar Al-Bashir on counts of war crimes and
crimes against humanity. A year later the ICC issued an arrest warrant for Al-Bashir
and indicted him for genocide as well. The Sudanese government retaliated by expelling
international aid agencies and intensifying the violence on the ground against Dar-
furis.36 In other words, a well-intended and justiﬁable act by the ICC inadvertently
caused more misery for the victims.
Below the macro level of international relations, the second Matryoshka enters into
force. Within the structure of war are nestled intrastate developments such as the ideo-
logical self-hypnosis of political elites, complex decision-making processes, the necessity
and logic of a division of labor, the emergence of paramilitary troops, and any mass
mobilization for the segregation and destruction of the victim group. The inception of
genocide is a central problem we need to understand better. Popular myths hold that
countries descend into “madness” as people pick up clubs and machetes to batter their
neighbors in a violent anarchy. Surely genocide is always organized by political leader-
ship, but we need to recognize as well that generally these enormous processes have sur-
prisingly few practical organizers at the top. For example, Aktion Reinhard murdered
approximately two million Jews and was set up by Christian Wirth, Odilo Globocnik,
Franz Stangl, and Irmfried Eberl. In the Soviet Union, it was Stalin’s inner circle that or-
ganized the mass murders: Vyacheslav Molotov, Kliment Voroshilov, Lazar Kagano-
vich, Andrei Zhdanov, and Nikolai Yezhov. Hundreds of thousands of people were
murdered within a year across the huge country upon orders from half a dozen men. So
too in the Armenian Genocide. A small group around Talaat Pasha organized the geno-
cide; Dr. Bahaeddin Shakir, Dr. Mehmed Nazım, Ali Münif, Şükrü Kaya, and a few
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fanatical governors wiped out almost the entire Armenian community of the Ottoman
Empire.
The decision-making process consists of the initiation of a genocidal policy and
further developments. Two assumptions should be avoided. First, one should not search
for the order, the decree that authorizes absolute destruction and separates the pre-vio-
lent period from murder. Genocide generally develops through radicalizing phases that
come as shocks to existing policies. A sophisticated literature exists on this subject in
the ﬁeld of Holocaust history.37 Second, political elites do not and cannot always foresee
the consequences of the decisions they take. Persecution can develop into expulsion and
expulsion can escalate into mass killing, and each shift in policy can be an unintended
consequence of the previous one. For example, during dekulakization in 1930–1931 the
Soviets deported 1.8 million kulaks (better-off peasants) to Siberia. When tension with
Japan grew in the 1930s, the kulaks’ presence in the Soviet-Japanese borderlands was
seen as an internal liability and many were killed after all to subdue an “insurgent rebel-
lion.” In other words, “one repressive policy created the foundation for another.”38 The
genocidal process is to some extent an unintended but directional process (a blind pro-
cess),39 and determinism should be avoided.
I will now brieﬂy discuss one important issue relevant to the meso level: regional
variation in genocides. Regionalization and de-regionalization are important themes in
recent genocide research. Genocide scholars have examined the relationship between
central decision-making processes and the implementation of mass murder at the local
level. In-depth research on how the genocidal process evolves at the provincial, district,
city, or even village level has proven to be a fruitful endeavor. It can teach us a great deal
about how local shifts in power dynamics can inﬂuence the course and intensity of geno-
cidal processes, some of which, as we know, are more regionally disparate than others.
Local political or social elites can anticipate, expedite, intensify, or delay and resist geno-
cidal destruction steered from above. A meso focus can also follow the deterioration and
ultimate disintegration of intercommunal relations as a result of external pressures,
amidst drastically worsening security conditions for the victims.40 These insights at the
meso level of the Matryoshka doll illustrate how dynamics within the perpetrator group
can account for variation during genocide. They also instruct us that even if genocides
unfold on twisted paths, the eventual result is still destruction. It is a desideratum of
future research to penetrate deeper into and probe further the complexity of genocides.
Tucked away at the heart of the three Matryoshkas lies the smallest but most ven-
omous doll: the countless killings of defenseless victims carried out by perpetrators. The
central question at this level is, How do ordinary people become involved in genocide?
Or, to quote Alexander Hinton, “Why did they kill?”41 Comparative research on geno-
cide perpetrators is gradually reﬂecting common ground and increasing sophistication
of this subject.42 Horizontal pressure (group conformism), vertical pressure (coercion in
a command structure), and routinization are major mechanisms that propel massacre.
Genocidal behavior such as sexual violence and cruelty are part and parcel of this level
only. Moreover, the interdependence of the macro, meso, and micro levels of genocide
runs both up and down: just as the macro context of crisis and war is a precondition
for micro-level killings, so too the success of political elites’ attempt to destroy a victim
group is dependent on the mobilization of perpetrators. The génocidaires need to
believe and act in a way that facilitates the genocide as smoothly as possible. Through-
out the killing process, they experience an increase in role distance, a development in
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which particular commitments and principles give them the moral integrity to carry out
the murders.43
One of the cornerstones in the research on rank-and-ﬁle perpetrators is undoubt-
edly Christopher Browning’s highly acclaimed Ordinary Men. This powerful study is
famous for adopting a socio-psychological model of obedience to authority to explain
the behavior of German perpetrators. Browning’s research is based on a substantial pri-
mary source, records that were housed in the Central Ofﬁce for State Justice Adminis-
trations (Zentrale Stelle der Landesjustizverwaltungen) in Ludwigsburg, near Stuttgart.
He beneﬁted from an extensive collection of records that included later interrogations
of the perpetrators who carried out the massacres. Browning writes, “Never before had I
encountered the issue of choice so dramatically framed by the course of events and so
openly discussed by at least some of the perpetrators. Never before had I seen the mon-
strous deeds of the Holocaust so starkly juxtaposed with the human faces of the kill-
ers.”44 Another example of perpetrator research drawn from the Yugoslav wars is a
chapter in Slavenka Drakulić’s book, They Would Not Hurt A Fly.45 Drakulić uses ICTY
hearings to paint a picture of Goran Jelišić, a Bosnian Serb who was known as an ordi-
nary, quiet young man who enjoyed life and liked ﬁshing but who, in 1992, ran a deten-
tion center where he tortured and shot possibly hundreds of people. Indeed, he
murdered without mercy, without distinction, and without consequences.
What emerges from these studies of perpetrators is a nuanced and complex discus-
sion of dispositional and situational factors. But this is where the research reaches its
boundaries. Browning, Waller, Welzer, Drakulić, and others have studied different gen-
ocides but reached remarkably similar conclusions, which has become a solidiﬁed com-
monplace in genocide research: anybody can become a perpetrator under the “right”
conditions. The Milgram experiments,46 which offered a psychological underpinning of
this thesis, have been replicated and have apparently yielded uniform results across so-
cieties. However, there are grounds to question this established wisdom. Recent research
has focused on differences in empathy among human beings.47 Some people are
equipped with lower levels of empathy at birth, and some people are able to “switch
off” their empathy with other people (including victims) better than others. Both of
these arguments on disposition have consequences for the study of genocide. Based on
a more controlled replication of Milgram’s experiments, the psychologist Jerry Burger
has argued, “Participants who were high in empathic concern expressed a reluctance to
continue the procedure earlier than did those who were low on this trait.”48 The societal
dehumanization that accompanies the genocidal process, then, cannot but further exac-
erbate this and render individuals more susceptible to the process of genocide perpetra-
tion. Forthcoming research will hopefully ﬂesh out this problem and offer more
complex answers.49
This Matryoshka model with its three levels of analysis can be seen as a set of com-
plex processes that trigger the initiation and execution of mass political violence. The le-
vels roughly correspond to academic disciplines: whereas political scientists study the
macro level, sociologists may be more interested in the intrastate meso level, and the
micro level is perhaps an object of study within the domain of psychology. Genocides
can best be seen as a complex interplay of developments in this three-tier structure. The
model is by no means meant to be an exhaustive evaluation or comprehensive research
program but merely a model for possible future research into relevant new directions in
genocide research.
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Conclusion: Grapes and Wrath
Comparative research can be a rewarding and meaningful effort, but without models or
theories research on genocide quickly reaches its limits. Without a theoretical perspec-
tive or a modicum of conceptualization, there is a risk of tracing only superﬁcial simila-
rities rather than delving deeply into parallel biographies, analogous structures, and
similar developments. Empirical density cannot substitute for clear reasoning. Digging
for and locating relevant evidence is important, but the materials must be sufﬁciently
integrated into a study as a whole. In other words, not only do the grapes have to be
picked, but the juice of the grapes must be fermented in order to create wine.
Finally, the consequences of genocide cannot be captured in the happy endings
characteristic of Hollywood. (Perhaps this is why Hollywood has never produced a single
ﬁlm on genocide with a fairly realistic plot.) The rule is not rescue and escape into free-
dom, but denial and impunity. Even worse, the consequences of traumatization and vic-
timization can potentially lead to more violence and (cycles of) revenge. Studies of
genocides often (rightfully) draw sharp dividing lines between “perpetrators” and “vic-
tims” and lock these immutable roles at that particular segment in history.50 But hu-
mans’ potentially multiple roles in genocidal processes are often overlooked or
ignored.51 Moreover, survivors and victim communities are too often patronized as hav-
ing drawn universalist humanist lessons from their victimization and are often expected
to forgive and “reconcile,” a deeply problematic concept. On the contrary, victimized in-
dividuals and groups often feel vindictive (with or without justice) and can call for ven-
geance as a justiﬁed response to victimization. Political elites often capitalize on desires
of vengeance among victim groups. Once mobilized, when such a process of collective
vengeful desire escalates and crosses the threshold of violence, we are back to square one.
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On Situating the Study of Genocide within
Political Violence1
Ernesto Verdeja
University of Notre Dame
This article identiﬁes a particular challenge for comparative genocide studies, namely the underem-
phasis of investigation into the relationship between genocide and other forms of political violence
and the ways in which they are related temporally and spatially. It advocates situating genocide
studies within the broader domain of political violence research to explain not only the causes of
genocide but general variation in violent outcomes. By systematically comparing genocides to non-
genocides, we gain greater insights into the factors that result in large-scale, group-oriented destruc-
tion. The article also calls for greater disaggregation of analytical frameworks in comparative
research, including the adoption of microanalytical perspectives to explain variation in the onset,
dynamics, and abeyance of violence within cases.
Key words: comparative genocide, causes of genocide, microanalysis, methodology
The past twenty years have seen impressive advances in the comparative study of the
causes and patterns of genocide. Following World War II, most analyses of genocide
focused on the Holocaust. These earlier works presented us with sophisticated under-
standings of the historical, ideological, and structural origins of anti-Semitism, Nazi po-
licies, and the dynamics of mass violence that resulted in the genocide of Europe’s
Jewish and Roma and Sinti populations.2 In the years following 1945, however, there
were few comparative studies of genocide, and most of those were largely ignored by
social scientists.
Beginning with a number of pioneering works in the 1980s, and continuing
through the 1990s with the violence in Rwanda and the former Yugoslavia, scholars
turned their attention to the methods of comparative assessment. This “second genera-
tion” of comparative work continues to produce important insights into the conditions,
onset, and patterns of genocide.3 Scholars have widened their interests to explore the
relationships of imperialism and colonialism with modern genocide as well as the con-
nections linking environmental degradation and resource scarcity to mass killing.4
Some have called for a reinterpretation of Cold War state terror through the rubric of
genocide.5 And still other analysts are calling for a fundamental reframing of our basic
epistemological and ontological assumptions about genocide, drawing on critical theory,
post-structuralism, and other areas of political theory with provocative and important
results. The interdisciplinary ﬁeld of genocide studies is growing and becoming more
analytically sophisticated.6
Nevertheless, the ﬁeld faces some basic questions and challenges, including deﬁni-
tional disagreements that affect the scope and types of cases chosen; problematic
understandings of intentionality; and reductive conceptualizations of ideology and
rationality, among other issues.7 Given space constraints, here I focus on one speciﬁc
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issue requiring further attention: the relationship between genocide and other kinds of
political violence. How is genocide related temporally (in terms of sequencing) and spa-
tially to other kinds of violence? Although we have increasingly rich and sophisticated
empirical accounts of speciﬁc cases of genocide, our understanding of the theoretical
relationships between genocide and violence more generally is still under-developed.
This is especially evident in comparative causal theories, which focus largely on the
comparison of genocides and thus ignore connections between genocide and variations
of extreme violence, such as revolution, civil war, counterinsurgency strategy, and the
like.
This article does not provide an overview of the ﬁeld of comparative genocide stu-
dies.8 Instead, I examine the theoretical challenge of articulating genocide’s relationship
to political violence and sketch a few ways forward for the ﬁeld. These comments are
motivated by the belief that we should seek not only to understand the historical contin-
gencies of genocide in particular cases but also to develop theoretical knowledge of
mass political violence: the conditions under which it is likely to occur, the small-scale
processes (or, in Charles Tilly’s terms, “mechanisms”) of violent escalation and de-
escalation at local levels, and the ways in which these processes are shaped by, connect
to, reinforce, accelerate, and impede higher-level processes of violence.9 We should ex-
plain, in other words, variability in violent outcomes. With a few exceptions, our com-
parative theories have yet to develop systematic theoretical accounts for the interactions
of these various levels of violence (micro, meso, macro) and consequently the onset
and diffusion of genocidal violence; nor do they investigate cases where genocide did
not occur.
The points below are primarily aimed at comparative works on the causes of geno-
cide—a topic that continues to receive an enormous amount of attention from scholars.
The comments are largely methodological in nature and are thus a few degrees removed
from the deeper epistemological and ontological debates currently raging in our ﬁeld.
Nevertheless, these methodological issues require attention if our knowledge of this ter-
rible phenomenon is to deepen.
Genocide and Political Violence
It is by now well established that genocide and war often go hand in hand. Numerous
studies have shown that genocides tend to occur during wars, when populations are liv-
ing under conditions of fear and are de-sensitized to the use of mass violence, when in-
group and out-group distinctions are pronounced, when the elite are likely to choose
more radical strategies to achieve their aims, and when state resources are already mobi-
lized for the killing of enemies and the repression of internal dissent.10 Nevertheless,
comparative research on the causes of genocide has generally been remarkably uninter-
ested in exploring how genocide is situated in the wider constellation of political vio-
lence. Instead, studies have largely focused on cases in which the outcome has been
genocide. To be clear, I am not arguing that scholars have failed to explore antecedent
factors or that they have only studied speciﬁc genocidal periods (say Armenia 1915–
1923, Cambodia 1975–1979, etc.). Indeed, most of the comparative literature in the ﬁeld
draws on a wide variety of background conditions to explain genocide, from historical
and structural factors (state formation, regime types, political culture, histories of exclu-
sion going back decades or more, and the like) to more immediate factors, such as polit-
ical crises and the strategic choices of the elite. Rather, the problem has been that cases
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are chosen for analysis based on the experience of genocide, while other instances with
similar prior conditions and different violent outcomes are mostly ignored.
The narrow focus of research on cases of genocide (or selection on the dependent
variable) carries some signiﬁcant methodological problems. By studying only those
cases which have resulted in genocide, how do we know whether our proposed factors,
causal dynamics, and processes actually explain genocide? It may be that these same
factors explain other forms of violence as well and that we are consequently misidentify-
ing the true fundamental and distinct causes of genocide. The problem is that in study-
ing only genocides we likely choose only those cases that conﬁrm our theoretical
assumptions at the expense of discovering whether our stipulated causal mechanisms
are indeed primary causal factors. Take, for instance, the examination of only highly
ideological genocides. Bounded in this way, one’s ﬁndings are likely to show that radical
ideologies are a primary cause of genocide (which itself risks being tautological), while
failing to explain how these ideologies may be present in less violent outcomes or not
present in other cases sharing many of the empirical features of genocide.11 If radical
ideologies also appear in non-genocidal violence, then we need to re-examine the causal
importance of ideology to genocide. And yet without investigating cases with broadly
similar prior conditions but different violent outcomes, it is difﬁcult to gauge the impor-
tance of ideology (or any other factor).
There are several possible ways forward. First, scholars should broaden the types of
violence they study and thus situate genocide more thoroughly within the literature of
political violence. Rather than ask, “What do all genocides have in common?” (a ques-
tion, incidentally, made all the more difﬁcult given the lack of consensus in the ﬁeld on
the deﬁnition of genocide12), we should explore the conditions that lead to extreme
forms of political violence—of which genocide is a subset—as well as examine the ways
in which genocide and other forms of political violence interact and reinforce one
another. To do this, the ﬁeld needs to engage with advances in other research areas on
political violence, such as civil war and non-genocidal state repression. Second, compar-
ative genocide scholars should look to the expanding microanalysis work on violence
(such as research on civil wars) as a way of better understanding the dissemination,
intensity, and patterns of violence within cases. In sum, the comparative study of geno-
cide needs to engage the broader domain of conﬂict studies.
Genocide and Political Violence: Expanding the Research Frame
I am advocating a change in theoretical perspective to situate genocide within the larger
context of political violence instead of focusing solely on the study of genocide. I do not
claim that we should abandon single-case or comparative studies of genocide tout court,
since these methods have developed important theoretical and practical knowledge.
Rather, I envision this contextual turn (and broadening) as a complement to the “geno-
cide only” approaches still dominating our ﬁeld. This alternative contextual approach
has, I believe, several beneﬁts: it would draw attention to the broader host of perpetrator
repressive and destructive policies (beyond those leading to genocide), show the interac-
tive effects and general processes of perpetrator policy radicalization, and shed light on
the different steps in the continuum of repression. In addition, by extending our
research to cover instances of non-genocidal mass violence we could explore why geno-
cide does not occur in certain cases and why, in other scenarios, violence might remain
constant, without degenerating into intentional extermination. Extant comparative
literature in genocide studies does not adequately account for either possibility.13
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Without wider research into cases of political violence we risk producing causal theories
that either misrepresent the causes of genocide or over-determine outcomes. In other
words, we cannot understand why political violence escalates, remains constant, or
declines.
The state repression literature may be helpful here.14 Scholars across disciplines
have explored when and how repressive behavior increases and decreases.15 The ques-
tions that arise from these lines of inquiry are widely varied, but they are meant to
encapsulate a broad range of violent behavior beyond genocide alone. For instance, re-
searchers ask, Under what conditions do states move from institutional coercive prac-
tices, such as legalized civil and political discrimination or language restrictions, to
wider forms of collective suppression, such as total language and religious prohibitions?
When do occasional riots turn into sustained attacks and when do they not? Why do
targeted forced displacements become large-scale, violent deportations in some cases
and not in others? And why do some states settle on forced conversion or the removal
of target populations, while others choose extermination? The state repression literature
includes a variety of methodological approaches, but it generally shares a commitment
to exploring the emergence, sustainment, decline, and variation of repression and violence
in a multiplicity of forms and over time.16 In addition, much of the best repression litera-
ture is interactive in approach17; it investigates how interactions between the state and
non-state actors (armed and unarmed) alter the political landscape, in some cases esca-
lating violence and in others lessening the probability of conﬂict. Contextualizing geno-
cide research within the broader domain of political violence can provide us with
theoretical purchase on change and variability in violent outcomes. With some impor-
tant exceptions, works in our ﬁeld fail to draw general theoretical insights about radica-
lization from case-speciﬁc historical contingencies.18 Given that so little comparative
genocide research embeds its analytical framework within broader explanatory models
of political violence, it is perhaps unsurprising that genocide seems over-determined:
the frameworks provide few theoretical resources for understanding the escalation
and de-escalation of violence. Anchoring our causal theories within the political vio-
lence literature may allow us to theorize more broadly about the dynamics of escalation
and de-escalation.
Microanalysis of Genocide
We should also pursue more microanalyses to explain the dissemination and intensity
of violence within cases (a point relevant to genocide studies and the study of political
violence more generally). Country-level studies are still prevalent in comparative geno-
cide research. Vahakn Dadrian, Leo Kuper, and Richard Hovannisian produced classic
works focusing on the role of pre-existing cleavages in society, and Irving L. Horowitz,
Rudolph Rummel, and Hannah Arendt drew attention to regime type and state power
to explain genocide.19 More recently, Barbara Harff has analyzed the destabilizing ef-
fects of national political crises and Benjamin Valentino has focused on the interests
and goals of national elites.20 Michael Mann has traced the process of elite and follower
radicalization against a background of utopic ideologies and the rise of modern mass
democracy.21 Nevertheless, outside of anthropological and historical studies,22 there is
still relatively little work that systematically explains internal differences across space
and time. Genocide is understood as an aggregate outcome of country-level factors,
while variation within states and regions is ignored. This can lead to an overrepresenta-
tion of the role of national elites and macro-level state failure and the employment of
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static and reiﬁed conceptions like “masses” and “ethnicity” at the expense of under-
standing sub-national and local dynamics and patterns of violence (and non-violence).
We should complement and deepen these macro-level studies by investigating spa-
tial and temporal variations within case studies (countries or regions, such as the Great
Lakes region). Doing so could provide us with a better understanding of why genocidal
violence occurs in some places prior to others, and what the micro- or meso-causal pro-
cesses that affect internal variation might be. Current research on civil war has taken
this microanalytical turn and made important ﬁndings. The ﬁeld of genocide studies
could draw from these methodological advances to great effect.23
A host of questions are open to microanalytic research on genocide, such as:
(1) How is identity articulated and acted upon in particular circumstances? We know
from careful ethnographic research that master ideological narratives articulated by
elites (ethnic, political, regional, religious, or other) frequently have complex and rather
indirect relations to violence in situ.24 Skin color, height, or facial features may operate
as reductive phenotypal indicators in ofﬁcial discourse, but they might also be inter-
preted in a variety of ways depending on local attitudes. Accent or linguistic compe-
tence may serve as a relevant signiﬁer in other instances, but here, too, perpetrators
often interpret identity in myriad ways. More tangential markers, such as clothing,
occupation, or neighborhood of residence may function as proxies for primary identity.
And of course, when victim groups are displaced and ﬂeeing, interpretations may
become looser and more encompassing to ensure that no potential “enemies” escape.
(2) What is the role of geography in the onset and diffusion of violence? Geography
plays an important role in our understanding of the Armenian resistance in Musa
Dagh, and, elsewhere, in the abilities of Tutsi and Hutu to evade murder and the
Khmer Rouge’s unstable control over various national zones. Yet we still have no
sophisticated explanation for the role of geography in genocide as such.25 Finally,
(3) consider state power (or capacity), frequently put forth as central to explaining geno-
cide. Rudolph Rummel noted crisply, “Power kills; absolute power kills absolutely.”26
However, measuring state power at the national level—as Rummel does—provides little
insight into when genocide is likely to occur or how it may spread.27 States may have
uneven control over their territory given coercive and intelligence gathering capacities,
which may explain why in some places violence is highly targeted, while in others it is
wild and all-encompassing. Greater sensitivity to state coercive capacity across space
and time, as well as the use of local allies and proxies, could provide us with more
nuanced understandings of repression and mass killings.
Of course, some genocide scholars are already moving in this direction with sophis-
ticated ideographic studies on the Ottoman Empire, Cambodia, and Rwanda.28 How-
ever, comparative research has not integrated their methodological perspectives. Studies
on the Holocaust are furthest along in this area—unsurprising given the attention it has
received for 60 years—but we need more of this type of analysis to enrich our compara-
tive theories. Particularly in the context of war, in which genocide is most likely to
occur, violence is multidirectional and includes a host of armed and unarmed actors,
with variations in level, organization, and types of violence across space and time.29 We
need a better theoretical understanding of these dynamics.
Micro-level analysis strengthens comparative research in at least three ways. First,
as Scott Straus has noted, it increases the number of observations available for study, al-
lowing for more nuanced understandings of violent dynamics than those found in
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macro-level studies.30 Second, it de-centers our general descriptions of violent phenom-
ena. Greater sensitivity to local variation forces scholars to rethink how master narra-
tives may (or may not) connect to local violence and thus problematizes analytical
categorizations such as race and ethnicity. Finally, a microanalytical approach chal-
lenges the standard beginnings and endpoints of violent phenomena, such as genocide,
and instead highlights the continuity and discontinuity of violence before and after
event-deﬁning dates, thereby avoiding their arbitrary (and often rather neat) truncation.
Clearly, there are challenges to employing micro-level analyses. Genocide requires
elite commitment, complex logistical coordination, and the work of specialized killers;
it does not erupt spontaneously and randomly in communities, but is instead rooted in
broader political, institutional, and social contexts. Macro comparative frameworks
help us assess whether (and how) particular dynamics of violence ﬁt wider patterns
and to what extent we can generalize across cases. But the point here is not to replace
higher-level analysis with microanalysis. Rather, micro approaches can complement
macroanalyses by providing us with more nuanced accounts of the onset and patterns
of genocide, consequently forcing us to rethink our broader analytical frameworks. A
clearer understanding of local processes and circumstances, and the way in which these
interact with meso- and macro-scale phenomena, could help us avoid generalizing
causal theories that ignore real and important local differences.31
Conclusion
This article has identiﬁed a particular problem for genocide studies, namely the under-
emphasis of systematic investigation into the relation between genocide and other
forms of political violence, and the ways in which they are related temporally (in terms
of sequencing) and spatially. There is not necessarily one way to ﬁll this research need,
and the use of state repression literature in political science and sociology introduced
here is only one possible way forward. Contemporary microanalytical advances in the
civil war literature can also serve as an illustration of how to disaggregate analyses in
such a way that more general theoretical insights can continue to be generated. Clearly,
the ﬁeld of genocide studies is both inter- and multidisciplinary, and it would be short-
sighted to advocate for a single methodological answer to the problems raised here.
Nevertheless, scholars need to engage these problems if we are to advance our under-
standing of these dimensions of genocide.
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This article addresses the implications of recent gender research for the deﬁnition of the crime of
genocide and our understanding of it as an historical process. It proposes that gendered violence is a
central deﬁning component of the crime. Going beyond a discussion of rape and sexual violence, it
argues that a gendered understanding of atrocity in general offers important tools for an early
warning system that should be incorporated into the research methodology and reporting strategies
of the United Nations, the International Criminal Court (ICC), human rights organizations, and
government agencies and intelligence services. Brieﬂy examining the cases of Darfur and Srebrenica,
the article demonstrates how gender-neutral conceptualizations of the crime fail to recognize and
adequately account for the speciﬁc sorts of violence that are often the most immediately indicative
of the crime of genocide, and how this failure can inadvertently contribute to or perpetuate strate-
gies of genocide denial.
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Gender-based violence, particularly mass rape, has become a core element of scholarly,
legal, and activist approaches to genocide over the past ten years. There are many rea-
sons for this, including the ubiquity of sexual violence during the Bosnian, Rwandan,
and Darfur genocides; the activist efforts of international feminists; the existence of
women judges on international courts; and key legal ﬁndings, particularly the Interna-
tional Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda’s (ICTR) Prosecutor v. Akayesu decision, which
established the myriad ways in which sexual violence can be a tool of genocide. This
article will explore some of the less-developed implications of gender-sensitive research
for future study of the subject. I will focus principally on how gender research can pro-
ductively engage our understanding of genocide as a historical process, how it can con-
tribute to our conceptualization of the groups being targeted, how it can shape ideas
of perpetrator intent, and, ﬁnally, how it can impact the way we deﬁne the crime. The
upshot of the discussion presented here is that a gendered understanding of atrocity of-
fers important tools for an early warning system, tools that should be incorporated into
the research methodology and reporting strategies of the United Nations, the Interna-
tional Criminal Court (ICC), human rights organizations, and other non-governmental
organizations (NGOs) as well as government agencies and intelligence services.
The study of gender and genocide began with the study of women, whose particular
stories had been largely excluded from scholarship on the Holocaust and genocide up
to the 1980s. Since then, the process of inclusion has not been an easy one. Bringing
women back into the narrative required scholars to argue for the material relevance of
women’s experiences.2 For doing this, they were at ﬁrst sometimes accused of foment-
ing unnecessary discord between the sexes—as if the horror of genocide made gendered
inquiry somehow irrelevant or even unseemly.3 Then, as gender research became more
accepted by mainstream scholarship, feminist inquiry was occasionally accused of
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ignoring altogether the suffering of men and boys as well as the participation of women
as perpetrators of genocide. Unfortunately, such criticisms of feminist approaches to
conﬂict studies have tended to place gender analysis within a competitive framework, in
which the respective fates of men and women are weighed in accordance with their per-
ceived severity.4 Just as feminists once argued (rather indisputably) that women’s lives
were being ignored by male scholars, critics of feminist scholarship began to argue that
men’s fates were now being ignored it turn.
It has been crucial, of course, to unearth men as gendered subjects too, in order to
fully understand the complex ways in which gender informs the genocidal process. Of
particular importance has been Adam Jones’s work on the ways in which men, especially
civilian men of “battle age,” are victimized in times of genocide.5 In “root and branch”
genocides they are often the ﬁrst group to be separated out and massacred, paving the
way for the murder of women, children, and elderly men. In more common articulations
of genocide, however, they can be the only group slated for outright massacre, while
women, children, and elderly men suffer a range of alternative fates involving rape, sex-
ual exploitation, torture, forced maternity, murder, and expulsion.6 Equally important
has been the attempt to bring to light the ways in which women are perpetrators of
genocide.7 This latter subject in particular requires greater empirical and theoretical
development. However, despite drawing attention to these very important lines of
inquiry, namely the victimization of men and the role of women in perpetrating geno-
cide, critiques of feminist inquiry have had a tendency to reject or ignore the gendered
relations of domination permeating all levels of patriarchal society, and informing there-
fore the context in which male victimization and female perpetration occur. The subtle
argument sometimes seems to be that (civilian) men suffer the worst fate because they
are so often targeted for direct killing. This position casts men and women as two oppos-
ing sides within a single victim group, and overlooks thus a key characteristic of geno-
cidal violence: the targeting, through various means, of relations of afﬁnity within victim
groups in order to render these groups vulnerable to eventual elimination as historical
agents.
Focusing in particular on the supposedly harsher fate of men can and often does
have the effect of once again marginalizing the experiences of women. Moreover, this
action tends to lead to deﬁnitions of genocide that prioritize the “strictly murderous
dimension,” usually understood as outright massacre, above all else.8 This seriously un-
derestimates the severity of rape and other forms of sexual torture during genocide,
their life-long effects, and the number of women and girls who die over time as a conse-
quence of sexual violence. One side-effect of the competitive framework model in geno-
cide studies, then, could be the a failure within the genocide prevention community to
apprehend genocidal processes in their early stages, before arriving at mass murder; it
could also unproductively muddy the waters in cases where women and children have
been “allowed” to continue living after suffering severe trauma, intended by the perpe-
trators of genocide as part of an overarching plan to destroy a group.
Thankfully the study of gender has now become an established and respected sub-
ﬁeld within the genocide studies community, and competitive frameworks are gradually
giving way to more sophisticated analyses appreciative of the fact that the power of gen-
der analysis lies not in prioritizing one victim group over another, but in helping us to
better understand the crime and better devise protocols for preventing and responding
to it. It is therefore a propitious time to begin to draw out the implications of gender
90 von Joeden-Forgey
© 2012 Genocide Studies and Prevention 7, no. 1 doi:10.3138/gsp.7.1.89
studies for our broader understanding of genocide as a process: its roots, its immediate
causes, its shape, its aftermath, and ultimately, its deﬁnition.
Although it is often assumed that gender research is limited to the stories of
women, or to sexual violence, the gender question in genocide goes well beyond the ex-
periences of women and girls, the perpetration of gender-based crimes (against both
men and women), or even the comparative study of the experiences of men and
women. Rather, it involves examining the network of gendered relationships that go
into creating groups, whether in the objective world or in perpetrator subjectivity, and
how ideas about creative power inform annihilative violence. Gender follows the crime
from its long-term origins to short-term facilitators, to immediate indicators, to inter-
vention, to justice, and to reconstruction after the fact. The gendered study of genocide
therefore involves considering the simultaneous operation of gender within several dif-
ferent layers that contribute to the perpetration of the crime. These layers include the
gendered concepts through which perpetrators understand power; the gendered ways in
which they deﬁne both their own group and the group(s) they are targeting; the gender
dynamics that organize the economic, political, social, and familial spheres within per-
petrator and victim societies; the gendered strategies pursued in the course of group
destruction; the inﬂuence of gender on conceptions of self and on experiences of con-
ﬂict among perpetrators, victims, bystanders, and witnesses; the gendered nature of
international representations of and responses to a conﬂict; the use of gender in propa-
ganda and in denial strategies; the gendered inﬂection of justice systems; and so forth.
With the exception of extensive studies on the Holocaust, most of these topics have yet
to be researched in great detail.
The growing number of gender-sensitive studies of genocide has added tremen-
dously to our understanding of the crime and has challenged some of our thinking about
its deﬁnition.9 Gender in fact goes to the very heart of the crime of genocide. Because
gender studies raise questions about the biological and cultural reproduction of groups,
the construction of group identities, and the formation of perpetrator ideologies and
perpetrator intent, any study of genocide in one way or another addresses gender,
whether explicitly or implicitly. Because gender considerations open up for reﬂection
the horrifying details of the crime scene, they also force us to reconstruct and catalog
with excruciating speciﬁcity the crimes that were committed against each single member
of a community and demand that we think anew about the nature of the crime. When
considering all these things, genocide begins to emerge as in fact a highly gendered
crime.
Bringing the Women (and the Men) Back In
Most recently, the study of women and genocide has tended to focus on the phenome-
non of mass rape. The genocides in Bosnia, Rwanda, and Darfur have forced the inter-
national community to change the way mass rape is perceived and understood. In each
case mass rape was clearly used as a systematic tool of genocide. After much lobbying
by feminists and women’s NGOs—such as the authors of the CUNY Clinic Memoran-
dum and the participants in the Women in the Law Project (WILP) of the International
Human Rights Law Group—ad hoc tribunals began to prosecute rape as a war crime,
crime against humanity, and a crime of genocide, establishing important legal prece-
dents that were incorporated into the statute of the ICC. The full and dramatic story of
the surfacing of rape as a serious international crime in the past two decades has still to
be written, but several shorter studies have sketched its general outline.10
Gender and the Future of Genocide Studies 91
© 2012 Genocide Studies and Prevention 7, no. 1 doi:10.3138/gsp.7.1.89
The near ubiquity of mass rape during genocide raises important questions about
its historical origins, perpetrator intent, and, ultimately, about what constitutes the
crime of genocide. As Cynthia Enloe pointed out almost two decades ago, “We cannot
completely understand any war—its causes, its paths, its consequences—unless male
soldiers’ sexual abuse of women on all sides is taken seriously, described accurately, ex-
plained fully, and traced forward and backward in time.”11 The same could be said of
genocide. Focusing on rape in genocide puts gender-based violence front and center in
our analysis, pointing in new directions both forward and backward in time. It high-
lights a common experience of women victims, drawing their reality into our represen-
tations. The implications of this for genocide studies have only begun to be explored.
Although we commonly refer to “rape” in the singular, there are many crimes of
rape that happen during genocidal processes. There are those rapes that are not part of
an overarching plan but are instead the consequence of opportunity and impunity (often
referred to as wartime rape); there is systematic mass rape, forced maternity, rape as a
means of murder, and sexual torture, gang rape, coerced rapes between family members,
sexual mutilation, forced prostitution, sexual slavery, rape in rape camps, women forced
to “marry” génocidaires, and so forth. We need to be speciﬁc in the way we speak of sex-
ual violence during genocide, examining each case and each type for its particular rela-
tionship to genocidal intent. The purpose would not be to rank types of rape in terms of
degrees of severity, but rather to better understand the words and actions of different
groups of perpetrators so that we can begin to interpret rape’s multiple functions during
genocidal processes. Complicating our view of sexual violence, and understanding the
implications of this for research on the origins and the function of mass rape during
genocide, has the potential to yield important insights into its perpetrators.
For example, to the extent that it has been addressed, it is generally assumed in
cases of genocide that the rape of women and girls in the targeted victim group is a sec-
ondary phenomenon to the ideological hatred of the group: that genocidal ideology
came ﬁrst, followed by the use of rape as one tool among many. In many cases, such
as the genocides in Bosnia and Rwanda, mass rape was indeed both systematic and
intentional—implemented from the top down for the purposes of destroying the Bos-
niak and Tutsi communities as such. In other cases, however, such as the Armenian
Genocide, new research has suggested that much of the sexual violence attending the
genocide was not centrally directed or part of the genocidal plan, but that certain perpe-
trators may in fact have joined the killing voluntarily, not out of a general hostility to
Armenians but primarily because it gave them license to commit rape. According to
Henry Theriault, in certain cases “rape was not a tool of genocide; genocide was a tool
of rape.”12 This would mean that a violently masculinized atmosphere of impunity
might be a strong recruitment strategy available to génocidaires.
If indeed some (and the Armenian case would suggest many) men can be recruited
to commit genocide because it provides an extended opportunity to commit rape and
other sexual tortures against women and girls, then the history of genocide will also
have to be written within the framework of violent masculinity and patterns of violence
against women more generally. As Theriault has noted, “If a preexisting structure of
gender domination and violence can contribute to genocide, then intervention against
gender domination and violence might help prevent or at least mitigate genocide by un-
dercutting the ability of the main perpetrators to execute their plans.”13 Gender-based
violence will not simply be an aspect in the story of genocide itself, but also a key
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component in how we understand the emergence of genocidal ideologies and societal
vulnerabilities over the longue durée. A central question of this research would be
whether there is a speciﬁc kind of violent masculinity—symbolic or actualized in the
physical world—that makes societies more receptive to genocidal ideas.
Even in cases where much of the rape is committed outside the bounds of a direct
order from superiors, there are in almost all genocides speciﬁc sorts of rape that involve
the intentional brutalization—and often, subsequently, the murder en masse—of entire
families and communities. These ritualized forms of rape as total destruction raise two
important questions. First, in what ways might the historical investigation of speciﬁc
types of masculinity help explain the co-incidence of genocidal ideology among the ar-
chitects of genocide and the genocidal rape rituals of foot-soldiers in instances where
there has been no speciﬁc training or indoctrination ordering rape? Do some perpetra-
tors interpret genocidal language and policies in terms that encourage the performance
of genocidal rape rituals? The second question raised by these genocidal rape rituals
concerns what, exactly, the perpetrators are targeting. Rape, when used as a tool of
genocide, targets women both as individuals and as members of a speciﬁc group.14 Two
threads from peacetime thus weave their way into the tactic of mass rape: group hatred
and misogyny. The history of genocide should explore the contribution made by each
to genocidal ideology and implementation.15 But there is yet another apparent target to
genocidal rape, and that is life-giving. The elaborate rape rituals and ritual rape spaces
that perpetrators create are potent symbolic spaces in which to enact the annihilation of
a people. Usually going beyond the rape and gang-rape of individual women, genocidal
rapists prey on the social context in which they ﬁnd their victims, exploiting the sym-
bols and relationships available to them to intentionally exert maximum damage to the
woman or girl, to the community, to the group’s regenerative capacity, and perhaps
even to its invisible spirit. Thus, in genocidal contexts we frequently encounter cases of
public rape, particularly in front of family members, as well as instances of rape coerced
between family members, rapes involving sexual mutilation and torture, and rapes at-
tended by the murder of a victim’s family members. The intention seems to go well
beyond compromising the physical and psychological ability of women and girls to
carry children. It seems to puncture—to wound—that invisible space inside a woman’s
body, the source of the group in the ﬁrst place. Could that be the message transmitted
by the perpetrators’ use of sharpened sticks to rape and kill Tutsi women during the
Rwandan Genocide in 1994?
As some perpetrators seem to know, when female victims are allowed to live, the
consequences of sexual violation extend well beyond the genocide. The long-term phys-
ical, psychological, and socio-political effects of wartime rape are well-known, though
still in need of further study—particularly in terms of remediation.16 Protocols need to
be created to address the speciﬁc circumstances of genocidal rape and related atrocities.
In many cases women rape victims are rejected by their families and communities, are
unable to ﬁnd work, and remain left to raise children born of war alone and in abject
poverty. We also know that in post-genocide societies women face increased vulnerabil-
ity to rape, sexual exploitation, and domestic violence from their old tormenters, from
other perpetrators still walking free, from international peacekeepers, from liberating
armies, and from men in their own communities and families. There is even some evi-
dence that the sexual abuse of children increases after genocide.17 Explanations for this
trend range from the wartime brutalization and humiliation of men to the persistent
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patriarchal dehumanization of women, and to the culture of impunity that comes with
the breakdown of traditional social institutions and mores. Each of these suggests a dif-
ferent shape and chronology to the history of genocide than we might assume, should
we fail to take women’s stories into consideration.
This is especially true with regard to where we decide to locate the end of the crime
in our narratives. Women continue to die long after genocide from suicide, honor kill-
ings, HIV, and other illnesses that are the direct result of genocidal atrocities including
rape. They are frequently ostracized from their communities and completely alone in
the world, raising children born of war, or caring for children orphaned in conﬂict.
Women in post-genocide societies are often very poor, lacking access to jobs, resources,
land, and basic services. Although in places like Rwanda post-genocide conditions can
offer new opportunities for female political engagement, by and large women survivors
of genocide are marginalized from their own communities and from public life. For
those women whose children were killed in front of them (often because they were try-
ing to protect their mothers), the genocide never truly ends. Choman Hardi has written,
regarding women survivors of the Anfal Genocide of Iraqi Kurds, “For the women in
this research, the aftermath of this catastrophe is as much a part of the Anfal story as
the facts and ﬁgures that make up the grand narrative.”18
Bringing women back into scholarly representations of genocide favors those deﬁ-
nitions of the crime that do not limit the genocidal element to physical killing. Women
and girls often die as a consequence of gang rape and sexual mutilation, but they are
less frequently slated for direct massacre en masse.19 Given the apparent ubiquity of
mass rape during genocide, even during the Holocaust,20 it is hard to see how we would
carve off this aspect of the crime as inessential to our genocide determinations. And yet
this is what often happens, as is the case with Bosnia. Deﬁnitions that focus too much
on massacre—mass bodies, mass graves, distinct moments of mass murder—erase
almost completely the history and experience of women victims and therefore obstruct
deeper and more penetrating understandings of the crime.
To include women’s experiences in our deﬁnition of genocide is to recognize some-
thing that the perpetrators of genocide have known for centuries: that one can destroy a
group by destroying that group’s ability to reproduce. What this means in each instance
will differ according to the perpetrators’ speciﬁc beliefs regarding reproduction and the
way in which they deﬁne their target group, but it is not unthinkable that future geno-
cides might be committed primarily through the use of sexual violence and related atro-
cities. Some of the ﬁghting forces in the Democratic Republic of the Congo seem
already to be implementing strategies that resemble genocide-by-rape.21
The social aspect of genocide thus takes on an added importance when we consider
in particular the way that so many women victims have experienced it. Deﬁnitions
that include concepts like “social death” (Daniel Feierstein), the destruction of “social
power” (Martin Shaw), and “the interdiction of the biological and social reproduction
of group members” (Helen Fein) incorporate (in my opinion) the ground-level realities
of this crime for men and women, boys and girls, individuals, families, and collectivities
much more effectively that those deﬁnitions that get caught up in the numbers and the
identities of those killed.22 They come closer to capturing what this crime essentially is,
and arguably remain, as Martin Shaw has argued, more true to the spirit of the 1948
United Nations Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Geno-
cide (UNCG) and the work of Raphael Lemkin.23
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Research on the mass rape of women during conﬂict, and the attention now being
paid to this phenomenon by policymakers and NGOs, has gradually also brought out
new evidence regarding the frequency of rape, sexual exploitation, and the sexual tor-
ture of men. Treating women as gendered subjects of history has ampliﬁed the level of
attention paid to men as gendered subjects as well. This has made it possible for re-
searchers and the international community to perceive male civilians as victims in
entirely new ways, outside of the image of impregnability favored by militarized mascu-
linist and nationalist narratives.24 Scant existing research on male victims of wartime
(and genocidal) rape and sexual torture suggests that the post-genocide experiences of
these men are very similar to those of women victims. 25 Clearly, then, we need to factor
the experiences of both men and women survivors of rape into our understanding of
the crime and into the protocols we devise to address its long-term effects.
All of this points to a key feature of sexual violence during genocide: that it is
intended to desecrate the ways that members of collectivities—male and female—are
bound together and thereby to permanently destroy their capacity to rebuild themselves
as stable and active collective agents in human history.
Reading Genocide from the Bottom Up
One thing that becomes apparent when we centralize gender-based violence during
genocide is just how multifarious (and creative) are the means by which perpetrators
engage in the destruction of a group. Culture-speciﬁc studies of all those tiny-but-
essential details of the crime scene need to be undertaken in order to round out our
understanding of genocide. As the discussion thus far has indicated, the rape of women
during genocide is attended by multiple other crimes committed against the women
themselves and their family members, many of whom are men. Taken together, these
make up what I have called “life force atrocities”: that is, ritualized atrocities targeting
the life force of an entire group by destroying the physical integrity of its individual
members, the emotional and spiritual bonds that exist between family members, and
symbols of group cohesion, such as religious and intellectual leaders. 26
If we understand genocide as the intent to destroy a group speciﬁcally by destroy-
ing its source of life, the shared pattern of cruelties that we see in practice across geno-
cides would begin to make more sense. Gendered studies of genocide must therefore go
beyond gender-based violence—including rape and sex-selective massacre—to truly
grasp the extent to which ideas about gender are implicated in the crime. When com-
munities are assaulted by forces with genocidal intent, individual members are usually
targeted based on their (perceived) symbolic status within social and biological group
reproduction. These perceived statuses are unequivocally gendered: men are assaulted
as protectors, fathers, husbands, heads of families, political leaders, religious icons, lead-
ing intellectuals, past, present, and future patriarchs. Women are assaulted as mothers,
wives, daughters, bearers of future life, protectors of children, providers of food, and so
forth. The stereotypical gender roles that determine the exact nature of life force atroci-
ties will vary with respect to the cultures committing the genocide, and perpetrators will
draw on their own emotional and social experiences when devising ritual tortures, but
by and large we can identify patterns across various different instances of the crime.
By giving us the means to begin to identify some of these gender relational atroci-
ties during genocide, research on gender has also given us powerful tools to read geno-
cide from the bottom up.27 This may be one of the greatest contributions it has made to
genocide prevention efforts. Because gender operates in ways that are often unspoken,
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gender research requires that we interpret the nature of the forces and processes we
study through myriad means that go well beyond the language of the actors involved. In
a genocidal context, such a method involves searching for patterns that may not be
immediately evident and certainly are not clearly articulated by perpetrators.
Such a contextualized approach was taken by the US Atrocities Documentation
Team (ADT), sent in 2004 to refugee camps in Chad to document the experiences of
survivors of the violence in neighboring Darfur, Sudan. The genocide determination
that resulted from this research, while not explicitly based on gender criteria, was
sophisticated in its understanding of the multiple ways in which gendered strategies,
speciﬁcally widespread and systematic sexual violence, can be exploited and deployed
by perpetrators in committing the crime.28 Interviewers in the ﬁeld even updated the
code list of crimes printed on the ADT questionnaire to account for things like mosque
burning and the disembowelment of pregnant women.29 The ADT methodology seems
to have signiﬁed a return to contextualized understandings of the crime, considering
the experiences of victims and the ground-level behavior of perpetrators alongside state-
ments by the purported architects and the general political and historical context of the
conﬂict. The latter two elements—statements by leaders and macro-political contexts—
have dominated debates about genocide in the past decades, largely because they are as-
sumed to more clearly indicate the presence or absence of what counts as “genocidal
intent.” The price of an exclusive focus on large-scale, elite, largely male, and highly rei-
ﬁed phenomena is that the substantive experience of the victims—who occupy the
space in which genocide occurs and are the bodies on whom the crime is committed—
becomes lost in a sea of abstractions. As a consequence of this form of debate the term
“genocide” is often treated as little more than a political or legal label, rather than some-
thing real in and of itself.30
Rituals targeting people speciﬁcally in terms of gender and family roles are deﬁning
characteristics of violence in Bangladesh (1971), Bosnia (1992–1995), Rwanda (1994),
Sudan (the past decade), and the Democratic Republic of Congo (the past decade and a
half). In every commonly recognized case of genocide we can ﬁnd these scenarios in the
testimony of survivors. Perpetrators seem to have uncannily similar ideas about what
most deeply and terribly destroys a person, a family, a community, and a group. So we
need to better understand what lies behind these rituals. And we need to ﬁnd ways of
using these rituals to ask new questions about the crime we are studying. The stories,
often told by solitary survivors, are, in all their horror, also gifts. In them, perpetrators
overplay their hands; they risk letting us in on their secrets, on the deeply seated and
perhaps only vaguely recognized reasons for their terrible actions.
Unfortunately, human rights reports frequently fail to contextualize crimes and
instead tend to disaggregate related crimes according to the gender and sometimes the
age of the victim. We will be told that X number of men were killed, and X number of
women raped, with special mention of the murder and rape of small children and the
elderly. It is essential that we ﬁnd ways to bring the narrative link between atrocities
back into our statistical reporting strategies, since this genocidal narrative can help us
identify genocidal intent among perpetrators.
Gender and Genocide Determinations
Localized life force atrocities seek to destroy a deep cohesion within family units that,
during genocidal processes, stand in for the cohesion of a more extensive group. Recog-
nizing this logic can help us to begin making determinations that start with the facts on
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the ground, using the UNCG as a guide to the organization of these facts, without rely-
ing on our own abstract interpretations of its wording to make the case. Daniel Feier-
stein made this point quite elegantly when he wrote, regarding the question of genocide
against political groups, that “the crime is not deﬁned by the identity of the victim . . .
but by the characteristics of the material action which is carried out.”31
A good deal of pertinent information concerning this material action can be un-
earthed through gender-sensitive research, creating maps of afﬁnity and atrocity to help
us understand what perpetrators might have thought they were doing. Even in cases
where the objective target of genocide was a political, social, or economic group, we
know that génocidaires tend to view their victims as organic collectivities and persecute
families based on the alleged status of one of its members.32 In Argentina (i.e., during
the Dirty War, which has just recently been analyzed in terms of genocide), for example,
Interior Minister General Diaz de Bessone framed the target of state violence in the fol-
lowing way:
Founding a new republic is no easy matter. . . . The armed forces must be sufﬁciently
alert, determined and resourceful to act simultaneously as an efﬁcient ﬁghting force
against guerrillas and terrorists; an efﬁcient surgeon that will remove the evil from all
social classes and walks of life; and last but not least, parents of the new republic, strong,
united, just, free, supportive of others, clean, exemplary. . . . But it is only fair to point
out that since no national project was outlined beforehand, little has been achieved
so far to accomplish the remaining objectives, which are to defeat not only the guer-
rillas but subversion “in totum,” so laying strong foundations for the birth of the new
republic.33
As Feierstein points out, the general is here framing the counterinsurgency as a war
on the “forces of evil,” as “a clearly deﬁned ‘surgical operation’ on previously deﬁned
sections of the population whose disappearance is meant to have an ‘irreversible’ effect
on Argentinean society.”34 There is a gendered link between this plan to achieve the
partial destruction of the Argentinean national group by carving out its “evil” and “sub-
versive” elements and the atrocities committed against “suspect” families and net-
works.35 Judging from Diaz de Bessone’s understanding of the conﬂict, these families
were the cosmic and reproductive opponents of the new national family to which the
armed forces—“parents of the new republic”—were supposed to give birth. The torture
of family members was a way for junta members to perform—in a site-speciﬁc, localized
way—the broader genocidal intent to excise the generative units of opposition from the
nation. It is as if annihilating one family makes room for the birth of the new, national
family. The co-incidence of statements like the one above and a pattern of life force
atrocities strongly suggests genocide, even when all the reports have yet to be written;
all the individual human lives have yet to be murdered; all the bodies have yet to be bur-
ied and, if found, exhumed and identiﬁed and counted. Promptly identifying these cru-
cial indicators would be one way of recognizing the potential for genocide within what
is thought to be a brutal counterinsurgency.
Interior Minister General Diaz de Bessone’s preoccupations are shared by most
perpetrators of genocide. These preoccupations include biopolitics, family dramas, the
generative power of violence, and the use of familial terminology to describe political
parties. In such cases, the armed forces, the party, the executive branch of the state, or
the individual torturer plays the role of the generative unit—the parent—giving birth to
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something new and better through the total destruction of other generative units, not
simply in physical terms, but affectively and spiritually as well.36 The precise relation-
ship of these life force atrocities to cases of genocide needs to be investigated in more
depth. We should be curious about why the parental theme crops up so much in the
language of the architects of genocide. Is it merely a byproduct of their embrace of the
rhetoric of extreme nationalism? Or do they see or experience their killing as an act of
creation akin to fathering children?
Whatever the case, since there is such a strong correlation between the existence of
life force atrocities and the existence of a genocidal logic to violence and persecution, at-
tentiveness to these crimes can help us avoid the pitfalls created by the constraints im-
posed through the four protected categories in the UNCG, namely, “national, ethnical,
racial and religious” groups.51 Before trying to determine whether the victims conform
to these criteria, it might be more useful to determine whether people are being sub-
jected to the types of atrocities that are common during genocides, especially before
there are high numbers of dead.
Focusing on the presence of gendered atrocities and identifying those patterns in
them that are correlated most directly with genocide would provide another empirical
means of identifying situations in which genocidal violence is present, without having
to make an airtight argument for the existence of genocide in its comprehensive and
totalizing sense. We may even be able to identify potentially genocidal cadres within
armed forces, or among the supporters of speciﬁc political parties, by documenting who
has engaged or is engaging in ritual atrocities that appear to target a group’s life force. If
a small group of people, whether part of an armed force or not, commits life force atro-
cities during occupations, riots, communal violence, or more limited patterns of war-
fare, these actions tell us something important about how things might progress and
offer up new and crucial research agendas involving chains of command. At the very
least, we will know better who to watch in order to prevent the generalization of speciﬁc
atrocities into genocide somewhere down the road.
Identifying potentially genocidal violence in its early stages is important for many
reasons. Genocide, unlike conﬂicts with more limited and strategic goals, is a type of
violence that has ever-expanding horizons once it becomes the organizing principle of a
conﬂict. History has shown that perpetrators tend to enlarge their list of targeted victim
groups as their power and reach grow. Furthermore, societies and groups that have
faced genocide in the past have required particular sorts of interventions after the fact,
both to rebuild a social fabric whose core institutions were targeted for destruction
and to prevent the re-ignition of genocidal violence, either by the old perpetrators or by
descendants of the victims.
Gender and Genocide Denial: Darfur and Bosnia
Apart from the clear beneﬁt of gender analysis to genocide prevention mechanisms, re-
thinking genocide in gendered terms can help cut through some of the ideological layer-
ing that has made genocide determinations so particularly fraught since the 2003 US
war in Iraq. The current political debate about the use of the term tends to cluster
around a few controversial cases, notably Bosnia and Darfur. These cases are accepted as
genocides by the vast majority of genocide scholars, but opposition to the use of the
term has come from high places and has been quite visible and vocal. Much of this oppo-
sition comes from the left of the political spectrum and is a direct response to what is
considered to be a double standard used by the United States and its allies in their
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deployment of the term.37 These works show little concern for the evidence and none for
the experiences of the many victims in these regions. Genocide is merely a label here.
More seriously, the political scientist Mahmood Mamdani, in his work on Darfur,
has argued against the applicability of the term genocide largely because he believes that
those advocating for its applicability to the situation there are not using the term consis-
tently; if they did, he argues, they would also use it with reference to Iraq and Afghani-
stan. There are many threads to Mamdani’s argument, and in making it he offers a
serious and enlightening study of the historical dynamics of identity and conﬂict in
Sudan.38 His book seeks to show that the conﬂict in Darfur should more properly be
considered a counterinsurgency, not unlike the wars being waged by the United States
in Iraq and Afghanistan. Mamdani’s book, however, is surprising in its failure to take
seriously the atrocities suffered by the victims of Janjaweed attacks, even if he does not
consider these crimes to amount to genocide. When we begin to look at the nature of
the atrocities committed in Darfur the differences between counterinsurgency as such
and genocide become clear. What matters so much is not the objective, or even the sub-
jective, deﬁnition of the groups of people involved, but rather the excruciating detail
with which perpetrators go about destroying everything sacred and meaningful to their
victims, particularly family bonds. This takes Darfur beyond any reasonable character-
ization as counterinsurgency + generalized atrocity. In Darfur, as in Bosnia, the death
toll may fall well short of the mass killings that attended key twentieth-century geno-
cides; nevertheless, the focused assault on generative symbols and relations of affection
and loyalty—all those deep recesses of the human heart and soul—is evidence of geno-
cide that I ﬁnd most difﬁcult to refute and which ultimately makes the case for the
applicability of genocide in both instances.
Mamdani relies quite a bit in his argument on the report of the UN’s Commission
of Inquiry (COI), which found the same evidence as the US Atrocities Documentation
Team but came to the conclusion that the crimes did not amount to genocide; yet this
too is not dispositive. The COI used a very limited deﬁnition of genocide, conﬁning it
to cases in which the intent is the annihilation of a group in its entirety.39
The ADT discovered a systematic pattern of attack that was sustained across
hundreds of villages in Darfur, involving encirclement by mounted Janjaweed militias,
straﬁng and bombing from Antonov bombers and helicopters belonging to the army
of the Government of Sudan (GoS), murder and disappearances of men and boys,
sexual exploitation of women and girls, and the wholesale destruction of property and
food and water supplies. Mamdani does not engage with these ﬁndings analytically or
explain why they do not point to genocide, as argued by the US Department of State
legal team. Indeed, he dismisses one of the key ﬁndings in both the ADT and the COI
investigations that—in concert with all the others—seems to point most directly toward
genocide: evidence of systematic mass rape. To critique the inclusion of this charge in
the ICC arrest warrant for President Omar al-Bashir, who is charged with conspiracy to
commit genocide among other things, Mamdani writes, “To claim that ongoing rape in
the [internally displaced person] camps is the result of ofﬁcial government policy is to
ignore the simple fact that rape occurred in all camps, those controlled by the govern-
ment and by the rebels.”40
Mamdani’s statement about rape is misleading. In his efforts to normalize and
depoliticize the conﬂict in Darfur he has ended up undervaluing, indeed entirely ne-
glecting, the stories of women and girl survivors, which are so valuable precisely because
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they give us access to the behavior of perpetrators during the moment of attack. Simply
because rape occurs in many different contexts and is committed by many different
types of men does not mean that mass rape by one particular group, such as Janjaweed
militias or GoS soldiers, is not itself part of a genocidal strategy. But, even more impor-
tant than such an obvious point is the narrative framework in which these atrocities
take place. These were frequently not rapes in the generic sense that Mamdani seems to
use the term. Survivors of the attacks in Darfur describe a multi-pronged strategy of
attack on villages in which rape occurred alongside a host of ritualized atrocities all
aimed at destroying the life foundations of a group—the family unit, the connection to
land and community, and the future social and biological reproduction of the group.
These atrocities included eviscerating pregnant women, raping women and girls in pub-
lic, mutilating victims of rape and sexual violence, raping women and girls with sharp
objects, killing infants (especially infant boys), murdering men, humiliating and tortur-
ing village leaders, and cruel performances involving family members, all while scream-
ing racist epithets at the victims.41
These types of atrocities are common to all other genocides and place Darfur clearly
within the ranks of genocidal violence. These atrocities share a genealogical link with the
type of violence that has attended every other known case of genocide in past centuries.
When such atrocities all begin to point toward the ﬁve elements of the crime enumer-
ated in the UNCG,52 then a working genocide determination seems entirely reasonable.
The key to understanding how gendered violence and life force atrocities work
together in a genocidal strategy is of course to examine how they contribute to the
destruction of the group as such. A recent work in criminology, Darfur and the Crime
of Genocide, makes fruitful use of the ADT interviews to reconstruct the crime scene in
several settlements in Darfur, generating data for shifts in the family size of respondents
as a consequence of the attacks and creating charts of the age and gender of people
killed and missing. On this latter point, the authors discovered that the groups with the
greatest number killed (and missing) were composed of young men between the ages of
15 and 29 and girls between the ages of 5 and 14. They note that “about a third of both
the young adult males and the preadolescent girls are represented among the dead or
missing.”42 This suggests that young men were not simply being killed as potential com-
batants, a common defense against genocide charges; the presence of such a high num-
ber of young girls alongside the high number of young men seems to point to an
attempt to destroy the ability of the group to organize and reproduce itself in the future.
When placed along other evidence of atrocity patterns and more macro-level indica-
tions of intent, such crime scene statistics are invaluable.
Gender data underscore the importance of empirical evidence in making genocide
determinations. Overarching schemas and analytical abstractions cannot replace this
evidence in our attempts to understand the genocidal process or make determinations
about its existence. Legal, political, and rhetorical arguments can be made to support all
sorts of positions in regard to the crime. The debate about its nature goes right back to
the debates about the wording of the UNCG. This is why the ADT’s atrocity statistics
are such an important innovation in the struggle against the crime. They allow us to
navigate through the heavy storm of ideology and politics and enter the moment of vic-
timization. By categorizing crimes that together are suggestive of genocide, they offer us
an empirical means of determining whether what we see could in fact be—or become—
the crime of crimes.
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As Mamdani and others emphasize, it is true that in Darfur a great number of
women and children have been allowed to survive after experiencing or witnessing
rape, murder, and the destruction of their families and communities. The absence of
the annihilation of most members in some villages targeted (though many villages were
completely destroyed) challenges one of the most common working deﬁnitions of geno-
cide: genocide as mass killing. Deﬁning genocide simply as mass killing, however, be-
comes very difﬁcult when one takes seriously the issue of gender and gender-speciﬁc
acts of violence. Studies that have considered the experiences of women and girls along-
side men and boys have shown that a common pattern in the early stages of genocide is
the systematic execution of male members of a community alongside the terrorization,
sexual exploitation, torture, and expulsion of women, children, and the very old. When
we limit our deﬁnitions to killing alone we can end up artiﬁcially separating processes
that are part of the same phenomenon.
The consequence of this could be that massacres of men and boys are deﬁned as
genocide, while the attendant rape, torture, and expulsion of the women and girls who
were their mothers, wives, children, girlfriends, colleagues, and so forth are either
ignored entirely or described as something other than genocide, such as ethnic cleans-
ing, crimes against humanity, war crimes, or uncategorized atrocities. This approach is
clearly inadequate and inaccurate, for it is unlikely that perpetrator intent can be bro-
ken up in a similar fashion. Furthermore, the evidence contained within witness testi-
mony shows time and again that perpetrators understand quite well the meaning and
function of peoples’ family and community relationships and that they appear to
intend to use these relationships in gender-determined ways in order to destroy a
group. Nevertheless, the survival of women and children—even when they have been
forced out of a territory—is often indicated as evidence that the sex-selective massacre
of men and boys cannot be construed as genocide, since the community was not
slated for physical annihilation in its entirety. This latter approach assumes that geno-
cidal massacres must include victims of both sexes indiscriminately in order to prove
intent. It also potentially underestimates the long-term destructive trauma caused by
systematic and intentional harm to the expelled women and children as well as the
effect that the massacre of men and boys can have on a community’s reproductive
capacity.
The best example of a case that has raised the two issues above is the 1995 Srebre-
nica massacres of over 8,000 Bosniak (Bosnian Muslim) men and boys by Bosnian Serb
forces under the command of Ratko Mladic. These massacres were determined by the
International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY) to constitute geno-
cide. Its ﬁnding was upheld by the International Court of Justice.43 As in the case of
Darfur, most genocide scholars view the Serb war in Bosnia to have been a genocidal
assault on Bosniaks. Even when the status of the war as a whole is in doubt, scholars
tend to accept Srebrenica as an instance of genocide. However, because the ICTY has
been conservative in its use of the term, and because the nebulous concept of “ethnic
cleansing” has confused characterizations of the war in Bosnia as a whole, Serbian at-
tacks on Bosnian populations between 1992 and 1995 have not been determined in a
court of law to ﬁt the deﬁnition of genocide. This has opened up ample space for confu-
sion, and one rarely sees reference to the “Bosnian Genocide.” The conﬂict in general is
instead referred to as ethnic cleansing and civil war. With the exception of the mas-
sacres at Srebrenica after 13 July 1995, most of the atrocities committed by Serbs in the
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course of the war have been punished as crimes against humanity and war crimes rather
than genocide, with public perception following suit.
Paying attention to the experiences of women and the gendered dynamics of the
Serb onslaught on the UN safe haven can help us maneuver through this difﬁcult deﬁni-
tional terrain. When we examine from a gendered perspective what went on in Srebre-
nica from the fall of the enclave on 11 July 1995 to the forced relocation of women,
girls, and very young boys two days later (an occurrence that directly preceded the start
of the massacres), we can see that there are several threads connecting the massacres at
Srebrenica in 1995 to a systematic Bosnian Serb policy that had been pursued since the
outbreak of war in 1992. The case of Srebrenica in fact demonstrates how important it
is that we consider the testimony of women survivors of violence in making our deter-
minations about what is and what is not genocide, and in thinking about which con-
ﬂicts are likely to have genocidal outcomes. Their testimonies, because they are often
the lone survivors of massacres, offer us evidence that is just as important as ﬁnal body
counts in establishing genocide and genocidal intent. Speciﬁcally, their testimonies can
establish a systematic pattern of atrocity aimed directly at the institutions, symbols, and
relations of reproduction as well as the biological capacity to reproduce.
Two examples of the testimony of women survivors demonstrate the kinds of life
force atrocities that were committed in Srebrenica before the massacres. Ramiza Gurdić
gave the following testimony to the Dutch law ﬁrm Van Diepen/Van der Kroef, which
is representing the surviving victims of the Srebrenica massacres in a suit against the
Government of the Netherlands and the United Nations for failing to protect civilians
in the UN safe haven:
At one time, I saw how a young boy of about ten was killed by Serbs in Dutch uniform.
This happened in front of my own eyes. The mother sat on the ground and her young
son sat beside her. The young boy was placed on his mother’s lap. The young boy was
killed. His head was cut off. The body remained on the lap of the mother. The Serbian
soldier placed the head of the young boy on his knife and showed it to everyone.. . . The
woman was hysterical and began to call out for help. . . . The Serbs forced the mother to
drink the blood of her child. Chaos broke out among the refugees.44
Another survivor, Munira Šubašić, tells us,
There was a girl, she must have been about nine years old. At a certain moment some
Chetniks recommended to her brother that he rape the girl. He did not do it and I also
think that he could not have done it for he was still just a child. Then they murdered
that young boy.50
These are just two of many stories describing speciﬁc atrocities witnessed by survi-
vors of Srebrenica. Rarely, however, do such stories work themselves into narratives
and analyses of the crime. Certainly, they are not part of dominant images of the Sreb-
renica massacre. The fact is that during the two days preceding the evacuation of an
estimated 23,000 women and children many women and girls as young as nine were
raped by Serb forces. They were frequently killed afterwards. Young girls and boys,
including infants, were murdered, often by having their throats cut in front of their
families. Pregnant women were eviscerated. Boys and men were picked out of crowds of
families seemingly at random, dragged off never to return. These atrocities—targeted
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as they were at family bonds—need to ﬁnd their way into scholarly, legal, and public
images of Srebrenica.53
We need to know details surrounding the separation of women and men before the
Srebrenica evacuations and deportations because they demonstrate the extent of rela-
tional and familial persecution carried out by the perpetrators. This, in turn, would sug-
gest that Bosnian Serb forces sought to compromise and destroy the most important
unit of group cohesion: the family. These are not instances of random and excessive vio-
lence perpetrated in a madhouse. The atrocities committed against family members—in
front of one another—are some of the strongest indicators of genocidal intent. They sug-
gest something much more malicious than an attempt to rid Serbian forces of a military
foe. Indeed, they conform to several elements of the crime as articulated in the UNCG.
These atrocities only come to light in the testimony of those who survived, the majority
of whom are women and girls. The stories and their implications are not considered by
legal scholars who argue against the ﬁnding of genocide in the case of Prosecutor v.
Krstic tried by the ICTY.45
Conclusion
The speciﬁc types of atrocities committed in Argentine prisons, the Srebrenica enclave,
and villages in Darfur could serve to specify exactly which atrocity crimes have a high
risk of turning into genocide.46 The Srebrenica massacres, for example, came on the
heels of over three years of violence and ethnic cleansing perpetrated by Bosnian Serb
forces against Bosnian Muslims, including several special forces that seem to have oper-
ated with orders from Slobodan Milošević in Belgrade.47 We can trace back from the
atrocities committed in Srebrenica on 11 and 12 July 1995 to similar atrocities commit-
ted in eastern Bosnian towns from April 1992 through July 1995. The atrocities we see
in Srebrenica can also be linked to atrocities in the various Serb-controlled concentra-
tion and rape camps that operated in Bosnia between 1992 and 1995. When we draw
lines from one atrocity to another across time and space we begin to see the dense tap-
estry of genocide in Bosnia above and beyond the evidence provided by single cases of
massacre, murder, rape, and ethnic cleansing. It therefore becomes difﬁcult to cordon
off the Srebrenica massacres as only one case of genocide within a wider war character-
ized by other things.48
Atrocity statistics that are sensitive to the contextual frame in which discrete crimes
are committed point to the usefulness of an approach to genocide that understands the
crime spatially, not only in terms of the geography of the attacks, but also in terms of
the geography of atrocity. Data and maps (similar to Hagan and Rymond-Richmond’s
for Darfur) could be created for those speciﬁc types of atrocity that have a high correla-
tion with the crime of genocide. If, early on in a conﬂict, we could see a map of the spe-
ciﬁc types of atrocities reported by witnesses—such as public rape or the evisceration of
pregnant women—this would help onlookers determine whether a conﬂict might be
threatening genocide and, if so, which participating group or cadre is of particular con-
cern to the international community. If we could begin to correlate the speciﬁc types of
atrocity that are highly suggestive of genocide with speciﬁc ways of envisioning repro-
duction, women’s sexuality, men’s power, and so forth, we may begin to tease out the
very speciﬁc types of thinking—genealogies of atrocity—that can lead to genocide way
down the road.
In our new century most of us will probably be drawn into a terrible position as
witnesses to genocide, if only by virtue of the international media. The ﬁrst and most
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fundamental question is, How can we know genocide before it announces itself with
mass graves, and how can we aid others to identify genocidal situations in crises and
conﬂicts at an early stage? A great deal of work has been done on this already, but we
are still at the beginning of an effort to develop effective early indicators, as is evidenced
by the endless debates over deﬁnitions that followed the US recognition of genocide in
Sudan in 2004. By considering the small, yet momentous, gendered details in the space
of genocide—such as the pre-massacre killing spree of 11–13 July in Srebrenica and
similar atrocities committed by Serb forces in Eastern Bosnia for three years before-
hand—we can reﬁne what it is we are looking for, with ramiﬁcations both for the ways
that we deﬁne genocide and work toward its prevention. To borrow from Jacobo Timer-
man, the stakes are, as they always have been, nothing short of rescuing civilization as
we know it from those who would bring about the disappearance of the universal,
human family.49
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Requiem for the Prevention of Genocide in Our Time:
Working toward an Improbable Possibility
but Not Giving Up
Israel W. Charny
Institute on the Holocaust and Genocide, Jerusalem
In response to the question “Can genocide in our world be stopped to a signiﬁcant extent,” I answer
“yes.” I propose an International Peace Army (IPA) sponsored by a world government that operates
rationally, based on veriﬁed news reports and scientiﬁc assessments, to respond to mass murders
that are in the beginning stages or threats that are gathering. It is very improbable, however, that
genocide in our world will be stopped to a signiﬁcant extent. Global society is not ready to launch
an IPA: humankind is still largely governed by totalitarian magic/faith ideological modes, world
government is still too much a theater of power seeking, and human beings are still too immoral—
that is, they are not committed resolutely to Life over Death for all people. Nonetheless, we cannot
afford to give up. Our developing ﬁeld of genocide studies needs to emphasize efforts at prevention
much more. Even if these turn out to be our ﬂailing end-of-species efforts, for me the effort to stop
genocide is what gives greatest meaning to being alive while we are.
Key words: genocide prevention, human nature, worldwide campaigns for Life against Death
Requiem Overture
As I reach my 80th birthday and mark close to 50 years as a genocide scholar, this is my
autobiographical requiem as it were, including a highly personalized review of the un-
folding of the early history of genocide studies as I lived it, a journey through much of
my own major work over the years, and yet another—thankfully very brief—consider-
ation of the deﬁnition of “genocide.” But mainly this article is my emphasis on the ef-
forts we need to make toward the prevention of genocide. I include a list of projects for
prevention that I think about from my own vantage point as a psychologist/social scien-
tist/journalist. In the process, I want also to illustrate how each of us as genocide scho-
lars can conceptualize projects for prevention in the respective areas of our own
disciplinary expertise.
While, by deﬁnition, my overview, such as my remarks on the history of the profes-
sion, is not offered as objective truth, but coming from a veteran who was in the heart
of it, it should be of interest to colleagues in genocide studies and, better yet, it might be
of some inspiration to some younger genocide scholars. From a very early time, in my
work I set for myself the two goals to develop my own research on genocide and to con-
tribute to the development of a new multiethnic and multidisciplinary profession of
genocide studies.
CAN Genocide in Our World Be Stopped to a Signiﬁcant Extent?
Yes. I propose an International Peace Army (IPA) sponsored by a world government
that operates rationally, based on veriﬁed news reports and scientiﬁc assessments of
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Studies and Prevention. doi: 10.3138/gsp.7.1.108
risks to human lives.1 The IPA would be empowered, like a standing local police force,
to respond to reports of the beginning of mass murders or gathering threats of immi-
nent mass murder and would move rapidly and promptly to the scene. I believe such an
international mechanism could dramatically reduce the incidence of genocidal killing.
WILL Genocide in Our World Be Stopped to a Signiﬁcant Extent?
This is improbable. I do not believe that the global society is ready to launch an IPA.
Humankind is still highly politicized, conﬂictual, and polarized between totalitarian
magic/faith ideological governance and cultures versus more democratic, empirically
based, expert governance and cultures; world government is still too much of a theater
of power seeking, power posturing, and scheming; and human beings are still too stupid
(meaning anti-empirical) and still too immoral—that is, they are not committed reso-
lutely to Life over Death for all members of the human species.
Nonetheless, we cannot afford to give up, and even if these turn out to be our ﬂail-
ing end-of-species and end-of-planet efforts, for me the effort to stop genocide—and all
human-caused death—is what gives greatest spiritual meaning and even sensual plea-
sure to being alive while we are.
My Bird's Eye View on the Status of Prevention in Genocide Studies Today
A new graduate student in today’s growing number of graduate programs in genocide
studies around the world learns that there are dozens of methods and tools to attempt
to circumscribe and reduce genocide, to reduce the probability of developing genocides,
and even to prevent genocide from occurring. He/she also knows that the success of
these tools to date is limited, but the search for new and better methods goes on.
We, the early pioneers of genocide studies, knew very little about how to think
of preventing genocide, although we very much dreamed about it and actually tried
to develop some means for prevention. However, we were caught up in amassing
new knowledge and developing concepts for the description or diagnosis of genocide.
There was so much to learn. In addition, in our naïve idealism we were sure that simply
spreading knowledge about genocide as a recurrent and universal problem would trig-
ger actual solutions. I believe that our generation of pioneers generated broad global
awareness of genocide as a universal problem, but this has not translated into any sig-
niﬁcant reduction in genocide. We were diagnosticians of the cancers of genocide, but
we were not able to ﬁnd a cure.
It is also to the credit of the ﬁrst half century of genocide studies that the world has
begun to intervene against genocide, as in Kosovo, though efforts are typically poorly
thought-out and politically colored. Still, the majority of genocidal situations in the
world have not been objects of international intervention, and there is no established
basic machinery for intervention. Similarly, our ﬁeld is just beginning to track the chal-
lenge of genocide prevention.
Transitioning Genocide Scholarship from Study and Diagnosis to Treatment
Interventions and Prevention
It is time for genocide scientists to become genocide doctors who are involved in heal-
ing, treating, and preventing. There is a long period in clinical research, as in medicine,
when we are busy with narrative reports, later with more complex information gather-
ing as we go about developing deﬁnitions and naming phenomena, and later still with
developing an increasingly scientiﬁc assembly of conclusions, facts, and hypotheses for
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further empirical research. That period is over for genocide studies, and it is time to
move on to treatment, which includes the development of mechanisms for responding
to “early warnings” of genocide and attempting to prevent incipient probabilities of
genocidal killing.
The blight of genocide is unbearable. R.J. Rummel’s last calculation of genocidal
deaths in the twentieth century stood at 260 million human beings2! Genocide is
humanity’s top public health problem because it is the most common cause of unnatu-
ral human death.3
Requiem First Movement: One Scholar’s Memory of the Early History of
Genocide Studies
Genocide studies begins with the genius and heroism of Raphael Lemkin. Lemkin pio-
neered the study of the Holocaust and genocide as organized mass murders. Lemkin’s
seminal work on the Nazis4 is very much written from and alongside his knowledge,
concern, and comparative study of many other cases of genocide in human history, with
a special awareness of the Armenian Genocide as the ﬁrst cataclysmic event of genocide
in the twentieth century that was then followed by its magniﬁed counterpart, the Holo-
caust.5 Lemkin is clearly the parent of genocide studies, and he literally gives his life to
the creation of a ﬁrst world law against genocide, the United Nations Convention on the
Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (UNCG).6 Regrettably, the ratiﬁ-
cation of the UNCG by many signiﬁcant countries, including the United States, took
many years. As with many legal documents, ratiﬁcation has been of limited practical
value in the face of leaders who and nations that are hell-bent on killing, and for all of its
great pioneering signiﬁcance, the UNCG itself is conceptually ﬂawed by major omissions
of several types of genocidal killing, some of which were proposed by Lemkin himself.7
Lemkin’s work focused in large part on generating legal machinery against geno-
cide. He made his ﬁrst efforts to enact legislation much earlier than the Holocaust in
the League of Nations in the 1930s.8 Following World War II, during which he was one
of the few exceptions in his family to escape death in the Holocaust, he selﬂessly
devoted the remainder of his life—and in some ways his very health and personal life
too as he progressively succumbed to illness accompanied by a great deal of personal
loneliness—to the enactment and passage of the UNCG.
Even so, and hardly as a criticism of this great man, there is a sense in which even
Lemkin’s sterling effort also conveys how much we did not know what to do about
genocide in a real way. Even a cursory reading of the text of the UNCG shows that the
initial concepts for any machinery for prosecuting genocide are as vague and unformed
as can be because even Lemkin did not know.
Dutch jurist Peter Drost was next to shine a searchlight on the legal dimensions of
genocide, and since there are perhaps no other known works during these years I feel
duty-bound to at least refer to his work. But I do not know much about the impact of
his writing or that his work included any signiﬁcant action initiative. Drost strongly cri-
ticized the prevailing UN deﬁnition of genocide and predicted that governments that
set out to commit genocide would push their way through the holes in the deﬁnition.
Drost proposed a redeﬁnition of genocide that to my mind is a wide-ranging sensible
one, quite similar in fact to my own deﬁnition, for which I have been criticized over
and over again in the literature by formalists and what I call “deﬁnitionalists” even as I
have simultaneously been complimented by some of the same critics for the humanity
of my thinking. In brief, I do not agree to any pile of defenseless bodies being excluded
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from the deﬁnition of genocide. Drost proposes, “Genocide is the deliberate destruction
of physical life of individual human beings by reason of their membership of any
human collectivity as such.”9
The next three early genocide scholars to appear on the scene were Irving Louis
Horowitz, Leo Kuper, and me. As for the contributions of each member of our trio to
concepts of actual intervention and prevention, I think it is clear that each of us cared
very much about reducing genocide but did not achieve very much at all. Still at the
diagnosis stage, we were not able to offer much in terms of prevention, despite, for
instance, my effort to pioneer the concept of a Genocide Early Warning System. Horo-
witz’s Taking Lives: Genocide: State Power and Mass Murder (1976)10 focuses on struc-
tures of governments that allow and themselves initiate and promote genocidal policies.
Horowitz moves us from a time-honored historical methodology of assembling and re-
counting the facts of what emperors, generals, and governments have done to whom-
ever at whatever times to new ways of describing and interpreting governmental
policies and self-interests that make it possible to announce to a people that genocidal
killing of such and such targeted victims is legitimate and necessary for one’s own mili-
tary, political, economic, religious, spiritual, or ideological self-defense. In addition,
Horowitz has become a leading and devoted publisher of works on genocide. In both
ways, Horowitz has made huge contributions to knowledge about genocide.
Leo Kuper produced his seminal work, Genocide: Its Political Use in the Twentieth
Century, in 1981.11 Kuper, who earlier had provided us with an understanding of the
process of polarizations of peoples, including racial and ethnic groups,12 and an insight-
ful picture of how such conﬂicts inevitably escalate into reciprocal excesses not only of
war but of savage mass murder, published the ﬁrst work describing and analyzing the
structures of different kinds of genocide and provided a number of case histories of gen-
ocides. Kuper was the beloved doyen of the emerging academic study of genocide in the
early 1980s.
Kuper’s next major book focused directly on prevention.13 The book’s tone of
regret and impotence and writing off of the UN as a viable force against genocide re-
sponded to the reality that the world had done little about genocide and looked unlikely
to do much more in the future. It was balanced by a major focus on the concept of pre-
vention and a very practical proposal for a new organization, International Alert (IA),
which was to become a worldwide organization for genocide prevention paralleling the
Nobel Prize-winning Amnesty International. To head the new international organiza-
tion Kuper recruited the fabled head of Amnesty—General Martin Ennals who had led
Amnesty from its shaky beginnings to Nobel Prize status.14 Ennals had earlier invited
Horowitz, Kuper, and me to an international meeting of Amnesty in Amsterdam in
1982 to introduce the subject of genocide as a possible future extension of Amnesty’s
mandate, but the organization turned down this expansion. Ennals later decided to
leave Amnesty and devote himself to building IA, but he passed away in 1991 before
the work advanced. Kuper’s efforts to establish an IA branch in Los Angeles likewise
failed to advance before his death in 1994.
My own emerging contribution to genocide studies is represented most strongly in
my book How Can We Commit the Unthinkable? Genocide, the Human Cancer, which
was published by Westview Press in 1982.15 The main thrust of this work was the psy-
chology of the different roles in genocide—victim, bystander, accomplice, and perpetra-
tor. Among other parts of my research for this book, I spent over a year in a sequence
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of psychodramatic exercises that I played out every morning, totally immersing myself
in fantasies of victim, bystander, accomplice, and victimizer.
Thus, my book was an exciting ﬁrst thrust into the psychology of our human readi-
ness to commit the unthinkable. It was also a major platform for my early writing,
which I had already begun to publish since 1969,16 about the shocking evidence of psy-
chological normality—meaning non-psychiatric disturbance—of perpetrators. Likewise,
it was a platform for a beginning formulation of a new approach to psychological diag-
nosis that would put doing harm to oneself and/or doing harm to others at the center of
every mental health diagnosis, as opposed to the norm—that still prevails to this day—
of focusing on the disturbed functioning of oneself with little to no attention to destruc-
tiveness toward others. The book also includes my painful struggles to work out a psy-
chology of our experiences of life and death, especially how human beings seek to bring
on the deaths of others as if, in magical thinking, by sacriﬁcing them to the fate of death
we fear for ourselves, we guarantee our own survival by their deaths.
In its concluding chapter, the book also offered a major new idea, the concept of a
Genocide Early Warning System (GEWS). Pronounced with a soft G, the acronym for
me personally was a memory tribute to my people’s suffering in the Holocaust and also
my wish that we transform the memory of the agony of our Jewish people into a contri-
bution to the prevention of future genocides.
My colleague in Israel, where I had moved from my native US in 1973, Chanan Ra-
paport, then director of a major think tank in Jerusalem, the Szold National Institute
for Research in the Behavioral Sciences, and I met weekly over many years to formulate
GEWS. The concept was ﬁrst published by the Szold Institute in 1977, and the ﬁrst
major publication followed in my 1982 book,17 where it earned the respectful recogni-
tion and recommendations of a wide range of leaders and institutions, including the
Chancellor of Germany, the Premier of France, an Undersecretary of Human Rights in
the US State Department, and the United Nations.
Rapaport and I identiﬁed 11 Early Warning Processes (EWPs), to which in more
recent years I added a twelfth EWP under the inﬂuence of Gregory Stanton’s inclusion
of this stage in his “Eight Stages of Genocide” and following a great deal of my own
research and publications on the subject of the denial of genocide.18 While all of the
EWPs are signiﬁcant, what Rapaport and I concluded was that one couplet of EWPs
was the most frequently recurring in a variety of genocides and in many ways con-
stituted the most powerful force for inciting genocide: the combination of dehumaniza-
tion and attributing dangerous power (demonization) to the very people whom one is
dehumanizing.
Alas, the idea of GEWS was never implemented and the efforts that Rapaport and I
made to implement a worldwide Genocide Early Warning System fell ﬂat. Other major
scholars then began to emerge in the newly developing ﬁeld. Among them was Helen
Fein who evolved into a giant ﬁgure in genocide studies beginning with her award-
winning masterpiece19 that analyzed the somewhat different fates of Jews in the Holo-
caust in relation to the different governmental and cultural norms of various countries in
Europe and the extent and ways in which these countries cooperated with evil Nazi di-
rectives to turn Jews over to them. Instead of blanket mourning for all Holocaust victims
in Europe, and beyond a ﬂat historical narrative, Fein developed a comparative study of
the fates of the victims in relation to deﬁnable parameters of governments and peoples’
cultural traditions. Soon afterward Fein followed up with what I believe to this day to be
112 Charny
© 2012 Genocide Studies and Prevention 7, no. 1 doi:10.3138/gsp.7.1.108
amazingly valuable blank dramatic scenarios of how genocide emerges in different his-
torical sequences.20 Along with the continuation of her very creative work in the follow-
ing years, Fein joined Roger Smith, Robert Melson, and me in founding the International
Association of Genocide Scholars (IAGS) in 1994 and became our founding president.
So many wonderfully important scholars followed in the development of genocide
studies. Some are strongly identiﬁed with the study of their own people’s genocides but
at the same time they emerge, slowly but surely, as spokesmen and women and suppor-
ters of efforts to honor all genocides and work for genocide prevention in general. Out-
standing examples include the indefatigable Richard Hovanissian at University of
California, Los Angeles, and his major contributions to knowledge of the Armenian
Genocide. (In terms of the early history previously given, Hovanissian and Kuper jointly
hosted a luncheon to honor Ennals and me at the UCLA Faculty Club in 1988.)
Another major genocide scholar on the center stage was R.J. Rummel, brilliant not
only in his amazing compilations of genocide statistics but also in his empirical and the-
oretical elucidations of the nature of power and the corrective potential of democracy to
control destructive power as the single most important issue in social organization.21 As
a psychologist, I think that the parallel truth is that the healthy control and channeling
of needs for power is probably the single most important psychodynamic issue in the
mental and spiritual health of individuals.
Although I must arbitrarily end my reminiscences of the early history of our ﬁeld,
I cannot but tip a hat to Henry Huttenbach, who ﬁrst became an inspired writer of a
personal newsletter and then founded the ﬁrst journal in the ﬁeld, Journal of Genocide
Research.22 I also cannot pass over the amazingly productive Samuel Totten whose
work I will not discuss here, but I do think that for the fuller history of genocide studies
the reader is well referred to two books that are references to keep at hand: Totten and
Steven Leonard Jacobs’s celebration of Pioneers of Genocide Studies23 and Totten and
Paul Bartrop’s excellent Dictionary of Genocide.24
Requiem Second Movement: A Psychologist/Genocide Scholar’s
Views on the Basic Nature of Homo Genocider
What do I understand about our human species and our overwhelming readiness to
commit genocide?
My requiem statement as a psychologist is that the human being, basically or in-
stinctually, is overwhelmingly available to be cruel and destructive—this immediately
alongside all the good facts of a human being’s basic desire to live as well as a wonderful
readiness to make efforts to protect others’ lives.
When I lectured in Israel in 1969 to the Israel Psychological Association and then
published a paper in Hebrew in an Israeli journal and another in English in an Ameri-
can journal and when once again in my 1982 book,25 I wrote that it was a psychiatrically
normal human being who was our common genocider. I was contributing to an emer-
ging new knowledge base that, it turns out, was shocking to many of us.
Two major opinions that ﬁrst shocked the professional mental health world into the
recognition of the essential psychiatric normality of genociders were those rendered by
the psychologist and psychiatrist who examined the prisoners on trial at the Nuremberg
Trials of Nazis following the end of World War II. The two had plenty grim things to say
about the personalities of the Nazi leaders, but in terms of conventional psychiatric con-
cepts—that prevail to this day, in my opinion, most incorrectly—they were not mentally
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ill.26 Some years later, Christopher Browning told the story most vividly and convincingly
in his Ordinary Men: Reserve Police Battalion 101 and the Final Solution in Poland.27
For many years now, we have known the facts that so-called normal and ordinary
people rally in large numbers to follow or give orders to kill masses of other people, let
alone that many of them enjoy themselves while doing so. Yet I am far from sure that
we have really assimilated the depth of the implications of these empirical facts. I often
fantasize that, were I able to ﬁnd the time in my remaining life, I would author a new
basic general psychology book that tells the real story that the human being often is rot-
ten, in a dozen ways of projecting responsibility onto others, hate, prejudice, bigotry,
persecution, conformity and collaboration with evil, suicide, terrorism, torture, and
mass killing of others.
Personally and professionally as a psychologist, I believe that each and all of these
should be deﬁned as pathological in a new healthier diagnostic system in psychology,
but the fact is that in contemporary psychiatry unless the person is also acting weirdly
in one of the many ways that dysfunction and craziness are manifested, he/she does not
earn any psychopathological diagnosis for any of the above behaviors. Believe it or not,
even suicide is not a bona ﬁde diagnosis in the current system (depression is but suicide
or suicidal behavior are not).
In general, I have proposed in a series of professional publications on mental
health28 that all psychiatric and psychological diagnoses should be based, routinely and
automatically, on diagnosing two vectors:
1. Is the person harming his/her own life? Beyond a certain extent this is to be deﬁned
as psychological disturbance, and basically this is what the present diagnostic sys-
tem does do.
2. Is the same person harming the life of another person or other persons? How
much so? How dangerously? Beyond a certain extent this should also be deﬁned as
psychological disturbance, and the present system largely does not do this.
In my proposal, either disturbance and combinations of the two can be the basis
for a deﬁnition of abnormality. Further, I emphasize that either vector can be easily
transformed into the other. One can murder millions while looking and acting super
competent and therefore, in current language, as if one were quite mentally healthy,
and only later in the process of the madness of power and destruction of life do symp-
toms of personal disorganization and self-hurting appear, but in my view the distur-
bance was there from the beginning of hurting others.
I propose that the central basis of all psychological health is respect for and protec-
tion of life—one’s own and the lives of others as well. And the common denominator of
dysfunction and psychopathological disturbance is violating, hurting, and destroying
human life—one’s own or the lives of others.
Lest there be any confusion, I also emphasize that beyond a certain point of hurting
others there can be no resort to a defense of psychological illness and the perpetrator
must face criminal charges.
Although my proposal has been referenced often enough in mental health literature
and reviewed positively by many—and I do not know of any major critique of the con-
cept in psychological literature—there has not been any move whatsoever toward its
recognition or adoption in ofﬁcial systems. In psychology, and in our Western culture
at large, the illusion that human beings are basically good, emotionally healthy, and
decent goes on and on in the face of hundreds of millions dead from genocide against
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unarmed people or in the face of brilliant psychological research such as Stanley Mil-
gram’s work on obedience to authority29—participants in Milgram’s study gave danger-
ous electric shocks on the order of the experimenter—or Philip Zimbardo’s work on
how many ordinary, presumably “normal” and apparently decent people turn into vul-
tures if given jailer status and power.30
Choice: The Key to Individual and Collective Policies toward Life over Death
and for the Prevention of Genocide
The model that Rappaport and I created in How Can We Commit the Unthinkable? has
two parallel components. The ﬁrst describes basic psychological processes and how the
same EWPs we are to use in the early warning system for collective groups are deeply
rooted in the inherent construction of the human mind and human experience (e.g., the
quite natural need we have to identify threats to our survival and ﬁght back in what we
sincerely believe to be self-defense or the needs to experience power, including power
over others). The second component presents the EWPs in the societal system that we
have identiﬁed as likely to culminate in genocide. The EWPs are described as extending
and amplifying basic mind processes that are seen in each individual’s psychology all
though life. Genocidal behavior is not a freak that descends out of the blue. It comes up
from the basic primary workings of the human mind and soul.31
The overriding key is choice—that is, the capacity of the human mind to decide to
stop, including stopping violence. Every collective—including religious movements,
political movements, and nations—must exercise such choices. We are all doing so
either knowledgably or inadvertently and unconsciously, but we are making choices.
While many people and collectives make positive choices, many make negative ones,
whether they see their actions as positive or not and whether they intend their actions
to escalate to killing or not.
Thus, a basically democratic nation embarks on its independence joyously, seeking
the freedom and welfare of its citizens, but in the course of its experiences—say of being
attacked by others and needing to invoke self-defense—and in the course of the develop-
ment of conscious and unconscious interests in becoming superior to other peoples and
exploiting or enslaving others, even a largely good nation can produce its share of geno-
cidal My Lais in Vietnam and Deir Yassins in Israel-Palestine in the course of military
operations basically devoted to self-defense. Patterns of colonial genocidal crimes can
spring without prior malevolent intentions as land and resources are taken from indige-
nous peoples. Genocidal murders can take place in the course of wars, even just wars, as
against Germany (e.g., Dresden) and Japan (certainly the nuclear destruction of Naga-
saki and perhaps also Hiroshima). In addition to genocide by “good” guys, the less dem-
ocratic countries stride more easily and rampantly to genocidal actions against endless
numbers of people in the Tibets, Chechnyas, Yugoslavias, Cambodias, and Rwandas.
Requiem Third Movement: Promoting the Prevention of Genocide in the
Emerging Field of Genocide Studies
Should the Concept of Genocide be Replaced?
Alternative words or concepts such as “extremely violent societies,” “atrocity crimes,”
“ethnic cleansing,” “democide,” and “crimes against humanity” can each add valuable
meanings to our understanding of aspects of a genocidal event and provide us with a
fuller language for classifying different types of genocide, but I am against seeking to
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replace the vital word genocide. First of all, this is the word that has successfully drawn
easy consensual use in the languages of people around the world. What they mean by it
in common-sense language is that some killing leader/group has murdered masses of
defenseless civilians. In my judgment, that is exactly what Lemkin’s word construction
was really intended to offer—a way of naming and describing mass murders of civilians
under any and all circumstances.
The Energy of the Field Needs to Move from Deﬁnitionalism to a Real
Concentration on Prevention
Genocide studies should be deﬁned today explicitly and prominently as a ﬁeld of study
as well as research and action for intervention and prevention. Prevention should be at
the center. For all my work in this ﬁeld, soon to be 50 years,32 obviously I still don’t
know very much about preventing genocide. Be that as it may, I believe that we have
reached the point at which we can think and plan a great number of prevention projects
and initiatives and, through trials, successes, and failures, there will come a future era
when human civilization will have developed signiﬁcant tools to achieve a meaningful
degree of prevention.33 In contrast to the past, the goal of learning and contributing to
prevention efforts should now be built into every graduate program in Holocaust and
genocide studies.
I have no doubt that the international and national legal systems sit at the forefront
of possible genocide prevention. I celebrate the several noteworthy steps that have
already been taken, such as the creation of the United Nations tribunals on the geno-
cides in Rwanda and in the former Yugoslavia and the creation of the International
Criminal Court (ICC). Yet I worry about the continuing deﬁnitionalism34 in legal cir-
cles that builds on the wasteful polemics of many genocide scholars who keep searching
for a “pure” deﬁnition and proof of “pure” intentional genocide and are willing to skip
past millions of dead bodies that are hardly anything but other versions and categories
(or types) of genocidal mass murder.
One Genocide Scholar’s Nominations of Projects for Genocide Prevention
I wish to propose a series of serious projects, but I also want this list to illustrate a larger
point that in every discipline there await many possibilities for creative efforts at geno-
cide prevention. By combining proposals from the many disciplines that are involved in
genocide studies, we will have a dazzling array and agenda for future work in our ﬁeld
that moves us beyond the successful ﬁrst era of basic understanding.
Each of us, and each of our disciplines, must contribute ideas and tools for preven-
tion based on our areas of expertise. As a psychologist and social scientist, as well as a
journalist/writer, with deep interests in and a great deal of experience with information
systems and public communication, it is to be expected that I propose projects mainly
along these lines. Below are some of my ideas for projects toward the goal of genocide
prevention.
1. Proposal for an international peace army: an integrated use of military force, public
medical and health programs, and informed tools of community organization to
organize regions and cultures for life and against death-making, including long-
term prejudice and persecution of others.
2. Information systems and early warning systems that alert us to possible developing
genocides and direct us to seek possible interventions that might reduce and limit
the dangers of mass deaths.
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a. Genocide Early Warning Systems,35
b. World genocide situation rooms in major Holocaust and genocide museums,36
and
c. Genocide Prevention Now,37 an online magazine that provides information
about genocide in our world and about developments in genocide studies and
prevention.
3. Worldwide promotional campaigns for life and against seeking death: life protec-
tion needs to become a more consensual human value. Using a wide range of infor-
mation and media tools, with the leadership and participation of a wide range of
acknowledged public heroes, including many different religious leaders, I propose a
series of campaigns to elevate the value of life. The goals of the campaigns are to
promote respect for life and commitments to the right to life of all people, and
wholesome life-protecting social and ecological environments. Death-seeking, such
as genocidal terrorism or totalitarian murders of citizens, must become a forbidden
act in the basic consensus of human minds all over the globe. This could include
the formation of a new organization, “Right to Life” (R2L), based ﬁrst of all in a
coalition of victim peoples of past genocides who will be joined by other people of
good will to promote the goal of a right to life for all human beings.
4. Legislation against incitement to violence and genocide: European countries have
several criminal laws against denials of established past genocides, but Americans
oppose them as violations of the cardinal principle of free speech. I suggest that in
the US too there can be room for further legislation against incitement to violence,
including the blatant celebration or legitimization of past genocides and denials of
past genocides which convey manifest calls to renew violence against the same or
other peoples.38
5. International licenses for leaders of national governments: a program that awards
annual international licenses to leaders of national governments on the basis of
their proven histories and current policy assertions of ﬁrm commitments against
genocidal policies and terrorism. Only nations with qualiﬁed licensed leaders will
then be eligible for a range of international economic privileges and programs.
Clearly each of the above proposals merits an essay in its own right. For the pur-
poses of the present overview, I will conﬁne myself to some additional comments on
worldwide culture campaigns for Life over Death. With respect to the other suggested
projects, in a few cases I offer some introductory explanations in the notes and direct
the reader to some bibliographic resources.
Comments on the Proposal for Worldwide Promotional Campaigns
for Life and against Death
I have previously described a worldwide campaign for the Right to Life of all peoples
in my book on the psychology of suicide bombers.39 I then expanded this proposal to
formulate a cardinal principle of R2L or the Right to Life of Every Human Being and the
hope that such a principle could inspire millions of human beings around the world
and become a consensual principle of most of humanity, and I propose the creation of a
new worldwide organization: R2L! A Worldwide Union of Genocide Victim Peoples—
and All Caring People—On Behalf of a Right to Life of All Peoples.40
The proposed concept of R2L should be immediately recognized as a companion
to the historic proposal of R2P or the Responsibility to Protect, which was put forward
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by Gareth Evans, former Foreign Minister of Australia, and Mohamed Sahnoun, Special
Advisor to the UN Secretary-General.41 The International Commission on Intervention
and State Sovereignty issued its report in December 2001. It has been adopted by the
UN and has been considered by many to be a momentous breakthrough in human
thinking and the value system of the international community. On a legal level, it is a
breakthrough concept that goes against a belief that countries are not responsible to
intervene in the domestic affairs of other nations and instead stipulates that each nation
has no less than a responsibility to intervene on behalf of saving human lives when it
becomes clear that the government of another nation is failing to do so or is actively in-
volved in mass killing.
I envision R2L as a major international ofﬁce conducting international cultural
campaigns on behalf of the sanctity of life and commitment to protecting human life
in projects conveyed in the different languages of our world and through the various cul-
tural forms known and trusted by different peoples, including religious leaders, as well
as through activities, folk art, music, and more. I also see such an organization under-
taking or supporting a variety of major action projects such as those I sketched above.
R2L is the antithesis and antidote to the Culture of Death. Osama bin Laden was quoted
as saying “We love death. The U.S. loves life. That is the difference between us two.”42
The Necessary Authenticity and Scientiﬁc Validation of Information
and the Battle against Denial and Falsehoods
A cardinal rule for any R2L project or activity must be the authenticity and scientiﬁcally
established validity of information, for which purpose it is not difﬁcult to establish clear
procedures for ruling on the admissibility of information, such as the use of multiple
multiethnic and multidisciplinary evaluation committees working in parallel but
entirely separately from one another and protected to the utmost from political pres-
sures from any source. In the course of working with information about past genocides,
it is inevitable that data will also be presented about the execution of genocidal mas-
sacres and even larger genocidal campaigns by some victim peoples.43 For all that, we
legitimately remain strongly identiﬁed with our sorrow and anger at our having been
victims of genocide. The facts and critiques of the faults and errors of our various peo-
ples must be dealt with responsibly and respectfully.
The endless denialist propaganda in the world cannot be ignored. It is not difﬁcult
to establish clear procedures for ruling on the inadmissibility of openly false misinfor-
mation and propaganda, and there is no reason that the world community has to con-
tinue entertaining intentionally denialist claims by anyone, including governments, as if
they deserve a fair hearing as “the other side” of the story, a “competing narrative,” or
an alternative view that has to be “researched” further.
Requiem Finale: A Call for Integrity and Commitment in Genocide Studies
I have been too often disappointed by leaders in our ﬁeld of genocide studies. Naively,
but idealistically, I expected a higher level of personal ethics and comportment in our
profession, which after all is committed to stopping the scourges of all sorts of claims of
superiority and power over others and attacks against other people. I remember vividly
Kuper’s amazement and unbearable hurt when he ran into a hunger for power and
superiority on the part of individuals and agencies in our young ﬁeld rather than an
inspiration of caring to stop genocidal killing. I think our discipline needs to devote
some time to the creation of a professional code of ethics and a review machinery to
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help constructively process complaints and angers that arise in the course of our work
with one another.
Since life makes no sense to me unless it is for serving life, beginning with my own
safety and health and also the safety and health of others, I am happy and devotedly
committed to advancing efforts (my own as well as those of others) to work toward
genocide prevention. Even though we are not going to make it in our time, or perhaps
ever, this is the only way I want to live and die.
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Against the Grain: Critical Reflections on the State and
Future of Genocide Scholarship1
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This article critiques certain trends in genocide studies, including scholarly misuse of Lemkin’s sta-
tus and work, retreat from academic activism against genocide, dismissive approaches to victim
groups’ political agency, relativist tendencies of the “memory politics” concept and its application,
growing institutionalization of the ﬁeld, the obscuring of genocidal violence against women and
girls through the concept of “gendercide,” the focus on dehumanization as a condition of genocide,
and the emphasis on early warning. The article also discusses a new genocide denial strategy. In
light of this, genocide early warning is largely irrelevant and, far beyond political indifference
accounting for the continued prevalence of genocide, the prevalence results because the current
global order and many individual societies have been largely formed through genocide and related
mass violence and oppression. The article contends that a global reparation process could help
rework the current world away from its genocidal foundations and tendencies.
Key words: Lemkin, memory politics, gendercide, dehumanization, genocide prevention, reparations
This article examines certain current issues and trends in genocide studies. Some are to-
pics that have garnered sustained attention in recent years, while others are issues that
are not well-studied but that I consider important for the future of the discipline. While
this article recognizes important strides represented by various recent activities in the
ﬁeld as well as the typically well-considered overarching emphases of the ﬁeld, the re-
ceived topics are engaged critically in an effort to expose problematic assumptions,
gaps, and other points for analysis and open them to new insights and directions.
Through an identiﬁcation of under-discussed issues, this article subjects the ﬁeld as a
whole to similar critique to open new avenues of inquiry or effort.
While the article aims at the speciﬁc rather than the abstract, the goal is not a
sequence of direct evaluative engagements with particular scholars and works. There
are two main reasons for this. First, the purpose of the article is to look at the overall
features of the ﬁeld as well as where it is and where it should go in the near future.
However productive commentaries on particular scholars might be as part of that pro-
cess, too speciﬁc a focus will mean, in a short work, losing sight of the general issues at
stake. Second, while scholarly history is one of the last places where the obsolete “great
man” of history model is still used (note the concept of “pioneers of genocide studies,”
for example), the evolution of a ﬁeld of study is driven by a complex of global and par-
ticular forces and situational factors that include individual desires and acts but are not
exhausted by them. Individual work is a function of these trends as much as or more
than it is some kind of core, independent, individual intellectual activity. This is not to
say that work in genocide studies is derivative, though it is the case that many recent
trends—“gendercide,” colonialism and genocide, and so forth—are in essence the result
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of (rather belated) applications of long-standing, even institutionalized, scholarly and
intellectual movements—gender studies, postcolonial and subaltern studies, and so
forth—to the particular subject of genocide. Indeed, while certain individuals might
have attached themselves or been attached to particular trends in the ﬁeld, the reality
more typically is that multiple independently working scholars were moving toward
similar ideas.
The applications of external theoretical frameworks is not a bad trend at all. Quite
the contrary, the incorporation of postcolonial theory, for instance, is quite welcome
and has advanced the ﬁeld. What is more, the interaction between such an approach
and the study of genocide is clearly advancing postcolonial theory as well, just as the
application of Holocaust studies approaches to other genocides actually reﬂected back
into the former in productive ways—for instance, in the treatment of denial. But a focus
on scholars in the ﬁeld misses the long intellectual traditions outside it that are the
foundation of this kind of work in genocide studies.
The topic of the ﬁeld itself is an interesting issue. A decade ago, scholars referred to
the ﬁeld as “comparative genocide studies” and emphasized the notion that the range of
cases of genocide, including the Holocaust, should be understood as part of a broad
phenomenon through analysis of the similarities (and differences) among various cases.
This might be seen as a response to the now undiscussed but once hotly debated issues
of the comparability of the Holocaust and of Holocaust studies versus Holocaust and
genocide studies versus genocide studies. In any event, the “comparative” modiﬁer has
in recent years been dropped, perhaps in recognition of the broadness of the ﬁeld,
which in one sense subsumes, in addition to comparative analysis, all discrete studies of
particular cases of genocide as well as abstract theoretical discussions that do not focus
on speciﬁc cases.
The mention of the “great man” theory of history suggests a ﬁrst point of analysis.
This is the recent increase in attention to Raphael Lemkin. While a re-examination of
his work as the source of multiple interesting ideas that have not been tapped and have
even been set aside is useful for the ﬁeld, as is the publication of writings that have
been heretofore the province of a very select set of scholars, the culture that is growing
around Lemkin has led to what might be called a “Lemkin fundamentalism,” according
to which present moves in scholarship are justiﬁed by appeal to Lemkin’s authority
(this or that is what he really meant by the concept of genocide) rather than by the
merits of the positions themselves. While a respectful recognition that what appear to
be new ideas were anticipated by Lemkin is certainly a mark of humility and to be
lauded—indeed, in particularly gifted scholars’ hands, it marks an attempt to go back in
the history of genocide studies to reactivate strands of thought that were truncated in
favor of the particular path that has evolved (for instance, the legalistic approach to
genocide, the discounting of structural processes,2 and the nearly exclusive emphasis on
killing3)—an overemphasis on Lemkin runs the risk of stiﬂing new possibilities that he
did not anticipate. This is typically not noticed adequately because the very notion of
genocide is viewed as a static universal, ﬁxed across place and for all time, in the man-
ner in which Plato conceived “Virtue,” “Justice,” and the like. Genocide, however, is not
a natural object; it is a set of historical events or processes that have been grouped
together by a common term, typically based on a set of shared characteristics that have
been deemed, relative to the prevailing ethical views of a time and place, of special
importance, but sometimes also or instead based on a historical lineage or some other
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factor serving to unify particular cases. Lemkin had as his reference data only acts prior
to 1944, when he announced coining the term. While he is to be lauded for having
deep insights into the nature of the genocidal processes, his insights are limited by his
location at a particular point in history. Just as a theorist of the ancient world would
have had a different concept of genocide—we cannot say more limited because it could
have involved nuances and insights that would not have been available later—from
Lemkin, so would Lemkin writing today have a different concept and deﬁnition from
the one that he developed seven decades ago. Indeed, in direct proportion to the gains
in global political, legal, media, and public attention, the concept and practices
of genocide have evolved in ways that show perpetrators’ awareness of the most likely
bases of intervention and prosecution. Some approaches to genocide appear in fact
modiﬁed to avoid generating the most obvious evidence of genocide. For instance,
the extensive use of systematic sexual violence as a tool of ethnic depopulation/
repopulation, community destruction, and genocidal dispersion by Serbian forces in
Bosnia-Herzegovina, coupled with a lower incidence of direct killing than in similar
cases, suggests a witting or unconscious modiﬁcation of typical approaches to genocide
to decrease the likelihood of international intervention. The modiﬁcation was quite
successful, for despite evidence of tens of thousands of rape victims (each often raped
dozens if not hundreds of times) over multiple years, it was only after the direct killing
of thousands of men and boys in Srebrenica that the international community took
decisive action.4
If we switch focus from the limitation of theorizing genocide based on Lemkin’s
approach to exclusive focus on Lemkin historically, we might recognize a related “Lem-
kin fetishism.” A key example is Samantha Power’s journalistic use of Lemkin as a
hook—that is, a rhetorical, even propagandistic, device—to entice, even manipulate,
readers into a particular kind of engagement with her subject matter.5 While Lemkin
certainly deserves credit for coining the term “genocide” and being the founding scholar
of genocide studies, exclusive focus on him as the major historical ﬁgure in the long
process of development of the concept of genocide within the broader notion of human
rights authorizes a fetishism of Lemkin that ignores a much fuller history which includes
such things as Morgenthau’s use of the term “race extermination,”6 Rousseau’s ethical
argument against genocide, and even Thucydides’s work on the Melos Genocide.7
A second issue is the “theory-practice” distinction. While clearly it is possible
to engage in theoretical work—such as deﬁning genocide—without regard to its practi-
cal implications and just as possible to do concrete work—for instance, in a camp of
refugees from a genocide—without attempting to theorize the forces producing the con-
text in which the concrete work is being done, practical implications are implicit in
theoretical work and concrete work demands theorization. Thus, the all-too-frequent
dismissal of academics by public policy makers, non-governmental organization (NGO)
workers, and others ignores the fact that such people are always already operating
within theoretical frameworks to which they are typically blind. The choice of how to
approach refugee work is often terribly ideologically loaded, while policy practitioners
focused exclusively on “political realities” and rejecting any kind of ethical concerns are
actually committed to a speciﬁc ethical theory themselves—that of privileging practical
interests over other considerations. A person’s “on the ground” activities are mediated
through ideological structures embedded in his or her mind, institutional practices, and
structures; geopolitical forces and trends supporting these institutions and the individuals
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operating within them; occupational and organizational attitudes, language games,
boundaries, blind spots, and so on—that is, mediated through mental structures inﬁ-
nitely distant from “the ground” precisely because they prevent direct interaction with
what is happening on the ground on its own terms.
Recent condemnations of activist scholars are at once appropriate and incorrect. It
is appropriate to call attention to the politicized nature of genocide scholarship, but it is
incorrect to pose a depoliticized, “objective” alternative of pure scholarship. Regarding
the ﬁrst point, there is clearly the potential to tap, exploit, or taint scholarship on geno-
cide for or with particular political agendas. For instance, those pushing for an increase
in military spending by the United States might cite the Responsibility to Protect as a
moral imperative that requires the expansion of the capacity of the US military for civil-
ian protection operations. What is more, powerful interests are always already fully
present in universities and NGOs. In the US, Department of Defense funding for all
sorts of programs is rampant, for instance, while the apparent exculpatory inﬂuence of
powerful US political elites on the representations of the Rwandan and Armenian Gen-
ocides in the Albright-Cohen report suggest deep problems with the US Institute of
Peace.8 Perhaps the most signiﬁcant danger today is the growing militarization of geno-
cide studies. Through such mechanisms as Mass Atrocity Response Operations: A Mili-
tary Planning Handbook,9 scholars researching mass violence are being pulled into the
orbit of the US military. The lessons of the US invasion of Iraq that has been (partially)
justiﬁed on humanitarian grounds—as has the invasion of Afghanistan, for instance,
with the aim to free women and girls from the oppressive yoke of the Taliban—are
clear: as human rights and anti-genocide discourse has gained greater and greater public
presence and moral legitimacy, it is more and more appropriated as a rhetorical cover
for the pursuit of other, less laudable, agendas. Just as with Lemkin, Samantha Power’s
work in this regard has been as problematic as it has been effective. Her “A Problem
from Hell” is, in fact, an extended polemic designed to convince members of the US
public that military violence is the one and only correct and effective response to the
problem of genocide, based on a highly selective and ideologically tainted understand-
ing of the US military and the United States’ historical relationship to genocide and
other human rights abuses at home and around the world.10 Not a few genocide scho-
lars seem to have accepted this, to the point where the discipline can appear at times
hawkish. While it is unreasonable a priori to rule out military intervention, it is equally
so to ignore many other avenues, particularly avenues of deep prevention. This is con-
sidered further at the end of this article. Sufﬁce it here to state that every aspect of the
relationship between the ﬁeld of genocide studies and military institutions and every
conceptual element of militarization must be subjected to ongoing critical analysis, and
scholars must have the courage to point out the inappropriate militarization of the
discipline despite the militarism prevailing in many countries globally, especially the
United States. Scholars should be ever mindful of the fact that the tighter the discipline’s
connections to military interests, the less of a brake on military abuses of human rights
the discipline will be. Even in cases of international peacekeeping forces, abuses are
well-known.11 The militarization of genocide studies is functioning to pull a potential
oppositional nexus against militarization and a broader abuse of human rights into the
system that abuses human rights, so that it loses its critical edge and ability to position
itself as a resistant force to the root causes of genocide, however much it might reject or
lament the effects of genocide.
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Responsible scholars must continually evaluate the uses and abuses of scholarly
research and teaching as well as the powers and interests at play in university and NGO
settings in order to clarify continually the ideological dimensions of all scholarship in
their chosen ﬁeld. This is not to say that there is such a thing as “pure scholarship” that
can be opposed to the various agendas and interests that, in two ways, have intruded
into academia and/or appropriated its activities. First, regardless of a scholar’s inten-
tions, his or her work is always placed within and inﬂuenced by a social and political
context. At the very least, every discussion of any aspect of genocide has potential politi-
cal implications, as it can be used to justify a range of actions or inaction. Second, that a
scholar is ethically or politically disinterested raises a question about why he or she is
conducting research in this ﬁeld. Those most committed to the notion of “disinterested”
scholarship are too often those most interested in their own status within their ﬁelds.
They do have an agenda, but not a broad political agenda in the service of others; they
serve their own career interests in the sense of trying to raise their prominence in rela-
tion to other scholars and in the broader community. There is nothing inherently
wrong with this and it might spur great scholarly achievements with important social
utility, but it is false to claim that such scholars are “disinterested.” What is more, too
often in academia the personal agenda undercuts the potential social utility of the scho-
lar’s activities by focusing them exclusively on self-aggrandizement and self-beneﬁt.
This calls into question the objectivity of such scholars, who come to prize “original”
ideas without regard to their correctness. Academia becomes an industrial engine
devoted to generating “new” ideas, the main evaluation of which depends not on the
lives they might save but on the extent to which they represent differences from re-
ceived ideas. Scholars critique other scholars not out of genuine intellectual and social
commitment but in order to demonstrate their own superiority—that is, in order to
offer ideas that are superior to those critiqued in virtue of the fact that they come later.
While new ideas are of course the lifeblood of scholarly research, this is so because they
produce new and better understandings. Novelty and criticism for their own sake or as
the demonstration of power are only valuable coincidentally, if they are valuable at all.
In the end, it is not a question of whether or not this or that scholar has an
agenda—every scholar always already does—but of what that agenda is.12 In this light,
the anti-activism bent is actually based on the principle that individual self-interest is
more worthy than other-focused interests. Clearly, “other-focused” interests can include
the worst of motivations, such as in Nazism, with an individual serving the promotion
of the “Aryan master race,” but just as clearly they can motivate efforts to overcome the
oppression of others. There is no choosing a priori between “disinterested” scholarship
(read: self-interested) or “interested” scholarship: responsible scholars must decide
regarding each work of scholarship whether the agenda behind it undercuts its value for
scholarly inquiry aimed at a better understanding of an issue—and, perhaps, addressing
it, which is not precluded.
Just as some scholars are criticized for “activist” stances, in recent years self-
advocacy by former victim groups has drawn as much disapproval. The positive side
is the frank discussion of certain forces within a victim community exploiting actual
genocide histories and the suffering of victims. But too often scholars claiming objective
indifference extend this criticism carelessly to all political agency by post-genocide
victim groups, labeling their approach to genocide with the pejorative term “memory
politics.” The typical claim is that victim groups’ political agency that challenges the
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post-genocide status quo and points out continuing harms by the perpetrator group,
and perhaps advocates repair by the perpetrator group—which asserts basic categories
of “perpetrator” and “victim,” in fact—is based on misrepresentations or at least selec-
tive narratives of the genocide history toward some current political end. Again, this
can be the case in some instances, but that abstract possibility is all too often unjustiﬁ-
ably assumed to be actual in all concrete cases.
Regarding this tendency, we might notice a number of things. As has been commen-
ted on before in reference to genocide and other kinds of oppression, only weak, depen-
dent, deferential victims are considered true victims. When victims demonstrate their
independent wills, especially in ways that conﬂict with the agendas or desires of the scho-
lars or governmental or non-governmental individuals helping them, that agency is dis-
paraged.13 But this is a function of power. Victims in an objective sense have little power,
precisely because of the degrading of their political, economic, cultural, social, familial,
and other structures and strengths through genocide. While the most obvious way in
which this plays out is the ability of the perpetrator group and successive generations not
only to deny that genocide occurred but to continue to enjoy and extend the beneﬁts
accruing to them from it (in the form of land occupation, wealth expropriation, political
power and legitimacy, identity superiority, etc.), it also structures the relationship between
helpers and victims, which is just as much a power relationship. While some “helpers”
are cognizant of this and consciously or naturally operate in ways that do not exploit and
even mitigate the power differential, too many are not and do not. It has been argued, in
fact, that precisely this kind of power is characteristic of, for instance, non-governmental
international development work. What is more, a cursory examination of the relation-
ships of third-party actors to perpetrator and to victim groups reveals a tendency to be
much more deferential to the former than to the latter. As a function of power, victim
groups’ actions and attitudes are subjected to intense scrutiny, while even perpetrator
denials are largely tolerated as expected behaviors, “free speech,” and so forth.
This is evident in recent attention to the claimed tendency of victim groups to
become subsequent perpetrators in what has been labeled “cycles of violence.”14 There is
no doubt that some victim groups become perpetrators. But this does not mean that
victim groups in general have this tendency. The question to ask is not whether some
victim groups become perpetrator groups, but whether the incidence of this among
victim groups is higher than it is among non-victim groups. I am aware of no study of
this particular issue, one researched for instance for individual crime,15 but an informal
tally of cases of genocide in recent centuries would seem to indicate no special differen-
tial one way or another. The reality is that some victim groups commit genocide because
some groups commit genocide. It seems a perverse extension of the dominational logic
of genocide for victim groups to be subjected to disproportionate scrutiny and pre-emp-
tive disapprobation because they are subjected to genocide. In this way, they seem to
have to be punished for the transgressions of the actual perpetrators. It is quite interest-
ing that the most prevalent link between past and future genocide is left under-discussed:
the tendency to commit genocide again of past perpetrator groups whose genocidal
acts are functions of embedded political, cultural, institutional, military, and other such
forces, attitudes, and structures or whose genocidal acts have embedded in their societies
militarist, political, and other attitudes and structures inﬂuenced by or reﬂecting geno-
cide, when those groups are not challenged or rehabilitated to expunge the embedded
elements. The United States, and the way in which genocide of Native Americans was a
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deeply embedded feature of the military, culture, and politics of the nineteenth century
is a case in point: there is little mystery as to why the same military committed atrocities
in Vietnam (against another indigenous group) or had intentional roles in the genocides
in Guatemala, Indonesia, and East Timor. “Serial” genocide perpetrators slip under the
radar as much now as genocide did relative to individual murder prior to Lemkin.
The memory politics tendency is to relegate victim group narratives, even when
these deserve some criticism for simplifying group identities and genocidal dynamics,
to an equivalence with perpetrator group narratives in being inherently ﬂawed and re-
ductive. Of course, no “narrative” of a genocide is free from some kind of reduction—
and this is true especially for accounts that emphasize the complex, multifaceted nature
of a set of events considered a genocide to emphasize that no “grand narrative” ﬁts
them, as such accounts lose sight of any unifying factors and focus exclusively on the
fragmentary character of the data—and even the best of yesterday’s scholarship is sub-
ject to revision today. But even more important is understanding the context of the pro-
duction of “narratives” of genocide. When victim group members understand their
relationship with the perpetrator group as a tension between two discrete, deﬁned
groups, they could well be expressing a kind of reactive prejudice that excludes compli-
cated members of their own group and progressive members of the perpetrator group.
But they are more likely—or at least also—capturing the concrete material reality of the
relationship, beyond rhetorical complexiﬁcations and effectively negligible countercur-
rents. For the result of genocide is an extreme domination relation between the perpe-
trator group and the victim group, both in terms of a maximized territorial, ﬁnancial,
political, and military disparity and of identity security, psychological and medical well-
being, familial structures, cultural vibrancy or even survival, and so on. These are cen-
tral to the lives of people in both groups even generations after a genocide. What is
more, extensive progressive rhetoric among members of the perpetrator group has no
effect against—indeed, can even buttress—the persisting devastating material and psy-
chosocial impacts of a genocide, which not only render the typical victim group politi-
cally, economically, militarily, culturally, and socially marginal in the very long term
but often worsen over time as the necessary social structures and institutions to support
even group maintenance have been either devastatingly degraded or eliminated alto-
gether through genocide and its aftermath. In the absence of substantial sacriﬁces on
the part of the perpetrator group to mitigate these impacts to at least the extent neces-
sary to stop further erosion and support the long-term viability of the victim group, re-
ductive narratives of this relationship and history capture its actual reality in terms of
the concrete effects of destruction. The complexities of both groups and countercurrents
in each (for instance, prejudicial attitudes against the perpetrator group by victim group
members) have negligible effects relative to the overall process of group destruction.
While it might be true that what is labeled a cohesive “genocide” can be seen as a tem-
porally and spatially extended multiplicity of acts that might or might not have been or-
ganized around intent from the early stages and whose agents might or might not have
shared the same goals, intent is usually clear in the acts and even statements of key par-
ticipants, and the complexities do not prevent the multiplicity of acts from having a rel-
atively uniform and linear effect on the victim group.
A common mathematical notion might help to illustrate this point. A complex of
forces might include very many individual forces pushing in all different directions with
different magnitudes, but if the multitude of vectors resolve into a vector sum—that is,
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a single vector—of sufﬁcient magnitude and pushing in the direction against victim
group survival, then it is legitimate to write of a single genocidal process uniﬁed in its
effects. The vector sum analogy is reductive in that it assumes that there is a clear set of
individual vectors with single directions and magnitudes that are quantiﬁable, while in
the case of a genocide component individual agents, acts, and statements are often com-
plex in their motives and implications, so that it would be more accurate to refer to vec-
tor sums of vector sums, with perhaps even these components being complex and so
forth. But the general model is sufﬁcient to convey that claims that uniﬁed narratives of
particular genocides are inherently inaccurate apply only to a simpliﬁed “straw man” nar-
rative such that a relatively consistent effect is produced by data that tend all in the same
direction—that is, a perpetrator group whose identical words and acts ﬂow in exactly the
same direction, uniformly against victims, without any countercurrents or complexity.
The shift toward the complex in genocide studies reﬂects perhaps a postmodern
turn, away from Ockham’s razor. Once one dispenses with the correspondence theory
of truth—that there are simple facts in the world and, when one has contending ac-
counts of some aspect of the world, which is true can be determined by determining
which of the accounts corresponds accurately to the facts of the world—appeal is typi-
cally made to Ockham’s razor, which is the view that among competing theories of the
same data, all other things being equal, the simplest explanation is the best, that is,
“true.” We now seem to be in an era in which it is assumed that a simple explanation
is inherently wrong and the truth is always complex, so a more complex explanation is
always better than a simple one, even if it is not perfect. But there is nothing about com-
plexity or simplicity that necessarily links either to truth; the truth can be complex or
simple, and complex and simple theories can both be false. While this might seem to
draw us back into a correspondence theory of truth, that is not the case: proponents of
neither simplicity nor complexity can make a positive case for their view, regardless of
the (independent) criterion of veracity used. The automatic valuing of “complexity” is
perhaps more a reﬂection of the cultural domination of accumulative (typically capital-
ist) economics that more is better—in this case, more elements in an explanation—than
it is the reﬂection of genuine epistemic inquiry.
It is also worth pointing out the resonances of the memory politics approach to
post-genocide contexts with some of the more subtle and progressive denialist ap-
proaches to mass human rights violations including genocides. Consider Chizuko
Ueno’s rejection of Yoshiaki Yoshimi’s documentary evidence of Japanese governmen-
tal organization of the “comfort women” system on the grounds that there is “no single,
objective historical truth”16 about a given matter and her view that former soldiers’ mis-
representations of the treatment of comfort women are just as valid as any survivor’s
own testimony about what she actually experienced. This relativistic approach to com-
peting narratives not only rejects obvious tools of critical analysis, such as the triangula-
tion of multiple historical sources, but it also evidences a kind of vulgar postmodernism
that contradicts the actual work of ﬁgures such as Derrida, who publically recognized
the truth of the Armenian Genocide despite denialist narratives posing an alternative;
Foucault, who recognized that brute facts of reality exist; and Lyotard, well-known for
his engagement with Holocaust denial. While Ueno’s work might be explained to result
from simple naïveté and intellectual inadequacy, a more disturbing resonance is to the
work of Norman Itzkowitz, who has consistently denied that the fate of Armenians17
under the Ottoman Empire was genocide. A decade ago I published a critique of
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Itzkowitz’s historical method,18 which Itzkowitz had developed with Vamik Volkan.
The method depended on the claim that all groups have “chosen traumas” that condi-
tion how they view their own histories and other groups around them. As long as
groups focus on these past traumas, they cannot live in the present and rework their re-
lations with other groups in a positive way. Thus, today both Armenians and Turks
emphasize their historical traumas in narratives that portray members of the other
group negatively as “others”19 and fuel ethnocentric nationalisms. Both groups should
give up attachment to their traumas. Of course, this approach equates denialist falsiﬁ-
cation, however sincerely believed, with a reasonably accurate historical account and
asks the victim group to give up its accurate version of history while the perpetrator
group is to give up its falsiﬁcation, with the result that the falsiﬁcation actually wins out
because the accurate representation of history is set aside or suspended. The central
concern in the article was that the framework adopted by Itzkowitz, which is clearly his-
torically relativist in an untenable way, would have popular appeal because it appears—
as so much in the repertoire of deniers—to instantiate tried and true methods of critical
thinking, in this case suspicion of all historical narratives in light of contemporary poli-
tics. Were the model adopted broadly in academia, victim groups would have to accept
victimization in terms of giving up pressure toward perpetrator responsibility and even
giving up the ability to have the proper characterization of their experiences accepted
and disseminated as the truth. To the extent that the current trend of memory politics
discourse in genocide studies and elsewhere reﬂects this kind of methodology, the
feared trend discussed in the article a decade ago has materialized.
Itzkowitz’s work also anticipates another trend, the muddled use and overuse of
the term “trauma.” In genocide studies, conﬂict resolution and peace studies, and
related disciplines, “trauma” has come to be used incessantly to mean any subjectively
bad feeling with either a past or an external cause. But trauma has a precise clinical
meaning. It is an extreme psychological state characterized by such things as ﬁxation on
past events, hypervigiliance, and many other symptoms induced by the experience of
severe violence, related victimization (such as childhood sexual molestation), or loss. In
this sense, “trauma” is not a feeling but the normal or expectable psychological register
of extreme material harms. To say a genocide perpetrator group, such as “Turks,” has a
historical trauma deriving from the loss of empire is either nonsensical or changes the
meaning of trauma to mean something like “any subjective bad feeling resulting from
any historical change,” in this case the change being a reduction in status from dramatic
imperial domination of subject peoples to a more equal status. Yet, this kind of misap-
plication of the term is still afforded the psychological seriousness of genuine trauma.
Thus, the faux trauma of the Turkish loss of empire (no one is entitled to an empire in
the ﬁrst place) is still seen to give contemporary Turks the status of victims who have
been deeply harmed by history and whose psychological well-being is in danger and
must be supported by care in reference to history, for instance, by not mentioning a
genocide of Armenians. This article is not meant to be a sequence of prescriptions, but
if there is one which it will make, it is that genocide scholars begin using “trauma” in a
technically careful and precise manner, rather than loosely and vaguely. While not to
my knowledge treated as the foundation of contemporary concepts of trauma, Bergson’s
detailed and precisely technical distinction between “memory image” and “pure mem-
ory”—the latter is a return through memory to the brain and physical states experienced
at the moment when a memory was formed, while the former is merely a non-affective
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recall of the information contained in a given memory—could be very helpful in this
regard.20 For Bergson, there are different forms of memory with very different kinds of
functions, impacts, and epistemic statuses, a concept obscured in all too many discus-
sions of “memory politics” and “trauma.”
This criticism of the way “trauma” is often used might appear to be an attempt to
regulate the discourse of genocide studies (and related areas). That is not the intent. On
the contrary, a growing problem for genocide studies as a meaningful intellectual
endeavor, and not a mere academic path, is its increasing institutionalization, that is,
its organization into relatively settled, predictable academic methods and entities. Of
course the growth in Holocaust, Holocaust and genocide, and genocide studies centers,
courses, academic positions, and the like has beneﬁts, not the least of which is to ensure
wider and consistent attention to genocide driven by the dissemination of serious aca-
demic scholarship on it. But institutionalization also has its negative implications, as a
once dynamic, cutting-edge challenge to received ideas and academic structures be-
comes staid and self-regulated. Academic institutionalization proceeds not simply by
entrenching a discipline within university programs, permanent ﬁxed funding, and
so on, but also through a transformation of the positioning of the research, teaching,
and service done and its originality. Even “original” work, which might be quite creative
and occur in great volume, is captured within an institutionalized structure that orga-
nizes it in line with academic career trajectories much less than social and political
change. Early scholars of genocide were in fact not scholars of genocide. They were legal
scholars, philosophers, psychologists, historians, political scientists, anthropologists,
sociologists, literary critics, art historians, economists, and others who took systematic
mass violence as their object. Precisely because they had not cohered into a group with
a deﬁned identity through time, they made an effort at cross-fertilization that continu-
ally yielded fresh fruit. Typically as outliers in their home disciplines and without an
academic identity group besides, they were positioned persistently to challenge disci-
plinary limitations through genuine attempts to develop theories and analyses of geno-
cide and genocides. Each work of genocide scholarship required a positive effort to
reassert the topic of study as legitimate.
After decades, we have passed through a balanced period of semi-outsider/semi-
insider status—probably the 1990s and into the early 2000s—and now inhabit a space
in which the discipline has a more and more deﬁned identity (disputed to be sure) as
well as clear associated academic positions, journals, conferences, and centers. New
scholars of genocide do not create their own space but actually ﬁt themselves into
already established specializations and career tracks, graduate programs and professo-
rial chairs, and scholarly schools or traditions. Scholarship becomes less a matter of gen-
erating new ideas and more a matter of taking sides along pre-given fault lines, in line
with previously articulated positions, and mining research outside of genocide studies
for useful ideas that can be applied to genocide. Funders, governments, and university
administrators and faculty mold scholars through the manner in which they set up the
various pathways for genocide scholars into and through academia, even as budding
genocide scholars mold themselves (as they are trained to do in home disciplines). Even
disciplinary boundaries and methods are imposed on and become generative of geno-
cide studies (for instance, when a scholar decides to take a “public health” or a “philoso-
phical” approach to genocide).21 While there is nothing wrong with using the tools
available in a given discipline to understand genocide—on the contrary, genocide
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studies greatly beneﬁts from the wide range of disciplines represented in it—when the
disciplinal commitments become primary such that the discipline takes genocide as its
object (because it is in vogue or for some other such consideration), the result is an
articulation of the disciplinary bounds of an area of study and not insight into genocide.
Genocide understood through such a framework becomes a construct. Only when
scholarship is object-driven, such that all uses of disciplinary methods are checked
against the demands of the object itself, is the object itself captured well through the
methods. What is more, confrontation of an object that resists capture by existing
disciplinal concepts and through existing methods is an important occasion that can
spur advances in the discipline itself, but institutionalization tends to prevent this as
comfortable traditions are merely extended and the object ﬂattened into submission.
Such a challenge that has yet to occur (but should) in my own ﬁeld of philosophy, for
instance, is a re-evaluation of classic critical thinking methods, evidentiary standards,
and truth concepts as well as the development of new ones that can handle the deep
epistemological crisis produced by prevalent genocide denial. This is particularly urgent
because deniers typically warp the received methods—such as Descartes’s method of
critical doubting and Hume’s critique of causal inference—to subvert truth rather than
achieve it.
While the security that goes with institutionalization has beneﬁts, in the end it
threatens to obscure the point of genocide studies as the discipline becomes merely an
academic specialization no different from the study of early modern Indian Ocean com-
merce, eighteenth-century German literature, or the mating habits of fruit ﬂies. The dis-
paragement of activist scholars (read: those doing scholarly research who do not ﬁt into
neat, traditional academic roles) shows just how far the institutionalization process has
gone and just how little time might be left for meaningful contributions from the disci-
pline. The pressure toward institutionalization and its eventual undercutting of a true
intellectual movement as it becomes an academic discipline is perhaps inevitable, but it
can be recognized, resisted, and slowed (a second prescription).
One sign of resilience of the genuine movement is that there are still frequent prin-
cipled debates about core issues, such as freedom of speech and denial, that have much
more than academic implications. But at the same time there appears to be more and
more maneuvering within and among organizations, journals, and so forth focused on
the development of power bases and the imposition of speciﬁc agendas and ideologies
(and even some founding ﬁgures seem to participate in this). While the discipline is un-
doubtedly more vital than many others in academia, it increasingly resembles other dis-
ciplines as academic power dynamics under rhetorical cover play out as putative
academic debates. Another sign of health is the work of ﬁgures such as Herb Hirsch
and Alex Alvarez, who are questioning whether in the future we need to dramatically
rethink our comfortable notions of how group destruction occurs, for instance, by re-
cognizing the genocidal impact of climate change that could displace in importance ear-
lier forms of genocide through military action.22
A similar trend, spear-headed by ﬁgures such as A. Dirk Moses, is to push the
boundary of genocide into the traditional sphere of postcolonial theory, as discussed
above. While denials of genocides of indigenous peoples in North and South America,
Australia, and elsewhere are nothing new, the new application of post-colonial theory
is important in responding to denial through structural analyses that identify features
of colonialism and/or imperialism that tend toward genocide. This follows Ward
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Churchill’s analysis of such factors as disease and starvation as apparently unintended
consequences of contact between Europeans and indigenous Americans that lead to
the dramatic demographic collapse of the latter. Churchill exposes the intent behind
policies that, for instance, created conditions under which disease became rampant
among indigenous populations.23 It is possible to extend Churchill’s approach through
an additional logical point that does not appear ever to be addressed by those who claim
there was no genocide of indigenous Americans. Medieval and early modern European
history is ﬁlled with disease epidemics with devastating demographic effects. If contact
between Europeans and indigenous Americans had not been genocidal but the mere
product of the passage of unfamiliar pathogens from one group to the other—without
compounding, intended reductions of the resilience of one of the populations in ques-
tion—then one would expect the pathways of pathogens to have run in both directions
somewhat equally. But, where were the matching European epidemics, at least among
settlers in the Americas? Why were these not transferred back to European populations
through the return of voyagers?24 The obvious answer is that the trajectory of disease was
not a function merely of the random exchange of pathogens, but occurred, as Churchill
argues, in a context of direct biological warfare and/or the weakening of indigenous
populations through other means, such as imposed starvation, food-source destruction,
physical destruction, psychological trauma and family destruction, and so forth.
There have been other interesting recent developments around the issue of denial,
for which genocide scholars deserve a signiﬁcant amount of credit. One example is
denial of the Armenian Genocide.25 Through their efforts as well as those of advocacy
organizations, academic denial of the Armenian Genocide is less and less prevalent and
tenable. Indeed, in recent years, those who claim that no Armenian Genocide occurred
have moved more and more from academic debate to legal suits to gain legitimacy for
their views. These include the lawsuit to force the inclusion of denialist sources on the
recommended resource list for public school genocide education in Massachusetts and
the suit against the University of Minnesota for its Holocaust and Genocide Studies
Center identifying sources as “unreliable” that reject the veracity of the Armenian
Genocide.26 This tactic is telling in two ways. First, it is evidence of just how marginal
denial has become in academia. Second, it shows that those who claim that no Arme-
nian Genocide occurred have taken the issue out of academia and placed it into the
legal sphere. This is interesting in light of how often Armenian groups are criticized for
“politicizing” the issue and not leaving history to historians. Of course, there is a speciﬁc
danger here: the legalistic approach can function to intimidate into retreat those who
would stand up against denial. Whether this intimidation succeeds in the long run or
not will depend in part on the commitment of genocide scholars. The broader danger is
that this tactic will be used again and again in the future against genocide scholars
whose scholarship refutes denials of or establishes the truth of other genocides, such as
the Nanjing Massacre, the Guatemala Genocide, and many others.
An apparent advance also occurred starting in the early 1990s through the intersec-
tion of feminist theory, particularly around violence against women, and genocide stu-
dies. Initial work such as Alexandra Stiglmayer’s edited volume Mass Rape: The War
against Women in Bosnia-Herzegovina27 was groundbreaking on a number of levels.
Such work brought together the extensive literature on sexual assault and other violence
against women, pornography, and related issues; the literature on militarization and
violence against women; and nascent understandings of the roles of rape in genocide.
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The recognition that sexual violence against women and girls has been and remains
rampant in military conﬂict as well as one-sided mass violence; that it has deep effects
on the direct victims that undermine their ability to function in the future; that the ef-
fects on direct victims reverberate throughout their communities, for instance, by creat-
ing an impetus to leave the home territory with the result of dispersion and destruction
of group identity which affects many more people in ways that the direct murder of a
portion of the group probably could not; and so on was an important advance in the
conceptualization of genocide and mass violence against women.
Other considerations can be added. First, sexism within victim communities that
produces a problematic treatment of rape survivors or tension over rapes can contribute
to group dissolution by means other than killing. Thus, because of a double layer of
sexism, sexual assault becomes an effective alternative, especially because direct killing
is much more likely to trigger outside condemnation and intervention while rape is so
tolerated in the day-to-day existence of most societies that even mass rape evokes at
best minor responses.28 Whereas murders become unifying rallying points for commu-
nities, condemned cohesively by members, rape often fragments a community along
various lines. Second, rape can be inﬂicted on a victim again and again and again. It is
deeply harmful physically and psychologically, but if the rapist(s) choose(s) it preserves
the victim for further harm. Once a person is killed, short of corpse mutilation (often
done in a sexualized manner), there is no further harm that can be inﬂicted. The excess
of violence that is typical of genocide seems to call for more than direct killing alone
can satisfy. This is, presumably, the reason gratuitous torture is so prevalent alongside
rape.
By the 2000s, however, the connection between genocide and mass violence against
women had been displaced by use of the term “gendercide,” originally coined by Mary
Anne Warren as a gender-neutral term denoting sex-selective extermination.29 Thus,
gendercide refers to the Srebrenica massacre of thousands of Bosnian Muslim men and
boys as much as it applies, for instance, to the rape of Tutsi women by HIV-infected
perpetrators in the Rwanda Genocide. The gender neutrality of the term, as opposed
to previous terms such as “femicide,” is seen as important because male segments of po-
pulations are sometimes killed outright and in a short period and, in some cases, adult
females appear to have survived at a higher rate than adult males from the victim
group,30 which would suggest that in at least some genocides on average men have it
somewhat worse than women.
Against the uniform approach typical of earlier scholarship on the Holocaust and, to
an extent, other genocides, for scholarly understanding as well as prevention and post-
genocide support, there is a value in recognizing that perpetrators often treat and use
different methods for different segments of victim populations, and the latter often
experience the genocidal process differently. The tool of gendercide allows a more
nuanced, precise, and complex analysis of individual genocides and genocide generally.
While the approach adds complexity in one dimension, however, it obscures other facts
of genocide and is reductive in another. It approaches gender difference in a mechanis-
tic and quantitative sense, focusing on the bare outcomes and not on the deep causal
factors of contextual forces and structures. It is true that in some cases men are killed
en masse and women more selectively, but that does not mean that the motivation for
this is a desire to attack men simply because they are men. The hundreds of thousands
of Armenian soldiers killed by the Young Turk regime at the beginning of the
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Armenian Genocide and the thousands of Bosnian Muslim men and boys killed at Sreb-
renica were not killed because the perpetrators acted out of prejudice against men.31
They were killed because they were Armenian or Bosnian Muslim men and their group
in general was targeted. The gender differentiation was instrumental: in order to weaken
the target group for fuller destruction or destructive dispersal, potential military resis-
tance was eliminated. Indeed, these segments of the population were killed due to a sex-
ist hierarchy of men over women, in which men, but not women, were considered
inherently powerful and capable of military opposition, and socialized to be so. That in
these instances sexism was detrimental to some men does not mean that it was not en-
acted by other, more powerful men—that is, the genocide perpetrators. The neutralist
gendercide approach confuses correlations with gender—for instance, in a given case,
men are disproportionately killed—with causation by gender—that these men are killed
because the perpetrators want to kill men simply because of their maleness.
When women are raped (and often killed afterward), sexually enslaved, or sub-
jected to other gender-speciﬁc violence in the context of genocide, it is true that the tar-
geted women are targeted because of their ethnic, religious, national, racial, or some
other group identity. It is also true that, for instance, in the former Yugoslavia Serbian
forces used rape intentionally as a means to accomplish destruction of a targeted ethno-
religious group. But these factors do not exhaust the causal forces driving the use of
rape. For instance, as Matthias Bjørnlund has argued, the massive sexual violence per-
petrated against Armenian women and girls during deportations resulted from the
removal of usual constraints on men’s sexual aggression against women and girls and
the effective creation of zones in which they had complete freedom to act on their
misogynist attitudes and desires.32 It should go without saying that this does not mean
that men have natural sexual energy that they need to discharge and will do so when
given any opportunity or will do so through rape if other avenues for discharge are
blocked. Such a naturalistic rationalization of rape and exoneration of men who practice
it is not only insulting to men but deeply problematic in that it normalizes rape and
shields it from moral evaluation. On the contrary, men rape in such contexts for a vari-
ety of reasons that are all socially derived, from the socially constructed view of women
as inferior objects to peer pressure or military orders. Underlying all of these reasons is
a fundamental but socially constructed hierarchy in which the domination of women is
normalized and linked to pleasure. In other words, what produces rape is not the drive
for sexual pleasure but rather the fact that violence has become sexual, that organic sex-
ual pleasure for rapists has been replaced by “domination as pleasure,” and that sexual
gratiﬁcation comes with domination rather than mutual sexual interaction. This ex-
plains why men who rape typically have ready access to sex by other means but choose
to rape despite this.33
The upshot of this is that, to understand why women are treated as they are in
genocide, one must include analysis of overarching or external systems of gender domi-
nation, which is a key aspect of the structural context in which genocide always takes
place. Genocidal forms and activities are at least to an extent, and certainly in this
dimension, culturally determined. Women and girls were raped because they were Chi-
nese (Nanjing Massacre), Bengali (Bangladesh Genocide), and so forth, but also because
they were female. Being female is a primary, not an instrumental or indirect, reason for
violent treatment. In genocide, men are never victims as men but women are typically
victims both as part of their identity groups and as women. In this regard, it is helpful
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to understand that, in a context of inequality, equal treatment of all people in a neutral
manner regarding their differences actually reinforces or leaves in place the domination
of one group by the other. Treating gender neutrally, that is, discounting the context of
universal—if culturally variable in particulars—sexist hierarchy in which all acts of
genocide occur, actually functions to obscure the real nature of the treatment of women
and girls. While this is presumably not the intention of the advocates of the gendercide
model, the approach resonates with the anti-feminist backlash movement that emerged
in the 1980s and 1990s in the United States and its demand for equal attention to
“men’s victimization.”34
There is one important caveat to these critical points. As in the Holocaust, gay and
bisexual men and transgendered individuals are frequent targets of deep oppression.
Indeed, in the contemporary world, anti-gay/lesbian/bisexual/transgendered (GLBT)
prejudice is expressed in a variety of forms, including formally discriminatory and even
punitive laws that give ofﬁcial sanctions to the prejudices. This is largely tolerated despite
the probability that if the same types of laws targeted people based on race, gender, or
religion they would trigger massive global outcries. While anti-GLBT oppression and
violence in the context of genocide or otherwise can be seen as oppression along sexual-
ity lines, because of the deep intertwining of gender norms and sexuality35 when gay or
bisexual men or transgendered individuals are targeted it should also be recognized as
oppression of a segment of men based on exclusionary norms of gender identity, in the
same way that the targeting of lesbian and bisexual women and transgendered indivi-
duals should be recognized in part as a function of sexism. Such men are targeted pre-
cisely because they violate the gender norms that are one of the foundations of the sexist
hierarchy, and they are targeted primarily by men embracing that hierarchy.
The foregoing line of argument suggests an important insight into the relationship
of genocide and violence against women. While the recognition of “rape as a tool of
genocide” marks an important advance in the understanding of genocide and rape, this
shift has not gone far enough. We must also recognize that genocide can be a tool of
rape, at least for some perpetrators. It is not just that genocide frees (socially con-
structed) male sexual aggression or that it systematizes and organizes it instrumentally,
but that male sexual aggression can motivate participation in and the destructiveness of
genocide. It could even be a general motivating factor for genocide. Was rape central to
Serbian aggression because the desire to rape was one of the constitutive causes of that
aggression? In any event, it is clear that in case after case the opportunity to rape is a
motivating factor for many participants. This is especially true when what could have
been relatively restrained military deployments or conquests become hyperviolent de-
structions, as in Bangladesh. In such cases, the escalatory dynamic might have been
driven in part by an increasing desire to rape on the ground and reﬂected in the atti-
tudes of and condoned by those in power. At the very least, if some genocide perpetra-
tors are motivated to participate by the possibility of raping, then in these contexts
genocide is a tool of rape as much as rape is a tool of genocide.36 The complex ways in
which masculinity is constructed through militarism and the high incidence of sexual
violence within military violence conﬁrm that young soldiers’ sexualities are in part
constructed along lines of “hypermasculinity” and sexist power over women, and the
assertion of this masculinity becomes an end in itself.37
There is another side to this as well. Despite recent work on female participants in
genocide, the vast majority of high-level perpetrators as well as ground-level killers,
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rapists, and so forth are male as propaganda and ruling myths are masculinist when
gendered. This suggests that masculinity has a role in perpetration, which a neutralist
approach to gender elides. When men are targeted as potential military threats, they are
treated as male rivals in a dynamic of machismo aimed at establishing the supremacy—
that is, super-masculinity—of the dominant group. Even male rape can be seen as a
function of patriarchal domination of women, conﬁrming the above analysis. It is typi-
cally perpetrated by men and functions to “feminize” the victims, that is, to lower their
status to that of women and girls. This is not to say that victim men choose to engage in
or act as participants in this kind of macho contest; on the contrary, they often operate
in ways that accept violence in the hope of sparing their families, which might be mas-
culinist but at the same time is altruistic within the patriarchal framework typical of
most societies historically and now. Within the typical gender hierarchy that exists in
real terms in most if not all societies (both perpetrator and victim societies), prior to
genocide the gender of women and girls already makes them ﬁt targets of violence.
Domestic violence has long been tolerated and encouraged in most societies and,
despite apparent progress in “advanced” countries, it remains common to the point of
prevalence in them as much as anywhere else. Rape is too often a rite of passage among
various groups, from sports teams and fraternities to gangs and military units. When
genocide begins, when the killers look for their targets, race or ethnicity is selected as
the key criterion, but grafted onto it almost inevitably is the relish of making women
and girls suffer through rape and other violence, enslavement, and more.
It is very important to stress that, even though the vast majority of perpetrators are
men, the foregoing points of critique are not meant in any way to suggest that women
suffer “more” than men in genocide—how could this be measured?—or to discount sex-
ual violence against men, who need and deserve the same level of care, sympathy, and
support as other victims of sexual violence. Rather, it is to point out that men’s suffering
in genocide is not a result of an anti-male agenda or prejudice, while women’s suffering
typically involves a layering of different causal forces that include male domination and
misogyny. There is nothing in recognizing a truly existing gender hierarchy and its im-
plications for genocide that requires or produces an inaccurate discounting of the actual
suffering of men. To say that some part of women’s suffering has a different genesis
from that of men is not to say that male victims are not victims or suffer less horriﬁcally
in genocide. But it does say something about who perpetrators tend to be, why they
perpetrate genocide, and why they do so in particular ways.
The recognition of the speciﬁc relationship between male domination and genocide
is crucial for insight into the causes of the latter. If the analysis of that relationship
in this article is correct, then pre-existing structures of gender hierarchy often contrib-
ute to the genocidal process. Indeed, rape, domestic violence, and other forms are pre-
existing vectors of violence that are widely and extensively tapped in the commission of
genocide. This pre-existing vector of violence is a signiﬁcant enabling factor of geno-
cide. A challenge to the prevailing socialization of men and boys toward gender hierar-
chy, and more speciﬁc challenges to the role of violence against women in popular and
pornographic culture, can help prevent genocides.38
A long-standing truism of genocide studies is that dehumanization is a necessary
precursor. While dehumanization does occur in genocidal processes, the claim that it is
an essential or typical causal factor is not necessarily true. Dehumanization is often the
endpoint of the process,39 not its cause or the condition that allows it to occur. While
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space constraints preclude a consideration of detailed evidence, it is apparent that
in many cases the genocidal process has depended on the recognition of the humanity
of the victims. For instance, torture is more pleasurable for the perpetrator the more
complex the mind of the victim—that is, the degree to which he or she can register mul-
tifaceted pain, dread repetition in the future, and so forth. The pain caused by raping in-
dividuals in front of their family members depends signiﬁcantly on the complex human
emotions experienced by the individual and the family. Similarly, forced choices about
which child to save is an agony for human parents much more than for other animals.
Thus, in many cases, perpetrators’ calculations of pain inﬂiction depend on the recogni-
tion of the human status of victims, in direct contradiction to dehumanization theory. In
place of dehumanization, perpetrators assert their own exceptionality (sometimes super-
humanity, as in the case of Nazi ideology), rendering themselves superior to victims in
the same measure as dehumanization theory.40 The ethical dimension of that exception-
ality is crucial: less than placing a certain group outside “the universe of obligation” as
Helen Fein puts it, perpetrators grant themselves a virulent form of the ethical exception-
ality identiﬁed by Kant in The Groundwork for the Metaphysics of Morals as an ethical
trap, an exceptionality that gives them the right to do whatever they want to whomever
they wish.41 This might help explain why genocide perpetrator groups tend to target
multiple groups at once and/or over time, as in the case of the Nazis, the Young Turks,
the Rwandan Interahamwe, the Khmer Rouge, the ultranationalist Serbs, Stalin’s Soviet
Union, the US, the UK, and so on. What is more, the dehumanization of victims might
in part be a function of the inﬂated sense of superiority that perpetrators feel.
That is not to say that dehumanization theory is entirely wrong. Dehumanization
can be an enabling factor for genocide. What is more, dehumanization theory captures
a key element of genocide: the power or status differential between perpetrator and vic-
tim groups. The power differential is necessary to genocide, either as a beginning condi-
tion or sought outcome, but that differential might include any combination of victim
and perpetrator group statuses so long as the perpetrators are dominant.
Many genocide scholars are so wedded to dehumanization theory, in my opinion,
because of its ethical implications. Dehumanization theory explains genocide without
attributing to perpetrators some primitive form of “evil,” which is positive, but also
without recognizing that human beings are perfectly capable, often for petty reasons, of
wittingly and intentionally inﬂicting serious harm on other human beings, which is a
problem. Rampant domestic violence globally shows just how much intentional vio-
lence against other human beings—intimate partners or children—is present in our
day-to-day lives. It should be no surprise that these violent tendencies can be mobilized
easily for other purposes as well. If so many can abuse their own family members, even
to the extreme of sexual abuse or murder, how much easier is it to do violence to others,
especially strangers? Dehumanization theory is actually a modern form of the Socratic/
Platonic view that wrong acts or harms are always done out of ignorance, never inten-
tionally. That is, harm is a mistake, not an intended outcome. This old account of
wrongdoing is comforting but naïve and not well-grounded. Indeed, it is advanced
through some of Plato’s weaker arguments, depending on equivocations, for instance,
in the Meno. Over-reliance on dehumanization is an impediment to understanding why
genocides occur and thus how to prevent them, in addition to allowing perpetrators,
particularly mid- and lower-level ones, off the hook ethically to too great an extent.
This is not to suggest that ignorance, manipulation, and so forth do not have roles
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especially for lower-level perpetrators, but that there is no simple either/or dichotomy
regarding perpetrator responsibility for acts of genocide. Perpetrators must be evaluated
on a continuum from full agency to coerced participation.
There are other totalizing tendencies among recent theories of genocide, including
claims that all genocide is counterinsurgency42 and that (modern) genocide is a func-
tion of the nation-state system.43 While these and other similar theories are complex,
nuanced, and tremendously fruitful as studies of genocide—in part because they bring
into focus important elements of at least some genocides which are not always recog-
nized or emphasized—any totalizing theory of genocide by its nature will require Ptole-
maic stretches to cover a full range of cases. Genocides vary greatly in context, goals,
causes, impacts, type of victim group, and other factors and simply cannot be reduced
to a single explanation. For instance, the notion that genocide is colonialism is very
important in drawing attention to the great extent of colonial genocide across the globe,
especially over the past 520 years, and in highlighting features of genocides that are not
typically understood through this framework. But the approach also constrains the ana-
lysis of cases that do not ﬁt it perfectly. Colonialism is one kind of domination relation,
but there are others and these can also be main or partial factors in genocide. A focus
on power relations that could be colonialist, gendered, or national, among others, is the
key to recognizing the various forms of genocide and the ways in which the phenome-
non occurs in different contexts.
Totalizing theories also tend to reduce genocide to another, putatively more foun-
dational, oppressive force, such as imperialism, capitalism, authoritarianism, national-
ism, militarism, racism, or even mental illness. The question is, Why such a reduction?
Given the prevalence of genocide across political and economic systems and throughout
human history, in a manner similar to sexism, why should it not be seen as an elemental
form of oppression? Why is the impetus to group destruction any less primary than the
differential treatment of people based on religion or ethnicity? It is true that genocide
might be committed as part of a broader process of colonization or slavery, but slavery,
for instance, is also a typical element in genocide. Such forms of oppression all have
explanatory value and in practice often overlap or interact. Rather than a reduction of
some to others or one, it would appear more fruitful to examine the complex ways in
which these forces intermingle in different instances of violence and oppression.
There is a danger in reducing genocide to other social forces or oppressions. We
might come to believe that if we eliminate the other force or oppression, we will elimi-
nate genocide. But genocide has persisted throughout dramatic historical changes; for
instance, simply doing away with nation-states is unlikely to change that. We might see
new forms of genocide appropriate to the features of a new historical era, but genocide
will likely persist unless it is directly addressed.44
At the same time, genocide’s intertwining with other forms of oppression and
oppressive structures, including colonialism, imperialism, racism, chauvinist national-
ism, sexism, slavery, apartheid, religious intolerance, anti-Semitism, and homophobia,
has important implications for prevention. Much attention has been given to both inter-
vention and early warning. The problem with intervention, especially military, is that it
either comes too late to stop much of the impact or it introduces new power dynamics,
oppressions, and human rights violations even as it puts an end to the old ones. Early
warning is seen as an alternative, allowing steps way in advance of a potential genocide
so that disruptive intervention is not necessary.45 But this focus on early warning is
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problematic in two ways. First, early warning is not particularly difﬁcult to achieve, nor
is its failure what has allowed genocide to occur in recent years. The “world commu-
nity” had plenty of warning about the Rwandan Genocide, while it stood by for years as
genocide unfolded in both Bosnia and Sudan. Of course, there are those who would dis-
pute the characterization of both of these latter cases as genocide, but that is not the
real reason that they were treated with indifference; even if they are taken as mass
human rights violations, based on commonly accepted human rights principles, they
clearly should have been stopped in a timely manner.
But these failures were not contingent absences of “political will,” either, which
brings us to the second problem. Genocide is not a surface phenomenon inconsonant
with the broader social, political, economic, and cultural forces shaping our reality. It is,
on the contrary, deeply embedded within them as a constitutive element. The world we
inhabit has been shaped by genocide in conjunction with the other oppressive forces
and structures listed above. Genocide has become normalized as a frequent violation of
our stated standards of behavior that is tolerated if not condoned because it is part of
the very historical development of our world.46 States such as the United States, Turkey,
and Australia exist in their present form or at all through genocide. The problem of
genocide is deep and foundational, and extirpating it requires a substantial reworking of
our present reality. This is the fact that is avoided in discussions of early warning, inter-
vention, and prevention.
Clearly there is resistance to recognizing the true challenge of the implication of so
much of our world in the problem. Part of the resistance in genocide studies circles re-
ﬂects a general wariness of revolutionary transformation. As Robert Melson especially
has argued,47 some genocides have their origins in revolutionary movements. More gen-
erally, revolution is an extreme political activity, and the history of extreme political
activity that is genocidal counsels that all extreme political activity be engaged in cau-
tiously or avoided. But this fails to distinguish different kinds of radical political trans-
formation and to register that, so long as genocide is part of the current sociopolitical
order, centrist politics reinforce the normalization of genocide. Given the foundational
centrality of genocide and other oppression to the world today, it would seem that only
radical transformation can address the problem: great problems require substantial
responses, and early warning systems and advocacy organizations fall well below the
threshold.
One mechanism of transformation has already emerged. A decade ago, in most
academic, popular, and political circles, the notion of reparation for genocide and other
mass human rights violations was typically dismissed as fantastic and extreme. But,
since then, a global reparations movement has emerged that connects a range of victim
groups, including a number of genocide victim groups, seeking long-term justice.48 Rep-
aration is often misunderstood as a backward-focused remedy that attempts to return
victims to their pre-genocide state. This is of course impossible, and only a small part of
the great material, social, and cultural harm done by genocide can ever be addressed
after it has occurred, while the human harm is beyond repair. But the true function of
group reparations is a reworking of current conditions to restore the viability of a victim
group against the past genocidal assault. Accomplishing this requires a signiﬁcant shift
in resources and power, which can advance a broader transformation away from geno-
cide. As the impacts of particular genocides are addressed, the world more broadly will
become less a function of genocide and genocide will become less a part of that world.
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Space constraints prevent a full discussion of this line of analysis, but the ﬁeld of geno-
cide studies and its practitioners would seem to be at a crossroads. One path leads
toward surface engagements with genocide for the foreseeable future, while the other
offers opportunities to change the dynamics that produce genocide.
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